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
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
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












THE  
ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*,  
FOR  
THE BEING AND THE ATTRIBUTES  
OF  
THE ABSOLUTE ONE,  
AND THE  
FIRST CAUSE OF ALL THINGS.

BY  
WILLIAM HONYMAN GILLESPIE,  
OF TORBANEHILL, F.R.G.S., ETC. ;  
AUTHOR OF  
"THE NECESSARY EXISTENCE OF GOD,"  
ETC., ETC.

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Fifth Edition.

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LONDON;  
HOULSTON AND SONS,  
65, PATERNOSTER ROW:  
AND ALL BOOKSELLERS.

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MDCCCLXXI.

141. j. 140.



—Ο ΘΕΟΣ ὁ ποιήσας τὸν κόσμον καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ, οὗτος οὐρανοῦ καὶ γῆς Κύριος ὑπάρχων, οὐκ ἐν χειροποιήτοις ναοῖς κατοικεῖ, οὐδὲ ὑπὸ χειρῶν ἀνθρώπων θεραπεύεται προσδεόμενός τινος, αὐτὸς διδούς πᾶσι ζωὴν καὶ πνοὴν καὶ τὰ πάντα· ἐποίησέ τε ἕξ ἐνὸς αἵματος πᾶν ἔθνος ἀνθρώπων, κατοικεῖν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ πρόσωπον τῆς γῆς, ὀρίσας προστεταγμένους καιροὺς καὶ τὰς ὁροθεσίας τῆς κατοικίας αὐτῶν· ζητεῖν ΤΟΝ ΘΕΟΝ, εἰ ἄρα γε ψηλαφήσειαν αὐτὸν καὶ ἔυροιεν, καίτοιγε ΟΥ ΜΑΚΡΑΝ ΑΠΟ ΕΝΟΣ ΕΚΑΣΤΟΥ ΗΜΩΝ ΥΠΑΡΧΟΝΤΑ. ΕΝ ΑΥΤῷ ΓΑΡ ΖΩΜΕΝ ΚΑΙ ΚΙΝΟΥΜΕΘΑ ΚΑΙ ΕΣΜΕΝ· ὥς καὶ τινες τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς ποιητῶν εἰρήκασι·

Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

Γένος οὖν ὑπάρχοντες ΤΟΥ ΘΕΟΥ, οὐκ ὀφείλομεν νομίζειν χρυσοῦ ἢ ἀργύρου ἢ λίθου, χαράγματι τέχνης καὶ ἐνθυμήσεως ἀνθρώπου, ΤΟ ΘΕΙΟΝ εἶναι ὁμοιον. — ST PAUL.

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## PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION.

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THE present is the first complete edition of "The Argument, *à priori*,"—or, the Argument as consisting of Divisions III. and IV., as well as of Divisions I. and II. This is, in other words, the Argument as embodying the whole of the Moral Attributes, from *Goodness* onwards to *Holiness*, the apex of the construction, as well as containing that preceding portion which may be regarded as the immutable foundation and solid basement-story of the whole edifice, however high it may be carried. For true it is, that hitherto the demonstrations for the Moral Attributes (corresponding generally with Divisions III. and IV.) have been procurable only in separate volumes, though the volumes were but small. But to exhibit a brief historical survey of things from the commencement: First of all, there appeared, as the original demonstration, what (barring alterations) is now comprised within the limits of Divisions I. and II. No greater were the dimensions of that first edition of the Argument. After a period of some length, during which the work was, in various ways, much before the public, and much too upon its trial in all respects, the Propositions (relating to the *Happiness* and the *Goodness*) represented by the 1st Sub-Division of Division III., were added, and came out in the Torbanehill edition (1843.) After, again, a much longer interval,

in which events of moment to the fate of the demonstration were proceeding, the Relative Moral Attributes, as corresponding with the 2nd Sub-Division of Division III., were published, in a little volume, by themselves (1865.) Lastly, the Complex or Compound Moral Attributes, comprehended in Division IV., were, in a minute volume, given to the public in the beginning of this year (1870.) Such has been the course of events, and the progress of the demonstration to consolidation and completion.

From its very first appearance, the "Argument" was doomed to meet with opposition of every kind, or from believer and unbeliever alike. But on the present occasion, our view shall be confined within the limits occupied by the Infidel objectors and opponents.

In another quarter,\* it has been my business to record a survey, by epitome, of the operations conducted by the opponents of the atheistical class against the reasonings employed in the demonstration treated of. With a view to the object immediately before us, it will suffice to mention, that the "Argument" had been no long time in existence when it was assailed by an enemy to all Theistical ratiocination, of whom it may be truthfully said, that, on the side of the Atheists, his equal in metaphysical and logical powers, and general grasp of his subject, has not since arisen. Yet even the celebrated "*Antitheos*" (for it is of him I speak) was obliged to lower his ensign, by virtually acknowledging overwhelming defeat at his own weapons. After him, a shoal of small fry sailed, in pursuit, in the wake of the offensive conqueror: but (as was to be expected) the puny efforts

\* *Debate*, referred to below.

availed but little, save only to keep up, and support at a certain elevation, the interest by that time created in the discussion.

For a dozen, or for perhaps a score, of years after *Antitheos's* day, the Atheists of the East, no less than of the West, and of the South as well as the North, tried to find a weak spot in the coat-of-mail endued by the author of the "Argument": but an unprotected joint in the armour became obvious to the eye of no atheist, how keenly soever he might peer. All the scrutiny was in vain. The reader will understand that it is of the "Argument," as it originally stood (or Divisions I. and II.,) that these assertions are made. But the original portion is the essential.

With regard to the succeeding portion, being that corresponding with the 2nd Sub-Division of Division III. (comprised in the publication of 1865;) it has been pronounced, by a not incompetent student, to constitute "a course of severe reasoning, as strict, indeed, as that of Euclid." ("Laws of Thought," 1868.)

In fine, it may safely be prophesied, that, as the Atheists have not hitherto been able to agree as to any one vulnerable point in the whole demonstration; so, they will never be able to lay their fingers on a single place where is any radical fallacy. The atheist being yet to be born, will therefore never be born, who will succeed in discovering the defenceless and indefensible spot.

Should it be objected, that the atheists, until comparatively lately, have had to do only with the early part of the entire ratiocination; the reply to be made lies ready at hand: the portion in question is indubitably the back-bone of the structure, the rest being merely educed elongations of the skeleton, or pure additions to the great axis of the vertebral column. Or if we

sought to be more accurate in the conduct of the comparison,—the first might be represented by the fixed skeleton generally ; the other portion being likened unto the flesh and blood, and all the outward adornments of the structure, as a living organism, in all the glow of high health and beauty.

Finally, in relation to this topic : If, at this time of day, atheistical opponents are less able (if diminution in ability be possible) to *refute* the reasonings of the “ Argument ” than they were at the first ; how impossible, how more than hopeless, now, would be the adventure to overturn the foundations, or any of the essentials, of this demonstrative construction ! The unabashed present Coryphæus of British Atheists has made it to be publicly known and most palpable, that he is even more unable than was his predecessor, the Champion of the Scottish Atheists, to accomplish the feat of overturning the reasonings of that demonstration which bars, and completely obstructs, the Atheistical highway.\*

If the “ Argument ” has, in the Atheists, met with foes from the beginning,—the tables are turned when the “ Argument ” is brought to bear directly against the very head-quarters whence the chief enemies must proceed. All this is but natural, and what might well have been anticipated. A just reckoning is sure to dog the steps of the enemies of truth sooner or later. In a word, this Fifth Edition is specially intended for Atheists, that is, for use against Atheists. But this requires a more particular explanation.

There are contained herein passages which might not have been introduced at all, but for the edition having a direct and express relation to the case of Atheists. For example, we

\* See second note below.

may take the contents of the Postulates, and a not unrelated Scholium, under the Sub-Proposition attached to Proposition IV., Part I., Division I.; or we might instance in the Scholium attached to Proposition I., Part III., of the same Division,—places introduced to meet the methods adopted by certain ardent, yet hard-pushed members of the existing atheistical host. And, on the other hand, there are places where additional matter might have been supplied, but for its utter unfitness for use against aught so crass and coarse as the current Atheism: of which the non-use, on a much more extensive scale, of the doctrine of *Spirituality*, introduced in the Sub-Scholium under the same Fourth Proposition, may be given as a striking example.

But farther. Whereas Dr Samuel Clarke wrote his justly celebrated *Demonstration* “more particularly in answer to Hobbes, Spinoza, and their followers”—with a view, in other words, to special schools of Atheists, or the special phases of Atheism at that era most prevalent; the present production has reference, almost equal reference, to the case of Atheists of another description. In truth, while this production does most emphatically keep sight of the present phases under which Atheism chooses to present itself, it is yet adapted and addressed to the case of every species of possible Atheism. This demonstration is, no doubt, peculiarly applicable to the method of arguing followed by the existing race of Atheists. There is, of course, a common, or, at any rate, a generally adopted road, in which the bulk of the Atheists of our day are to be found—and this demonstration follows them into their frequented high-way. Every instructed man knows, that our present Atheists are pure—or, rather, extremely gross—



Materialists, as they deny the existence of any extension whatever separate from Matter: they, however, add to their pure Materialism a sort of Hylozoism, or doctrine of life appertaining to matter as matter. They hold (somewhat after the fashion of those ancients who belonged to the school of Strato of Lampsacus) the doctrine of the essential life of all Matter: Matter is the genetrix and matrix of all particular or individual things, whether substances or events.

But our demonstration is also, and equally, applicable to the method of Atheists belonging to, and claimable by other schools. It is thoroughly applicable, for example, to the Atheism which (with the doctrine of Democritus and Epicurus, as expounded by Lucretius) admits of vacuum, or pure space, as a distinct ab-original principle in addition to matter, that is, its fundamental atoms, or primordial corpuscles.

Notice must be taken of a certain great difference which obtains between the early and the recent portions of the demonstration. In the original, and, in fact, in the early editions, the Scholia in Divisions I. and II. were brief: while the Scholia of the latter Divisions (we can hardly say, of the later editions) are frequently long, some being very much so. The Scholia, indeed, in Divisions III. and IV. are long, in relation to the attached Demonstrations, as well as compared with the earlier Scholia. One reason is easily given: The earlier Scholia concern the Being whose Existence is in course of being proved; while the later Scholia have much to do with Man and his concerns. In the former case, the simplicity of the Great Being treated of seems to transfer itself into the argumentation about *Him*: In the latter case, which is Man's, the reflection of the

entanglements and the disorderliness of his affairs seems to be diffused and transfused through all the reasonings. The truth about the Being of beings, as He is in Himself, is simple, and capable of being clearly stated in few words. But with Man's entrance on the stage, a complicated and confused state of affairs is superinduced, and, by comparison, a deluge of words (which you may perhaps accept as a modest redundancy of language) becomes necessary, and requires to be excused. Sometimes words pour down upon the reader avalanche-like: nor can the torrent be avoided. The difference, in fine, is inevitable, since it arises from the nature of the case.

We may adopt another method of bringing out the same result, wherein the points of contact with the preceding exhibition will be sufficiently obvious. In Divisions I. and II., the great substratal Substance is viewed—or His Modes are viewed—as Absolute, as well as Simple. But in the subsequent portion of the piece, the Attributes, become Moral, are at length directly Relative, and they come to be, at last, Complex or Compound. Now, 'tis plain, that the elucidation of the subject of Relative and Complex Attributes, can by no means be trajected in so unelaborate a way as that sufficient for the handling of the Simple and Absolute Modes. The very circumstance of the relativity necessitates and enforces a more involved, intricate, and perplexed method of treatment.

Another matter, connected with the same topic, is worthy of even more consideration. In this Argument, the *demonstrations* themselves are the weighty things: all else is, comparatively speaking, quite subordinate and unimportant. If the Demonstrations fail—if, in truth, any one of the main Demonstrations be not infallible, all goes for nothing. If they are all infallible,

all is right. An ordinary Scholium is but an application—some inference or other drawn from the proof itself: and an error in the *application* of a demonstration would by no means invalidate the piece, in the way in which a radical flaw in the *demonstrative* part itself would do.

Pertinent instances might be easily produced to illustrate the position regarding the relative importance of a demonstration and a scholium, when compared with each other, whereby it would be very visible that the whole might remain intact and perfect although the application in the Scholium were allowed to be renounced as invalid,—while, at the same time, to make an acknowledgment of the illegitimacy of the proof in the Demonstration would have the effect of bringing down the entire edifice. The demonstration, as a whole, would fail at that point. Though all going before had been logically proved, and consequently were quite valid, yet at that precise point the demonstration, alas! would give way, and break down. On the other hand, again, if the proof at the place indicated be unassailable, or at any rate indestructible, no mighty harm would ensue although a succeeding scholium should contain an inaccuracy. But the reader can without difficulty look up examples for himself; and it may be taken for granted, that no one can fail to see the superior weight attributable to the Demonstrations over their attached Scholia. A demonstration must be irrefragable: a scholium, however, may be faulty in deducing a certain inference, without at all damaging the connected proof containing the imagined inference sought to be drawn and applied.

'Tis quite true, that all such special questions as are treated of in the long Scholia might have been left out of our consideration altogether. A demonstration, a full and perfect

demonstration, of a God, would remain, in the absence of all such discussions. To be particular: 'Twere quite possible to complete the construction of an *à priori* argument containing a reference to the Moral Attributes, even the whole of the Moral Attributes, without entering upon any discussion of the Rewards and the Punishments of the Future (the subject of our Scholium III., Prop. iii., as well as Scholium III., Proposition iv., both in Division III.) But to give the complete go-by to that topic, or any such topic, were to omit the topic of perhaps the greatest human interest of all in this whole inquiry. To say nothing of never-ending blessedness,—what subject can vie, in true importance, and absorbing interest to man, with the subject of the possible eternity of mortal anguish in insupportable torments? This topic has attached to it, in sooth, the very greatest human interest of all in this whole inquiry. Not, indeed, the inquiry concerning the Being and the Attributes, but that more limited one which concerns the Moral region of the Attributes. Now, an *à priori* argument which omitted topics of the deepest interest would be of too dry a character to invite the attention of the most of mankind. There might be all the essential fixities of the structure: each individual permanent of a perfect skeleton might be present: But, after all, the bones would be dry bones. "Rather the skeleton of an argument"—to use the words of a certain Professor of Moral Philosophy—"than anything entitled to be considered as a full and finished performance."\*

\* The words quoted in the text, are taken from the Review of the *original* "Argument, *à priori*," by the late Professor Patrick C. Macdougall, of the chair of Moral Philosophy in the University of Edinburgh. The Review was published in the Professor's volume of his "Papers on Literary and Philosophical Subjects," 1852.

The following passages are taken from the "Advertisement" prefixed to the publication of 1865, and from the "Preface to Division IV.;" with but few, and unimportant variations. There will be perceived, however, several places which touch on ground traversed already. But the repetition will not be found to be to any considerable extent.

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An attempt to demonstrate, in the strictest way, the Moral Attributes of God—unlike attempts to demonstrate generally the Being and the Attributes—had never been made before, or, if made, had certainly failed, since, of a surety, no *à priori* proof of those attributes is familiar to the world. The attempt was, therefore, a most difficult one.

It is true, that Dr Samuel Clarke, in the 12th and last of the Propositions of his celebrated "Demonstration," endeavours to reach the Moral Attributes: but the great Rector of St James's deals with the "Infinite Goodness, Justice, and Truth, and all other Moral Perfections," in that one Proposition, and, in a great measure, *in cumulo*. The author of the *Demonstration* does not treat these Moral Attributes as I have done, namely, by making each of them, one by one, in a proper order, the subject of a distinct *à priori* proof, in a Proposition devoted to itself. What that famous author did was, therefore, quite different from that which I have now attempted. My attempt was of a vastly more difficult nature.

Besides, Dr Clarke never once essays to introduce such an attribute as *Love*. An attribute Scripturally revealed, and thought to be so peculiarly the deliverance of Revelation that no endeavour had been made to attach it to Natural Religion by any of its modes of proof.

In fact, with reference to, not only *Love*, but *Moral Purity*, a main ingredient and element in *Universal Holiness*,—not one of these Attributes was ever brought into the field of view by that great author in his famous *Demonstration*.

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The preceding observations are—for the most part—from the *Advertisement* already spoken of. The alterations are few,—but there is an addition.

The following, again, is from the *Preface to Division IV*. The reader will perceive, no doubt, that there is some iteration to be encountered. But it is hoped that the offences of this kind will be of a nature easily pardonable, and really deserving to be condoned.

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As is patent, this piece is but a continuation of a previous work; in truth, of previous works. 'Tis also not unentitled to be regarded in the light of *last words*, since, with the demonstration of the cumulative attribute of *Holiness*, a veritable culminating point is attained.

The production of which a portion is now presented to the reader, is not the first attempt at *a priori* argumentation on the peculiar subject, which the world has seen. By no means: there have been many endeavours of the kind. But one thing may be boasted of by the present author, and 'tis this, that, while Dr Samuel Clarke (who possibly was not singular) aimed at demonstrating the Moral Attributes, in, however, a certain brief and agglomerating manner; among those he specified, even in his cursory way, were no such Attributes as "Love," and "Moral Purity," and "Holiness." This production, therefore, is peculiar, inasmuch as it has distinct demonstrations for Moral

b

Attributes which no previous author ever thought, or even dreamed, of proving in a demonstrative manner: while, with regard to other Attributes, there are here full and separate proofs, where before there were only brief allusions, in the course of a general proof, by no means lengthy as a whole. In short, in this our work are to be met with

Things unattempted yet in prose——

This may not be the very best place to magnify the importance of a work of this kind, on supposition that the attempt at irrefragable proof has been successful. Still, it may, not inappositely, be noticed, that our age is unquestionably *infidel*, and even *atheistical*, in tendency. The highest philosophy, and the exactest science, alike, on the one hand, and, on the other, the lowest literature, and the loosest *pseudo* science,—are equally set against any true recognition of a Righteous Moral Governor of the world, the Supreme Source of all human lights, and the Final Cause to which all mundane things must infallibly tend, whether men like or no. Again, the whole of Religion, speculative and practical, rests on the one foundation of Theism; and the sole root-doctrine of Theism is, There is a God. If this doctrine be satisfactorily established, and be firmly settled in men's minds, the solid basis of Religion is laid, and the superstructure may be advanced to completion. But if the doctrine be insecurely made out, or be generally deemed to be so, the interests of Religion at large cannot be on a safe and proper footing, and the ranks of Infidelity may be expected to increase still more rapidly, in accordance with the spirit of the times. The days on which we are fallen are unquestionably evil, and evil they will continue to be, and they will be increasingly evil, unless men can point to some proof which believers shall hail

as a true demonstration of the truth of their faith; while the unbelievers seek in vain to demolish the edifice which, rising step by step, all rests upon a foundation which cannot be shaken—far less, removed, or to the slightest extent displaced.

These remarks apply, or their spirit applies, with double force to a strictly logical proof of the *Moral Attributes*. A Supreme Being such as is imagined by some Deists, is one thing: A Supreme Judge who, executing righteous judgment, will assuredly reward the good, and punish the evil, exactly according to merits and demerits; this is quite a different existence, and one which the immoral man cannot but be most averse to in his inmost heart.

Neither is this the very best place to magnify our demonstration as a relative thing: If our method be good in itself, 'tis perfectly obvious that it is vastly superior to the rival method. To magnify the virtues of a strict deductive proof, by vindicating its vast superiority over the claims of the other plan, even allowing this latter to be all that its patrons can legitimately claim it to be; is not the proper business on this occasion. Nor are we in search of a contrivance by which, if we do not perceive a lawful road, we can at least make a cunning though arduous cutting through the unsuitable and, indeed, intractable middle region. No: the superiority of the one method to the other, is no such occult matter, nor so difficult to understand, that we need to force the topic unseasonably on attention. Suffice it to say at this present, that there is evidently a fast-growing disposition on the part of theologians to desert the mere *à posteriori* way, and come over to the dialectical domain where the *à priori* method is regnant. None



know so well how unfit the *à posteriori* argument is for the exigencies of these days in which we live, as do those who have tried to use the method in encounters with skilled atheists. The atheists, indeed, condemn the method now in view, to the very point of holding it in contempt, as a weapon calculated to affect their position : and, of a truth, the argument derived from the beautiful and majestic works of Nature draws none of its glory from its adaptation to the case of atheists. On the other hand, according to the admissions of the atheists themselves, they have not, up to the present moment, been able to bring forward a single good argument in opposition to "The Argument, *à priori*:" that is, there is no common consent, nor any approach to a common consent, among our atheists as to any one good objection valid against the demonstration in question. So far from any valid objection, of universal acceptance, having been worked out, there is the strongest evidence that no one objection is recognised—save by its own creator, and elaborator, and advocate. Having endeavoured, for more than a score of years, to adduce undoubtedly valid objections against that demonstration, the atheists have, in their latest efforts, gone to loggerheads with each other about which of them has failed most egregiously: Who has done most harm to the common atheistic cause by the ill-directed blows against the impregnable rock-built citadel?—this is the bitter complaint.\*

One thing may be apt to strike the student of the present performance; and, in sooth, it has forcibly struck its author.

\* See the "*Debate*" between *Iconoclast* and W. H. G., (1869), and, specially, the Address prefixed to Division II. thereof.

The conclusions arrived at by virtue of the most rigid and rigorous reasonings, are in wonderfully exact accordance with the intuitional discoveries of the Prophets of the East, made thousands of years ago. The seers of the segregate Hebrew people uttered truths appertaining to the higher planes of the Moral, where the Moral and the Religious are blended together in one, such as no Gentile philosopher, not even a Plato, nor an Aristotle, nor a Zeno, ever found out, or even so much as approached. Whether those surpassing ethical and theistical discoveries were made by reason of a supernatural elevation of the spirit into a sphere transcending the ordinary human sphere, or by reason of more purely human intuitions, in open vision: this is not a point for us, and for this place. Those intuitions were of the grandest nature, however they were come by. But our point is this, that, derive the discoveries of the Israelitish and Jewish Seers from what source you choose to fix on, the discovered truths are mighty facts, and are in astonishingly close conformity with the conclusions reached by our perfectly independent *à priori* reasonings. The truths promulgated by the "prophets old" of that Shemitic people, and the truths attained by so much labour of brain, and cast abroad in the present hour, ARE ONE. *Japhet* can do no better yet than dwell in the abodes of *Shem*: and well will it be, if there be full contentment with an ordinance which there is no passing beyond.

Finally, in an Advertisement prefixed to the Fourth, or *Russel*, Edition of "The Necessary Existence of God," (1863), it was said:—"I wish I could mention, here, (or any where,) " that I am quite ready to publish the full results of my much " pondering on the proper ultimate form for the strict *à priori*

"determination of *the great Moral Attributes of JUSTICE,*"  
 "or *RIGHTEOUSNESS, and of HOLINESS.*"\* The strong desire,  
 imparted to the public in that expressed wish, synchronising  
 with a wail of the heart, (for there was undoubtedly such,) has,  
 at length, been accomplished. The great Moral Attribute of  
*Justice* was demonstrated, and the demonstration was published,  
 several years ago; and now the great, and, if possible, greater  
 Attribute of *Holiness* is demonstrated too. After the aspira-  
 tions, and heart-yearnings, of so many weary waiting years,  
 the years have fulfilled their course: the star of hope has risen  
 above the horizon, and, after a happy ascension, it is to be  
 beheld now in the zenith. There is no question of any arguing  
 with any atheist here, and most unfeignedly do I say,

$T\tilde{\varphi} \Theta \varepsilon \tilde{\varphi} \delta \delta \zeta \alpha.$

W. H. G.

EDINBURGH,  
 September, 1870.

\* The wish of the text had been transferred from the Torbanehill edition,  
 where, however, the aspiration might have had no very articulate expression.  
*Sub-auditur*, it was heard as an indispensable ground-tone. By no means  
 the first time wishes and expressions to the same effect had found vent.

THE  
ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*,  
FOR  
THE BEING AND THE ATTRIBUTES.



# SYNOPSIS OF THE ARGUMENT.

## DIVISION I.

### THE BEING, AND THE NATURAL MODES.

#### PART I.

##### PROPOSITION I.

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THE  
ARGUMENT, *A PRIORI*,  
FOR  
THE BEING AND THE ATTRIBUTES.

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DIVISION I.

*THE BEING, AND THE NATURAL MODES.*

PART I.

PROPOSITION I.

*Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing.*

§ 1. Even when the mind endeavours to remove from it the idea of Infinity of Extension as really outwardly existent, it cannot, after all its efforts, avoid leaving still within it the idea of such infinity. Let there be ever so much endeavour to displace this idea, that is, conceive the external Infinity of Extension non-existent; every one, by a reflex examination of his own thoughts, will find it is utterly beyond his power to do so.

§ 2. Now, since even when we would remove the notion of Infinity of Extension, as existing, out of our minds, we cannot but leave the notion of it behind; from this, it is manifest, Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing: For,

*Every thing the existence of which we cannot but believe, is necessarily existing.*

§ 3. To deny, therefore, that Infinity of Extension necessarily exists, is to utter a downright contradiction.

§ 4. Infinity of Extension is, then, *necessarily existing*.

## PROPOSITION II.

*Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible.*

### PROLEGOMENA.

§ 1. To say, Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible, is as much as to say, *the parts* of Infinity of Extension are necessarily indivisible *from each other*.

§ 2. *Indivisible*, in this Proposition, means indivisible *either really or mentally*: For there can be no objection to a *real*, which would not apply to a *mental* divisibility; and a *mental* divisibility, we must suppose, would imply an *actual* divisibility, of Infinity of Extension.

§ 3. The Proposition, then, is to the effect, that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily indivisible from each other really or mentally.

### DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. That which is divisible really, may be divided really: and a thing which is actually *divided* from another must have *superficies* of its own, every way, and be *removed* or *separated* from that other thing, be it by ever so little a distance. If any one should say that things really divided from each other have not real superficies of their own, every way; to be able to believe him, we must first be able to believe this, that a thing can be, and not be, at the same time, and in the same place: And if any one should say

that things which are really divided from each other, which have real superficies of their own every way, can possibly be conceived as without a certain distance, however little, being between them; as this, it could as soon be believed that, in a good syllogism of the first figure, the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises. Being really divided, and being really separated, mean, thus, the same thing.

§ 2. Now, divisibility meaning possibility of separation: As it is an utter contradiction to say, Infinity of Extension can be separated; that is, *a part* of Infinity of Extension separated, by a certain distance, *from* Infinity of Extension; *there remaining Infinity of Extension after part of it is taken away*:<sup>a</sup> the part of Infinity of Extension so removed, being removed *from* the remaining parts to these very same parts; *the part, thus, being at rest while it is taken away*:<sup>a</sup> the part so moved away, being moved away *from itself*; *it still remaining*, inasmuch as there is necessarily Infinity of Extension;<sup>a</sup> that is, though moved away, being not moved away: Which could not be, unless it be false, that *whatever is, is, where it is, and when it is*. As it is, thus, an utter contradiction to say Infinity of Extension can be separated, so it is an utter contradiction to say it is not indivisible.

§ 3. Infinity of Extension is, then, *necessarily indivisible*.

#### SCHOLIUM.

The parts of Infinity of Extension being necessarily indivisible from each other; it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are *divisible from each other*, is not Infinity of Extension; nor any part of it: *part*, in the sense of partial consideration only, for otherwise Infinity of Extension can have no parts.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Prop. I. § 2.

<sup>b</sup> Prop. II. Dem. § 2.



## COROLLARY FROM PROPOSITION II.

*Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable.*

## PROLEGOMENA.

§ 1. Infinity of Extension is necessarily immoveable: This is equal to saying, *the parts* of Infinity of Extension are necessarily immoveable *among themselves*.

§ 2. And *immoveable*, in the Corollary, means immoveable *either really or mentally*.

§ 3. The Corollary, therefore, lays down, in effect, that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily immoveable among themselves really or mentally.

## DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. *Motion* of parts, that is, the motion of the parts of a thing as among themselves, supposes, of necessity, *separation* of the parts. He who does not see that motion of parts among themselves supposes, or presupposes, of necessity, separation of the parts, need never be expected to see the force of the dialectical inference, that because every A is equal to B, therefore some B is equal to A. And, Infinity of Extension being necessarily incapable of separation,<sup>a</sup> is, therefore, necessarily immoveable, that is, its parts are necessarily immoveable among themselves.

§ 2. Infinity of Extension is, then, *necessarily immoveable*.

## SCHOLIUM.

The parts of Infinity of Extension being necessarily immoveable among themselves; it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are *moveable*

<sup>a</sup> Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

*among themselves*, is not Infinity of Extension; nor any part of it: *part*, in the sense of partial consideration only, for otherwise Infinity of Extension can have no parts.<sup>a</sup>

## PROPOSITION III.

*There is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension.*

§ 1. Either, Infinity of Extension subsists, or (which is at bottom the same thing) we conceive it to subsist, without a support or substratum: or, it subsists not, or (which is the same thing) we conceive it not to subsist, without a Support or Substratum.

§ 2. First, If Infinity of Extension subsist without a substratum, then it is a *substance*. And if any one should deny, that it is a substance, it so subsisting; to prove, beyond contradiction, the utter absurdity of such denial, we have but to defy him to show, *why* Infinity of Extension is not a substance, *so far forth as it can subsist by itself, or without a substratum*.

§ 3. As, therefore, it is a contradiction to deny that Infinity of Extension exists,<sup>b</sup> so there is, on the supposition of its being able to subsist without a substratum, a *substance* or *being* of Infinity of Extension necessarily existing: Though Infinity of Extension, and the being of Infinity of Extension are *not different*, as standing to each other in the relation of mode and subject of the mode, but *are identical*.

§ 4. Secondly, If Infinity of Extension subsist not without a Substratum, then, it being a contradiction to deny there is Infinity of Extension,<sup>b</sup> it is a contradiction to deny there is a Substratum to it.

<sup>a</sup> Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

<sup>b</sup> Prop. I. § 3.

§ 5. Whether or not men will consent to call this Substratum *Substance* or *Being*, is of very little consequence. For, 'tis certain that the word *Substance*, or *Being*, has never been employed, and can never be employed, to stand for any thing better entitled to the application of the term than the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. But to refuse to give such Substratum that name, *being a thing obviously most unreasonable*, let us call the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, by the name *Substance* or *Being*.

§ 6. Then, there is, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Extension.

#### PROPOSITION IV.

*The Being of Infinity of Extension is necessarily of unity and simplicity.*

§ 1. Because Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible,<sup>a</sup> therefore it is of the *truest unity*. For to affirm that though it is necessarily indivisible, even so much as by thought, yet it is not of the truest unity, is to affirm what is no more intelligible than would be the assertion, *that a circle*, this being a figure contained by one line, with every part of that line or circumference equally distant from a certain point, *is not round*.

§ 2. And as Infinity of Extension is necessarily of the truest unity, so it is necessarily of the *utmost simplicity*. For what more can be included in simplicity than is implied in unity caused by a thing being necessarily indivisible, we can have no conception.

§ 3. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Extension subsists by itself, there is necessarily a being of Infinity of Extension,<sup>b</sup> so, this supposed, that being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

<sup>a</sup> *Prop. II. Dem.* § 2.

<sup>b</sup> *Prop. III.* § 3.

§ 4. If Infinity of Extension subsist not without a Substratum ; that we cannot, without an express contradiction, deny, that the Substratum is of the truest unity, and utmost simplicity, may be most easily demonstrated.

§ 5. For it is *intuitively evident*, that the Substratum of Infinity of Extension can be no more divisible than Infinity of Extension itself. And if any one should affirm that though Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible, yet that its Substratum can be considered as divisible, we could no more assent to the proposition than we could believe that a subject can never be truly predicated of itself. And, therefore, as Infinity of Extension is necessarily indivisible,<sup>a</sup> so is its Substratum.

§ 6. And Infinity of Extension being necessarily of unity and simplicity because necessarily indivisible,<sup>b</sup> its Substratum is so likewise, for the same reason.

§ 7. And as, on the supposition that Infinity of Extension subsists not without a Substratum, there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Extension,<sup>c</sup> so, this supposed, that Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 8. Then, the Being of Infinity of Extension is, necessarily, of *unity* and *simplicity*.

#### COROLLARY.

The Substratum of Infinity of Extension being necessarily indivisible,<sup>d</sup> that is, its parts being necessarily indivisible from each other: it is a corollary, that its parts (*parts*, in the sense of partial consideration only,<sup>d</sup>) are necessarily immoveable among themselves: For the same reason that the parts of Infinity of Extension are necessarily immoveable among themselves, because necessarily indivisible from each other.

<sup>a</sup> Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

<sup>c</sup> Prop. III. § 4 & 5.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra*, § 1 & 2.

<sup>d</sup> Prop. IV. § 5.

## SCHOLIUM.

On the whole, therefore, the thing, the parts of which are divisible from each other, is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, nor any part of it: And, the thing, the parts of which are moveable among themselves, is not the Substratum, nor any part of it: *Part*, in the sense of partial consideration only.<sup>a</sup>

## SUB-PROPOSITION.

*The Material Universe is finite in extension.*

## POSTULATES.

§ 1. If, now, it should be alleged, that the Material Universe is of Infinity of Extension, the falsity of the allegation may be made to appear most evidently. That is to say, the application of positions already demonstrated, directed to the fact of Matter, (in the case of those who shall, or may, object the fact,) enables the reasoner to make manifest, by incontestable proof, that the Material Universe is truly not of Infinity of Extension, but finite in extension.

§ 2. For, if any one should affirm, that the Material Universe is truly of Infinity of Extension; his affirmation might be made in one or other of two ways. To wit, *either* by way of an assertion grounded on reasons: *or*, as being an assertion made without the support of any reason at all. The allegation, in this latter case, being made simply because the allexer pleases—and for no better reason, or any other reason whatsoever. 'Tis first affirmed, that the Material Universe and Infinity of Extension are so related to each other, that this does not exist without that; and, next, it is admitted,

<sup>a</sup> Prop. IV. § 5.

that the affirmer of the close relation betwixt those two can assign no reason for his assertion of the existence of the relation save his own good pleasure.

§ 3. Now, as to the second of those alternatives, no more need be said about it. What is arbitrarily affirmed without any reason, and indeed reasonableness, may, much more, be denied with sufficient reason.

§ 4. As to the other member of the alternative, the position, to wit, that the Material Universe is of Infinity of Extension, as a position grounded on reasons, that is, necessary reasons, because, to speak of reasons other than necessary, were futile and absurd. *De facto*, or *à posteriori*, or mere empirical, reasons are out of the question in a case beyond the limits of all possible human experience, through the medium of sensation. Only reasons derived from the necessary relations of our ideas can avail. As to the position in question, we repeat, as one grounded on *à priori* reasons, it will be found, by that psychological experience which is here admissible, that no reason can be assigned, but one; *because*, to wit, the Material Universe is, *i.e.*, must be considered to be, the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. No other reason whatever, 'tis deliberately repeated, can be assigned: none can be imagined. The Material Universe is, or rather must be, of Infinity of Extension, by reason of its being the Substratum of Infinity of Extension: that, or some position or other, directly resolvable into that, is the one only reason which can possibly be advanced, or thought of. Which he who pleases, may know, or verify by experience: One may try the question in the interior of his own mind; and, should the experimentalist happily discover some additional reason, let him be sure to remember other folk, not by any means so fortunately situated, by making his discovery widely known.

§ 5. The Material Universe is of Infinity of Extension:

and the reason is, because the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. Therefore, the proposition which really comes before us for examination is this, The Material Universe is the Substratum in question. Yea, the upholders of the *dictum*, that the Material Universe is of Infinity of Extension, will be among the foremost to maintain that the Material Universe is that Substratum : since, on any other supposition, there would unquestionably be an Extension besides the extension of Matter ; and this is the very thing which these men are most determinedly (not to say, madly) set against as a position which they can by no means endure. In truth, the supposition of the existence of Extension, yea, of Infinity of Extension, apart from Matter, or distinct from the extension of Matter, would render it a piece of pure idleness, on the part of the supposer, to hold that Matter is of Infinity of Extension. It is only to get quit of an extension distinct from that of Matter that the assertion, Matter is infinitely extended, is made. Introduce the other and separate extension, as necessarily existing, and all reason for holding by the infinite extension of Matter is gone.

§ 6. *The Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension* : this, then, is the proposition for examination. And, after due reflection, it will become evident, as it is in itself incontestable, that to contend that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, is tantamount to another contention, the other being this, The Material Universe is a thorough *plenum* of Infinity of Extension. The proof, too, which will serve to evidence the unsoundness, and utter falsity, of the one proposition, would also suffice to demolish every vestige of the other position.

§ 7. That the Material Universe is the Substratum of *Infinity of Extension*, will, indeed, be maintained if it be

contended, and only if it be contended, that the Material Universe is a thorough *plenum* of Infinity of Extension. This is very evident, as, by a thorough *plenum* of matter, must be meant a material *plenum* in which no empty interstice, or hollow vacuity, (actual or possible,—by compression, or otherwise,) can be: the two factors, the Substratum, to wit, and the *plenum*, being perfectly, and at all points indissolubly, coincident. For, the supposition of a *plenum* in which there are, or can be, true vacuities, would be the supposition of no true *plenum* at all, and would avail nothing. A *plenum* (if one could rightly call it so) with vacuities, or any one *vacuum*, however small, could not serve as the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, in which no *vacuum*; nor division of any kind whatever, is conceivable.<sup>a</sup> The *plenum*, then, must be held to be without the possibility of any *vacuum*, when we speak of a thorough *plenum* of Infinity of Extension as being the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. But, on the other hand, to contend that the Material Universe is a thorough *plenum*—which is the equivalent of an absolute, or completely incompressible, solid—of Infinity of Extension, would be (as has been said) equal to the affirmation that the Material Universe is, verily, the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.

§ 8. Those *postulates* being thus laid down, the advance to the *demonstration* itself may be most satisfactorily accomplished.

#### DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. If, then, it should be maintained, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension; (which will be maintained, as is most evident, if it be contended that the Material Universe is truly of Infinity of Extension,

<sup>a</sup> Prop. IV. Schol.



that is, is a thorough *plenum* of Infinity of Extension;) to put to the proof, whether or not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, we have but to ask, Are the parts of the Material Universe divisible from each other? and, Are they moveable among themselves? For, if they be so divisible, if so moveable, then the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.<sup>a</sup>

§ 2. Now, we know, of a certainty, that some parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other*; and, as far as we know, every part of it to which our minds could be directed is as divisible, as are the parts which we certainly know are divisible: and this is the conclusion to which, by the rules of philosophy, we are entitled to come.

§ 3. Therefore, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.

§ 4. Again, we are certain, that some parts of the Material Universe are *moveable among themselves*; and, that every part of it to which our minds could be directed is as moveable, as are the parts which we certainly know are moveable, is (here, as in the other case) what we are entitled to conclude.

§ 5. Therefore, again, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.

§ 6. And, if, because the parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other*, it is proved that it is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension; then, because the parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other, and moveable among themselves*, it is proved, *much more*, (if that were possible,) that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension. It is proved, that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension; nor any part thereof, for the Substratum of

<sup>a</sup> Schol. under Prop. IV.

Infinity of Extension can have no parts but in the sense of partial consideration :<sup>a</sup> that is, that the Material Universe is finite in extension. For, were it of Infinity of Extension, it would be the Substratum thereof. But it being not that Substratum : Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Extension.

§ 7. The Material Universe, then, is *finite in extension*.

#### SCHOLIUM.

§ 1. It has been manifested, that an infinitely extended *plenum* of matter, with hollow gaps, would not serve as the Substratum of Infinity of Extension.<sup>b</sup> A Substratum of Infinity of Extension can have no *vacua*, nor divisions, nor even divisibility, of any sort.<sup>c</sup> In truth, a material substratum of Infinity of Extension, with empty interstices in it, would be no fit substratum, nor, indeed, substratum at all : yea, a *plenum*, with *vacua*, would be no *plenum*, or, at most, a *plenum* only in words. But even were one to suppose such a *plenum*, and such a substratum, to exist, the supposition would be made to little purpose. For, while such a *plenum*, and substratum, could not serve as the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, the Infinity of Extension itself must be conceived to have an adequate (or indivisible<sup>a</sup>) substratum of its own, if there be a substratum at all. An adequate Substratum would, in short, necessitate a Substratum, as without external limits, so without internal interstices. *Ab intra*, no less than *ab extra*, there must be no pure *vacuum*. The supposition, in question, would, therefore, be made in vain ; or, rather, it would be worse than in vain, and fruitless, since it would be fruitful of very undesired consequences.

§ 2. As it is here, so it will be there. Why, then, should

<sup>a</sup> Prop. IV. § 5.

<sup>b</sup> Sub-Prop. preced., Postul. § 7.

<sup>c</sup> Prop. IV. Schol.

any one suppose, even as the merest hypothesis, that, although matter have, or may have, vacuous spaces interspersed through it, or in it, (a supposition this involved in the position of the divisibility and moveability of matter,) matter yet has no general boundaries? Why suppose divisible and moveable, and, therefore, possibly vacuous, matter to be infinitely extended in that imperfect sense? It has been demonstrated, that matter is *finite in extension*.<sup>a</sup> What, then, would avail such a blind hypothesis? What could avail the hypothesis of a *plenum*, with *vacua*, but without general limits, that is, without *vacuum* all around the limits of matter as a whole,—seeing that the circumferential spaces of every internal *vacuum* bound, or limit, the material extension all round the circumference—make, in fine, the matter finite? The necessity of the concession of extension finitely extended in such respect, makes it of no moment to contend that the extension generally, or as a whole, is infinite. Extension infinite generally, or without general boundaries, but with interspersed hollownesses, were—not true infinite extension (which implies *fulness*) but, at most—*infinity, in number*, of finite extensions: each one of the empty interstices bounding, or limiting, or making finite, the extension all round the circumferential spaces. A single *vacuum*, indeed, anywhere in the Material Universe would destroy plenitude: all the lines converging on the *vacuum*—great or little—would be stopped by its circumference. The extension of the matter would be infallibly arrested, whenever the rim, or superficies, of the *vacuum* were reached.

§ 3. In fine, to allege, that Matter, or (if you will) a *plenum* of matter, exists, with so many, or not so many, *i.e.*, infinitely numerous, *vacua* contained in it, and interspersed throughout it, as a whole; were simply a form of the posi-

<sup>a</sup> Sub-Prop. preced., Dem. § 6.

tion, Matter is finite in extension. If matter be finite in this regard, it is worth no one's while to contend for its infinitude in the sense of no general boundaries. In fact, accept, or admit, (and who, after the preceding demonstration, can deny?) the finiteness in extent, in the one sense; and what could be the purpose to be served in asserting, that matter is infinite in extension, in the other sense? Generally, and to all practical intents, that which is divisible—much more, that which is moveable, is finite in extent.

#### GENERAL SCHOLIUM AS TO EXTENSION.

§ 1. The parts of Infinity of Extension, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, being necessarily indivisible from each other,<sup>a</sup> and immoveable among themselves:<sup>b</sup> and the parts of the Material Universe being divisible from each other, and moveable among themselves: and it therefore following, that the Material Universe is not the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, but is finite in extension:<sup>c</sup> Here are two sorts of extension. The one sort, that which the Material Universe has: And the other, the extension of Infinity of Extension. And *as* Infinity of Extension is necessarily existing,<sup>d</sup> *and as* the extension of the Material Universe must exist, if it exist, in the extension of Infinity of Extension; a part of this, or of its Substratum, if it have a Substratum, (*part*, but in the sense of partial consideration;<sup>e</sup>) must *penetrate* the Material Universe, and every atom, even the minutest atom, of it.

§ 2. It will be proper, therefore, to distinguish between these two kinds of extension. And, accordingly, let us con-

<sup>a</sup> Prop. II. Dem. § 2, & Prop. IV. § 5.

<sup>b</sup> Coroll. from Prop. II. Dem., & Coroll. under Prop. IV.

<sup>c</sup> Prop. IV. Sub-Prop. Dem. § 6.

<sup>d</sup> Prop. I. § 2.

<sup>e</sup> Prop. II. Dem. § 2, & Prop. IV. § 5.

fine to *matter*, namely, to the distance of the extremities of matter from each other, the name *extension*; and apply to the extension of Infinity of Extension, a part of which (*part*, in the sense of partial consideration only,<sup>a</sup>) penetrates all matter to the minutest atom, or corpuscular monad, the name *Expansion*.

§ 3. And, therefore, every thing which hath been proved to be true in relation to that extension which matter has not, must be true with regard to Expansion.

#### SUB-SCHOLIUM.

§ 1. Penetration, as evidenced in the foregoing General Scholium, being postulated, a most important result makes its appearance. Infinity of Extension—Expansion, rather,—or its Substratum, (if there be one,) *penetrates* matter: hence, we have the fact, and the doctrine, of *Spirituality* coming to the surface. That which intimately penetrates matter—all matter, of whatever kind—is, of course, *immaterial*: and it is no unwarrantable step farther to take, to advance that the Immaterial Being or Substance (a Substance, on any supposition<sup>b</sup>) which penetrates all matter, may be called a Spiritual Substance: in one word, a Spirit.

§ 2. Therefore, there has been proved to be a Spiritual Substance of Infinity of Expansion. And if any one should prefer to speak of such as being an Infinite Spirit, no fault would, or righteously could, be found with such a mode of speaking.

§ 3. Thus, there is existing necessarily a Spiritual Substance, or Spirit, of Infinity of Expansion, or, in other words, an Infinite Spirit.

<sup>a</sup> Prop. II. Dem. § 2.

<sup>b</sup> Prop. III. § 3, & § 5, with Gen. Schol. § 3.

§ 4. But although the Spirituality of the Necessary Being of Infinity of Expansion has been manifested, it will not be requisite or expedient to introduce, in express words, the element of the Spirituality at every stage, and carry it expressly along from point to point. It shall suffice to know, and bear in mind, that the principle, in connection with the Being of Infinity of Expansion, is always latently present—ready, when necessary, to be evoked, and drawn from potentiality into actuality.

#### PROPOSITION V.

*There is necessarily but one Being of Infinity of Expansion.*

§ 1. Infinity of Expansion either subsists by itself, or it subsists not without a Substratum.<sup>a</sup> In both cases there is necessarily a Being of Infinity of Expansion.<sup>b</sup> Now, we are under a necessity of inferring from the existence of such a Being, that there is *but one such Being*.

§ 2. For, as 'tis evident, *there can be but one Infinity of Expansion*, so, on the supposition that it subsists by itself, and so is a being,<sup>c</sup> there can be but one being of Infinity of Expansion. And, as 'tis evident *there can no more be more than one Substratum* of Infinity of Expansion (whatever that Substratum is) than there can be more than one Infinity of Expansion; and as, therefore, 'tis evident, there can be but one Substratum of Infinity of Expansion: so, on the supposition that Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being,<sup>d</sup> there can be but one Being of Infinity of Expansion.

<sup>a</sup> Prop. III. § 1, compared with Gen. Schol. § 3.

<sup>b</sup> Prop. III. § 3-4, 5, & Gen. Schol. § 3.

<sup>c</sup> Prop. III. § 3, & Gen. Schol. § 3.

<sup>d</sup> Prop. III. § 4, 5, & Gen. Schol. § 3.

§ 3. And, therefore, any one who asserts he can suppose two or more necessarily existing beings, each of Infinity of Expansion, is no more to be argued with than one who denies, Whatever is, is. The denying of this proposition cannot, indeed, be regarded as more curious than the affirming of the other.

§ 4. Then, there is, necessarily, *büt one* Being of Infinity of Expansion.

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## DIVISION I.

### PART II.

#### PROPOSITION I.

*Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, existing.*

§ 1. The truth of this is evident from the same sort of consideration as shows there is necessarily Infinity of Extension; to wit, that even when we endeavour to remove from our minds the idea of Infinity of Duration, that is, Infinity of Duration *à parte antè*, and *à parte post*, we cannot, after all our efforts, avoid leaving this idea still there. Endeavour as much as we may to displace the idea, that is, conceive Infinity of Duration *à parte antè*, or *à parte post*, non-existent, we shall find, after a review of our thoughts, that to do so is utterly beyond our power.

§ 2. And since, even when we would remove the conception of Infinity of Duration from the mind, we necessarily leave the conception of it, as existing, behind; 'tis manifest, *that* Infinity of Duration necessarily exists: Because, *Every*

*thing the existence of which we cannot but believe, is necessarily existing.*

§ 3. Infinity of Duration is, then, *necessarily existing.*

#### PROPOSITION II.

*Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, indivisible.*

##### PROLEGOMENON.

This proposition is equivalent to another: to wit, *The parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily indivisible from each other; and indivisible really or mentally.*

##### DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. As was laid down before, what is divisible may be divided; and that which is *divided* from something else must have *superficies*, every way, and be *separated* from the other thing, be the distance ever so small. There is no difference between being divided and being separated.

§ 2. Then, divisibility meaning possibility of separation: Because the parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily inseparable, they are necessarily indivisible.

§ 3. Infinity of Duration is, then, *necessarily indivisible.*

#### COROLLARY FROM PROPOSITION II.

*Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, immoveable.*

##### PROLEGOMENON.

The Corollary is tantamount to this proposition, *The parts of Infinity of Duration are necessarily immoveable among themselves, really or mentally.*



## DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. *Motion* of the parts, among themselves, of Infinity of Duration, would necessarily involve *separation* of its parts. And its parts being necessarily incapable of separation,<sup>a</sup> are, therefore, necessarily immoveable among themselves.

§ 2. Infinity of Duration is, then, *necessarily immoveable*.

## PROPOSITION III.

*There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Duration.*

§ 1. Either, Infinity of Duration exists, or is conceived to exist, without a substratum; or, it exists not, or is conceived not to exist, without a Substratum.

§ 2. First, If Infinity of Duration exist by itself, it is a *substance*. For should any one deny that it is a substance, if it so exist; we shall prove, past contradiction, the absurdity of the denial, by just demanding the reason *why* Infinity of Duration is not a substance, *if it exist without a substratum, or by itself*.

§ 3. And therefore, as there is necessarily Infinity of Duration,<sup>b</sup> there is, supposing it to exist by itself, a *substance* or *being* of Infinity of Duration necessarily existing: Infinity of Duration and the being of Infinity of Duration *being identical, not different*.

§ 4. Secondly, If Infinity of Duration exist not without a Substratum, there is a *Substance* or *Being* of Infinity of Duration. For the word *Substance* or *Being* can never, it is certain, stand for anything having a better claim to the application of the term than such Substratum.

<sup>a</sup> Part II. Prop. ii. Dem. § 2.

<sup>b</sup> Part II. Prop. i. § 2.

§ 5. And as Infinity of Duration is necessarily existing,<sup>a</sup> so there is necessarily a Substance or Being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that it exists not without a Substratum.

§ 6. Then, there is, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Duration.

#### PROPOSITION IV.

*The Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.*

§ 1. As Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible,<sup>b</sup> so it is necessarily of the truest *unity*. For, if what is necessarily indivisible, even by thought, be not of the truest unity, what unity consists in is altogether unintelligible.

§ 2. And since Infinity of Duration is necessarily of the truest unity, it is, also, of the utmost *simplicity*. Because, we can have no conception of what is in simplicity, that is not in unity caused by a thing being necessarily indivisible.

§ 3. And as there necessarily is a being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists without a substratum,<sup>c</sup> so, this supposed, the being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 4. If Infinity of Duration exist not without a Substratum; that the Substratum is of the truest unity and utmost simplicity, is a thing not difficult to be demonstrated.

§ 5. For, that the Substratum of Infinity of Duration is no more divisible than Infinity of Duration, is a *self-evident*

<sup>a</sup> Part II. Prop. i. § 2.

<sup>b</sup> Part II. Prop. ii. Dem. § 2.

<sup>c</sup> Part II. Prop. iii. § 3.

truth. Therefore, because Infinity of Duration is necessarily indivisible,<sup>a</sup> so is the Substratum.

§ 6. And Infinity of Duration, because necessarily indivisible, being necessarily of unity and simplicity,<sup>b</sup> its Substratum, for the same reason, is so likewise.

§ 7. And as there necessarily is a Being of Infinity of Duration, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists not without a Substratum,<sup>c</sup> so, this supposed, the Being is necessarily of unity and simplicity.

§ 8. Then, the Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of *unity* and *simplicity*.

#### SCHOLIUM I.

The Substratum of Infinity of Duration being necessarily indivisible,<sup>d</sup> that is, its parts being necessarily indivisible from each other; it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are *divisible from each other*, is not such Substratum, nor any part thereof.

#### COROLLARY.

It is a corollary from the proposition, The parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration are necessarily indivisible from each other, that they are necessarily immoveable among themselves: Just as Infinity of Duration is necessarily immoveable, because necessarily indivisible.

#### SCHOLIUM II.

And the parts of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration being necessarily immoveable among themselves;<sup>e</sup> it is a *necessary consequence*, that the thing, the parts of which are

<sup>a</sup> Part II. Prop. ii. Dem. § 2.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra*, § 1 & 2.

<sup>c</sup> Part II. Prop. iii. § 5. <sup>d</sup> Part II. Prop. iv. § 5. <sup>e</sup> Coroll. preced.

*moveable among themselves*, is not such Substratum, nor any part thereof.

#### SUB-PROPOSITION.

*The Material Universe is finite in duration.*

#### PROLEGOMENON.

Just as it will be maintained, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Extension, if it be contended that the Material Universe is truly of Infinity of Extension ; so, it will be held, that the Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, if it be alleged that the Material Universe is, of itself, of Infinity of Duration, *à parte antè*. To contend that the Material Universe is, of itself, of Infinity of Duration, *à parte antè*, is tantamount to holding that there is an indissoluble bond which we are under a necessity of conceiving (in the face of the notorious and decisive fact ;) so that the Infinity of Duration cannot be conceived to have existed without the Material Universe, the correlate. Now—not to rest on the undoubted and readily evincible fact in psychological experience, that the human mind can most easily conceive the non-existence, from Infinity of Duration, past or to come, of Matter,—no bond, which can anywise represent a necessary bond or relation, can be imagined, other than the relation between the two of Mode and Substratum, whereby the Infinity of Duration stands for Mode, (Quality, Property, Attribute, anything, in fact, you like,) and the Matter bears to the other the relation of Substratum or Substance. 'Tis posited, in fine, that the Infinity of Duration cannot be (*id est*, cannot be conceived to be) without the Matter, because this is the Substratum of that, the Mode.

## DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. If, then, it should be held, that the finitely extended<sup>a</sup> Material Universe is the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, or a part thereof; (which will noticeably be held, if it be alleged that the Material Universe is, of itself, of Infinity of Duration, *à parte antè*;) to put to the proof whether or not the Material Universe can be such Substratum, or a part thereof, we have but to ask, Are the parts of the Material Universe divisible from each other? and, Are they moveable among themselves? For if they be so divisible and moveable, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof,<sup>b</sup> the Substratum having no parts in the sense of capability of separation.<sup>c</sup>

§ 2. Now, we know, certainly, that some parts of the Material Universe are *divisible from each other*; and that every part of it to which our minds could be directed is as divisible, as are the parts which we certainly know are divisible, is the conclusion to which the rules of philosophy entitle us to come.

§ 3. Then, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof.

§ 4. Again, we know, certainly, that some parts of the Material Universe are *moveable among themselves*; and that every part of it to which our minds could be directed is as moveable, as are the parts which we certainly know are moveable, is (in this, as well as in the other case) the conclusion to which we are entitled to come.

§ 5. Then, again, the Material Universe cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part thereof.

<sup>a</sup> Part I. Prop. iv. Sub-Prop.

<sup>b</sup> Part II. Schol. i. & ii. under Prop. iv.

<sup>c</sup> Part II. Prop. iv. § 5.

§ 6. That is, the Material Universe is finite in duration. For, were it of Infinity of Duration, it would be the Substratum thereof, or, at least, a part of the Substratum. But it being not that Substratum, nor any part of it: Therefore, it is not of Infinity of Duration. That is, the Material Universe is finite in duration, or, it began sometime to be.

§ 7. The Material Universe is, then, *finite in duration*.

#### SCHOLIUM.

§ 1. To state, in few words, the result of the whole reasoning on the topic introduced by the Sub-Proposition, set down above: The truth is, that, while Matter, or (if you prefer it) the Material Universe, is emphatically *the* divisible, and *the* moveable; Duration, or Infinity of Duration, is *the* subject to which the predicates, divisible, moveable, are totally inapplicable. The ideas of the two things, Duration, and divisibility by separability of parts, are absolutely incompatible. And, on the other hand, Matter is simply another word for that which is divisible in every sense, or in every possible way. How, then, can the one—that which is so divisible—be so bound up with the other—that to which the idea of division, or divisibility, of any sort, is so utterly repugnant—as that the two things must be always associated together? The plain truth is, that the notion of such junction is purely preposterous.

§ 2. When, therefore, one shall be met with maintaining that the Material Universe, as a substance, or existence of any sort, the parts of which are divisible from each other, and moveable among themselves, in every variety of way; can be, and is, the substratum of that other thing, Duration, even Infinity of Duration, to which it is ridiculous to think of

applying the notion of divisibility at all, (far less, moveability of parts from parts :—) what are we to make of the allegation? Examine well, and, if it be clear that the propounder of the *dictum* is seriously in earnest, then there is plainly a case, not for any doctor of philosophy, but for a doctor of medicine, exclusively and imperatively. And as a philosopher labouring under a manifest intellectual delusion has never been found, in any age or country, to be the most eligible company; the sooner so unprofitable—perhaps, so dangerous—companionship is dissolved, the better for the party whose headpiece is yet unshattered and entire.

#### COROLLARY FROM SUB-PROPOSITION.

*Every succession of finitely extended substances  
is finite in duration.*

§ 1. Should it, now, be asserted that any succession, or successions, of substances finite in extension; *finite in extension*, for—not to say, that there can be but one Substance, or Being, of Infinity of Extension,<sup>a</sup>—a succession of substances of Infinity of Extension were we know not what: Should it be asserted, that any successions, or any one succession, of substances—say, of animals, or vegetables, or minerals, or all together, or of worlds, or of systems of worlds, or systems of germs of worlds—is of Infinity of Duration; the falsity of the assertion is, immediately and abundantly, apparent. For, seeing that the whole finitely extended Material Universe, itself, is finite in duration,<sup>b</sup> every succession of substances which are in the Material

<sup>a</sup> Part I. Prop. v., & § 3, Gen. Schol. under Prop. iv.

<sup>b</sup> Sub-Prop. preced.

Universe (and, of course, there can be no substances finite in extension which are out of it) must, therefore, be finite in duration, too.

§ 2. Should it be pertinaciously alleged yet farther, that—not substances in the Material Universe, but—such a world, as one actually existing whole, is but an item in a succession of worlds, or germs of worlds, having no beginning, or being of Infinity of Duration *à parte antè*: then, the ready answer would be, that a succession (of whatever kind) does, most obviously, involve motion, or things moved; since successions, or but a single course of succession, implies, by the very nature thereof, motion,—things succeeding each other, being things moved in relation to each other. Now, things (successions, as you will, of motes, or molehills, or mountains, or worlds, or systems of worlds, or systems of germs of worlds) which are moved, cannot be the Substratum of Infinity of Duration, nor any part of it:<sup>a</sup> and, therefore, cannot be of Infinity of Duration, but are tied down to finiteness in duration.<sup>b</sup> But an answer, overwhelmingly potent, is at hand, as a preliminary bar to any such supposition as is set down. The overwhelming preliminary is this: After all, such a succession of Universes as that *ex hypothesi* advanced, would be but our own old Material Universe, itself, in disguise. The supposed succession of worlds emerging, one by one, from the depths of eternity, would be nothing more than the Material Universe under one of its conceivable (if it be conceivable) or possible phases, or as a system of *primordia rerum* renewing itself, phoenix-like, over and over again. And we have seen, that the Material Universe itself is finite in duration.<sup>b</sup>

§ 3. Every succession of material substances, is, then, *finite in duration*.

<sup>a</sup> Part II. Prop. iv. Schol. II.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra*, Sub-Prop. Dem. § 6.



## PROPOSITION V.

*There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Duration.*

§ 1. Infinity of Duration either exists without a substratum, or, it exists not without a Substratum:<sup>a</sup> And in either case, there necessarily is a Being of Infinity of Duration.<sup>b</sup> And we are under the necessity of inferring from the existence of such a Being, that there can be *no more than one such Being*.

§ 2. Because 'tis manifest *there can be but one Infinity of Duration*, therefore, on the supposition that it exists without a substratum, and, so, is a being,<sup>c</sup> there can be but one being of Infinity of Duration. And because 'tis as manifest *there can be but one Substratum of Infinity of Duration* (whatever the Substratum is), as that there can be but one Infinity of Duration; and because, therefore, 'tis manifest there can be but one such Substratum: therefore, on the supposition that Infinity of Duration exists not without a Substratum, or Being,<sup>d</sup> there can be but one Being of Infinity of Duration.

§ 3. Then, there is, necessarily, *but one* Being of Infinity of Duration.

<sup>a</sup> Part II. Prop. iii. § 1.

<sup>c</sup> Part II. Prop. iii. § 3.

<sup>b</sup> Part II. Prop. iii. § 3 & 5.

<sup>d</sup> Part II. Prop. iii. § 4.

## DIVISION I.

## PART III.

## PROPOSITION I.

*There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.*

§ 1. This will be demonstrated, if it be proved, that the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Expansion, and the necessarily existing Being of Infinity of Duration, are not different Beings, but are identical.

§ 2. Now, either, Infinity of Expansion subsists by itself, and, then, it is a Being:<sup>a</sup> and, Infinity of Duration exists by itself, and, then, it is a Being.<sup>b</sup>

§ 3. Or, Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being:<sup>c</sup> and, Infinity of Duration exists not without a Substratum, or Being.<sup>d</sup>

§ 4. To take the former alternative. Every part of Infinity of Expansion being in every part of Infinity of Duration, every part of the Being of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of the Being of Infinity of Duration. And every part of Infinity of Duration being in every part of Infinity of Expansion, every part of the Being of Infinity of Duration is in every part of the Being of Infinity of Expansion. *Part*, in all the cases, in the sense of partial consideration only.

§ 5. To-wit, The whole of Infinity of Expansion being in the whole of Infinity of Duration, the whole of the Being of

<sup>a</sup> Part I. Prop. iii. § 1 & 3, compared with Gen. Schol. § 3.

<sup>b</sup> Part II. Prop. iii. § 1 & 3.

<sup>c</sup> Part I. Prop. iii. § 1 & 5, and Gen. Schol. § 3.

<sup>d</sup> Part II. Prop. iii. § 1 & 4.

Infinity of Expansion is in the whole of the Being of Infinity of Duration. And, The whole of Infinity of Duration being in the whole of Infinity of Expansion, the whole of the Being of Infinity of Duration is in the whole of the Being of Infinity of Expansion. *Whole*, in every instance, but as a *figure*.

§ 6. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, if the Being of Infinity of Expansion and the Being of Infinity of Duration be different; it necessarily follows, that they are identical.

§ 7. That is, Infinity of Expansion is Infinity of Duration, and Infinity of Duration is Infinity of Expansion. Which conclusion being plainly absurd; and it necessarily following from the supposition, that *Infinity of Expansion subsists by itself*, and that *Infinity of Duration subsists by itself*, it is proved, that the supposition itself is absurd. Therefore, Infinity of Expansion *cannot* exist by itself, and Infinity of Duration *cannot* exist by itself.

§ 8. Then, to turn to the other alternative, Infinity of Expansion subsists not without a Substratum, or Being: and Infinity of Duration subsists not without a Substratum, or Being.

§ 9. And, as every part of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of Infinity of Duration, therefore, every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion is in every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration. And, as every part of Infinity of Duration is in every part of Infinity of Expansion, therefore, every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration is in every part of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion. *Part*, but in the sense of partial consideration.

§ 10. That is, The whole of Infinity of Expansion being in the whole of Infinity of Duration, the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion is in the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration. And, The whole of Infinity of

Duration being in the whole of Infinity of Expansion, the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Duration is in the whole of the Substratum of Infinity of Expansion. *Whole*, in all the cases, used *figuratively*.

§ 11. And this being, most manifestly, impossible, if the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion, and the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration, be different, it follows necessarily, that they are identical: To-wit, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion is, also, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration.

§ 12. And this being proved, it is demonstrated, there is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion, and Infinity of Duration.\*

§ 13. Then, there is, necessarily, a *Being* of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

#### SCHOLIUM.

§ 1. Combinations of the alternatives might have been made other than those presented in Sections 2 & 3, in the preceding Proposition. Two sets of combinations are there given; but a third set might have been added. It is not thought necessary, however, to state the additional combinations of alternatives, in a formal manner, and as positions demanding consideration—far less, rigid discussion. Those other combinations of alternative propositions, going to constitute the third set, would be, at best, only stupid and inept methods of saying virtually the things over again which were said already.

§ 2. *Exempli gratiâ*, if one should contend that Infinity of Expansion subsists by itself, and that such is to be combined with Infinity of Duration, which exists not without a

\* *Supra*, § 1.

Substratum, and which has for its Substratum the self-subsisting Infinity of Expansion : what were this, at bottom, but a way of imperfectly and clumsily stating what comes, and amounts, to the same thing as the conclusion actually arrived at, by a more unobjectionable method,<sup>a</sup>—The Being of Infinity of Expansion is, also, the Substratum, or Being, of Infinity of Duration?

§ 3. Again, were one to simply reverse matters, and urge that the Infinity of Duration it is which exists by itself, and that the Infinity of Expansion it is which subsists not without a Substratum, the Substratum being the Infinity of Duration : what, in the way of conclusion, would be really advanced (so far as there is truly any comprehensible sense in the statement) more than what is alleged already when it was said, as the demonstrated conclusion,<sup>b</sup> There is, necessarily, a Being of Infinity of Expansion, and Infinity of Duration?

§ 4. Besides, and as the preliminary fatal objection to such *supposita* (which have undoubtedly their own inherent and ineradicable impossibilities :) No good reason can be given why either of these arbitrary, and ungainly, combinations should be preferred to the other. Why should one be allowed to hold, that Expansion can subsist, or exist, by itself, more than Duration can be self-subsistent, or self-existent : or, that Duration can exist, or subsist, by itself, more than Expansion can do so ? It is absolutely indispensable that a rational pretext should be set up, or laid down, for the preference,—since, *Whatever* (a thought in your mind, as much as one in mine, or his) *Whatever begins to be must have a cause*. And no rational pretext whatever can be given in this case, *i.e.*, for a preference of the one unseemly combination to the other. Try all you can to hit upon a *sufficient reason*, and,

<sup>a</sup> *Vide* *preced. Prop.*, § 11.

<sup>b</sup> *Vide, ibid.*, § 12.

in the end, confess the truth that 'tis really so : no reason for a preference is discoverable.

## PROPOSITION II.

*The Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.*

§ 1. The Being of Infinity of Expansion is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.<sup>a</sup> And, the Being of Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.<sup>b</sup> And these two being not different, but identical,<sup>c</sup> it follows, that the Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of unity and simplicity.

§ 2. Then, the Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration is, necessarily, of *unity and simplicity*.

## PROPOSITION III.

*There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.*

§ 1. There is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion.<sup>d</sup> And the Being of Infinity of Expansion being also the Being of Infinity of Duration,<sup>c</sup> it follows, that there is, necessarily, but one Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

§ 2. Then, there is, necessarily, *but one* Being of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

<sup>a</sup> Part I. Prop. iv. § 8, compared with Gen. Schol. § 3.

<sup>b</sup> Part II. Prop. iv. § 8.

<sup>c</sup> Part III. Prop. i. § 11.

<sup>d</sup> Part I. Prop. v. § 4.

## SCHOLIUM.

We may, for an instant, evoke here the always latent principle or element of Spirituality.<sup>a</sup> It has been shewn, that there is an Immaterial or Spiritual Substance, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion;<sup>a</sup> and there is but one such Substance or Being.<sup>b</sup> It has been demonstrated, too, that the Being of Infinity of Expansion is, also, of Infinity of Duration,<sup>c</sup> and that there is but one such.<sup>d</sup> Consequently, as there is one, so there is but one, Immaterial or Spiritual Substance, or Being, of Infinity of Expansion and Infinity of Duration.

## EPILEGOMENON.

Here endeth the consideration, as of the BEING, so of the *Natural*, or *Physical* Modes or Attributes. Those Attributes are also *Absolute* and *Simple*.

<sup>a</sup> Part I. Sub-Prop., Sub-Schol.

<sup>b</sup> Part I. Prop. v., and Gen. Schol.

<sup>c</sup> Part III. Prop. i.

<sup>d</sup> Part III. Prop. iii.

## DIVISION II.

## THE INTELLECTUAL ATTRIBUTES.

## PART I.

## PROPOSITION.

*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, is, necessarily, Intelligent, and All-knowing.*

## PROLEGOMENA.

§ 1. To try to define *Intelligence*, would be a vain effort. That which *Consciousness*, directly and always, testifies, while *thought* goes on, is best evidenced by *Consciousness* itself. *Thought* is best explained by being left without endeavour at explanation.

§ 2. The same holds with regard to *knowing*. What *to know* is, or essentially involves, is best come at by keeping silence to the outward ear, and letting the voices within be alone heard.

§ 3. If you understand wherein *Intelligence*, *Thought*, *Consciousness*, *Knowledge*, as subjective, or without reference to aught beyond the mind itself, consists,—farther than *Consciousness* itself doth immediately testify; thrice happy and fortunate, as well as most peculiar, are you, whoever you be. If, however, none of us can ascend higher up, or go farther in, than the testimony itself of *Consciousness*; 'tis because the secret in the *Cogito* is the ultimate to us all.



## DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. Now, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion, and of Duration, is Intelligent, will not be a thing very difficult to demonstrate. For Intelligence either began to be, or it never began to be.

§ 2. That it, absolutely speaking, never began to be, is evident in this, that if it began to be, in the sense of there never having been any Intelligence whatever before, it must have had a cause; for, *Whatever begins to be must have a cause*. And the cause of Intelligence must be of Intelligence; for, there having been no Intelligence whatever before, *What is not of Intelligence cannot make Intelligence begin to be*. Therefore, if Intelligence began to be, there was Intelligence before there was Intelligence. Now, Intelligence *being, before Intelligence began to be*, is a contradiction. And this absurdity following from the supposition, that Intelligence began to be, it is proved, that Intelligence never began to be: to-wit, is of Infinity of Duration.

§ 3. And as Intelligence is of Infinity of Duration, and supposes a *Being*: And no succession of substances, or beings, is of Infinity of Duration:<sup>a</sup> It necessarily follows, that there is one Being of Infinity of Duration, which is of *Intelligence*. And as there is but One Being of Infinity of Duration:<sup>b</sup> and this Being is of Simplicity:<sup>c</sup> and is also of Infinity of Expansion:<sup>d</sup> It follows, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration is necessarily of Intelligence.

§ 4. And that this Being is *All-knowing*, is no inference

<sup>a</sup> Div. I. Part ii. Coroll. from Sub-Prop.

<sup>b</sup> Div. I. Part ii. Prop. v. § 3.

<sup>c</sup> Div. I. Part ii. Prop. iv. § 8.

<sup>d</sup> Div. I. Part iii. Prop. i. § 11.

from the proposition, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration is necessarily of Intelligence, for it is, indeed, implied by such proposition : A Being of Intelligence who is of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, is convertible with an All-knowing Being.

§ 5. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, is, necessarily, *Intelligent*, and *All-knowing*.

#### SCHOLIUM.

§ 1. The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, being Intelligent,<sup>a</sup> is a Mind, a Mind conscious of Itself. An intelligent being who is not a mind, being all the same as an intelligent being who is not, in any proper sense of the term, *intelligent* : And a mind which is not conscious of itself, being just a mind which is not deserving of the name of *mind* at all.

§ 2. Perception without the power of apperception—Consciousness of thoughts, without there being thought *objective* to the *subjective* thought which is conscious ; would be no evidence of the existence of a mind, in any thorough sense of the term standing for the true idea of a *Mind*. To be conscious of consciousness, is to have the mind, as conscious *subject*, and the *objective* thought of which the mind is conscious : this much, at the least, is implied in the very being of thinking with consciousness.

<sup>a</sup> Div. II. Part i. § 3.

## DIVISION II.

## PART II.

## PROPOSITION.

*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is, necessarily, All-powerful.*

§ 1. This must be granted, if it be shown, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, *made matter begin to be.*

§ 2. Then, as the Material Universe is finite in duration,<sup>a</sup> or began to be, it must have had a cause; for, *Whatever begins to be must have a cause.* And that cause must be, in one respect or other, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing; inasmuch as, what being, or cause, other than, or independent of, that Being, could there be? And therefore, that Being made matter begin to be.

§ 3. The *momenta* expressed, or implied, in the proof are these:—The Material Universe is finite in duration,<sup>a</sup> or it began to be. *Whatever begins to be must have a cause:* Therefore, the Material Universe had a cause. Besides the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, there was—ere the Material Universe began to be—no substance or being. Therefore there existed no Substance or Being to be the cause of the Material Universe, other than the necessarily existing Intelligent Substance or Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration. Therefore, again, this

<sup>a</sup> Div. I. Part ii. Sub-Prop.

Substance or Being was, and must have been, the very Cause, or Creator, of the Material Universe, or all matter.

§ 4. By the common consent of philosophers who have flourished since men have been familiarized with the idea of *Creation*, in the strict and proper sense, (in the sense, that is, of a *creating* being simply *the making begin to be of what before was not*;) it has been agreed, that to make matter begin to be,—in other words, to create matter,—would evince the possession of unlimited power, or all power, not involving any contradiction, or impossibility, or absurdity of any kind. For good reason, did the philosophers, *nemine contradicente*, so agree. If true creation do not prove all-powerfulness,—this can by no means be proved at all. But Creation is the highest conceivable exercise of power. Creation is, in truth, the test, and the sign, of Omnipotence. In fine, the Being who created all Matter, namely, all the visible, or (as it is called) gross matter, and all the particles, atoms, germs, elements, however subtile, visible or invisible, solid or imponderable, of matter as men see it;—that Being can do all possible things. No truth can be plainer.

§ 5. And it being shown, that the Being in question did make matter begin to be, it must be granted, that that Being is, necessarily, All-powerful.<sup>a</sup>

§ 6. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, is, necessarily, *All-powerful*.

<sup>a</sup> *Supra*, § 1, 2, &c.

## DIVISION II.

## PART III.

## PROPOSITION.

*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful, is, necessarily, entirely Free.*

§ 1. This will be evinced, if it be manifested, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful, *made motion begin to be.*

§ 2. Now, of all the corporeal substances in motion, none of them belongs to a succession of Infinity of Duration, every succession of corporeal substances being finite in duration.<sup>a</sup> And the moving substances being all finite in duration, or having begun sometime to be, they must have had a cause; for, *Whatever begins to be must have a cause.* And no first cause can be assigned, or even thought of, other than the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful. Therefore, this Being made moving substances, or motion, begin to be.

§ 3. No philosopher, of any age, was ever known to call in question the position, that the Being causing, or making begin to be, all motion, or motion absolutely, is Free, or must be supposed to be Free,—*Free* of all outward or extraneous influence, *i. e.*, in the truest sense of the word. To be the cause of all motion—to originate absolute motion,—

<sup>a</sup> Div. I. Part ii. Coroll. from Sub-Prop.

is, and has universally been, allowed to be the best possible test, and sign, of the possession of true Freeness. There is the common consent of philosophers: and there is the *sufficient reason* for the universality of doctrine.

§ 4. Motion involves the existence of bodies, and, so, of matter. If there were no bodies, there could be no motion:—at any rate, no motion of the sole kind which could appear on a platform as between Theist and Atheist, or Materialist. Motion other than the motion of corporeal things, were altogether beside the purpose of this demonstration. Motion, then, implies bodies, or corporeal substances; bodies, again, imply matter.

§ 5. The *momenta* expressed, or involved, in this demonstration, are these:—Every individual corporeal substance, or body, and every set, and every succession, of bodies, in motion, being finite in duration,<sup>a</sup> began to be. *Whatever begins to be must have a cause*: Therefore, every moving body, or substance, and every set, or succession, of moving bodies, had a cause, or creator. Besides the Simple, Sole, Being, of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, there was—ere motion, all motion, began to be—no Substance or Being whatever in existence, except Matter, which, *ex hypothesi*, was at absolute rest. Therefore, there was no substance, or being, to be the cause, or creator, of motion, other than the necessarily existing Intelligent and All-powerful Substance or Being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration. Therefore, again, this Substance or Being was, and must be supposed to have been, the very Cause, or Creator, of all the motion which began to be,—that is, of all motion whatsoever.

§ 6. And this being manifested, it is evinced, that that Being is, necessarily, entirely Free.<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Div. I. Part ii. Coroll. from Sub-Prop.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra*, § 1, 2, &c.

§ 7. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, and All-powerful, is, necessarily, *entirely Free*.

#### SCHOLIUM.

As the Simple, Sole, Being, Mind, or Spirit, of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, was the cause of all substances that move,<sup>a</sup> or, in other words, all successions of substances, or beings, (for 'tis plain, that successions of beings, *as successions*, are moved;) therefore, that Being was the Cause of the particular successions, or succession, of men. To express the same thing otherwise,—The Being in question made the succession, or successions, of those intellectual and moral beings denominated *men*, begin to be. That is, that Being is the Creator of men.

#### EPILEGOMENON.

With this Division, the consideration of the Attributes called, by a certain licence, the *Intellectual* Attributes, ends. Those Intellectual Attributes may, moreover, be said to fall under the head of the *Absolute* Attributes. They are, likewise, to be classed with the *Simple* Attributes, or those which are not *Complex* or *Compound*. Lastly,—the Attributes being divided according to another classification, those Intellectual Attributes fall to be ranged among the *Psychical*, and, among the Psychical, their place is the first.

<sup>a</sup> Prop. preced. § 2, 3, &c.

## DIVISION III.

THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES.

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## SUB-DIVISION I.

THE TRANSITIONAL ATTRIBUTES.

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## PROPOSITION I.

*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is, necessarily, completely Happy.*

§ 1. *Every position which we cannot but believe, is a necessary truth.* But we cannot but believe, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is completely Happy. Therefore, that this Being is completely Happy, is a necessary truth. The *minor* proposition of the syllogism is the only proposition standing in any need of expatiation. The *major* is an undeniable axiom: and the conclusion is the unavoidable sequence.

§ 2. Before we could righteously predicate unhappiness of the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, we would require to know of some *sufficient reason* for the predication. But we can know of none. For every kind, and degree, of unhappiness must proceed, or be resolvable into what proceeds, from some natural defect, .or



imperfection : And what imperfection can that Simple Being be subject to, who, Only, is of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free ?

§ 3. And as we can have no sufficient reason for ascribing unhappiness to that Being ; so, on the other hand, there is a sufficient reason why we cannot help ascribing to It Happiness the most complete. For, the Being is a Mind,<sup>a</sup> conscious of Itself : that is, It perceives Its own attributes, or perfections, and is conscious of the thoughts whereby It perceives them. How could a Mind conscious of perceiving, as appertaining to Itself, such attributes as Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, All-powerfulness, entire Freehness, be supposed otherwise than as most consummately Happy ?

§ 4. Truly, therefore, we cannot but believe, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is completely Happy.

§ 5. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free, is, necessarily, *completely Happy*.

#### SUB-PROPOSITION.

*The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is, necessarily, perfectly Good.*

§ 1. On the supposition, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, created intellectual and moral beings—indeed, any animal natures

<sup>a</sup> Div. II. Part i. Schol.

whatever; the only motive, or, if you think there were more motives than one, one of the motives, to create, must be believed to have been, a desire to make happiness besides its own consummate Happiness begin to be. And should there be assigned any additional motive, it cannot be believed to have been incompatible with such desire. The reason being very plain: A Mind labouring with incongruous motives cannot be happy.

§ 2. But it has been demonstrated that 'tis the case, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, created intellectual and moral, or, to employ a most comprehensive term, sentient, substances or beings.\*

§ 3. Therefore, the only motive, or, at least, one of the motives, to create, must have been, a desire to produce creaturely happiness. The will to create moral intelligences,—in one word, men,—involves, on the part of the Creating Mind, a desire to communicate of—or, according to—Its own. Had there been no such will, the will presupposing the desire, in the Divine Nature, the Divine would have remained sole, alone, without the creatures. But creation having become an accomplished fact, we can legitimately argue back to the indispensably requisite *sine quâ non conditio*, without which the creature-minds must have been as impossible as *an effect without any cause*.

§ 4. The consequentially necessary connection between the consummate Happiness of the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and entirely Free; and Its desire to communicate happiness, all possible happiness (for there is no *sufficient reason* why we should suppose the amount of happiness to be bestowed on the creatures, as creatures, to be less than it

\* Div. II. Part iii. Schol., & Div. III. Prop. i. § 4.

might be:) the necessary connection, we say, is *intuitively evident*. By no stretch of imagination can we conceive, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, and completely Happy, could be the Free Cause of misery, or aught but happiness, to Its creatures: Unless we can conceive, that happiness, as happiness, can give birth to its opposite; the cause being wholly disproportionate to the effect.

§ 5. Now, to produce, in consequence of desire to produce, all possible creaturely happiness, is to be perfectly Good.

§ 6. From all which, it is most obvious, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is, necessarily, perfectly Good.

§ 7. Then, the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is, necessarily, *perfectly Good*.

#### SCHOLIUM.

§ 1. This Proposition as to Goodness, is the great transition Proposition. It passes from the *absolute* positions to those which are *purely relative*: itself constituting the link between the two sorts. The truly absolute Propositions discourse of an unconditioned Being, which, a Supreme Mind, yet exists in, and by, and for, Itself: while Goodness takes (so to speak) that Mind beyond (as it were) Itself, and supplies the creaturely objects for the exercise and display of the relative Moral Attributes or Perfections.

§ 2. The penultimate Proposition, with its positions relating to Happiness, is—it is to be noted—of a different complexion, in that the Happiness, strictly considered, is *quite* an absolute thing. That is, the Being treated of in

the Proposition now in question is consummately Happy in Itself. By Itself, it is in possession of complete Happiness; needing, or indeed admitting of, access, or the possibility of increase, in essential Happiness, from no quarter whatever; least of all, from the creature, the product of Its own Will, and mere good pleasure. But, the Happiness overflowing, Goodness, as a distinct thing, is to be seen in being, and the creature, in its train, is the result. The creature once in conscious existence, objects for the manifestation of the relative Qualities or Properties of Mind stand out as realities.

§ 3. There may be much propriety in noticing, on this occasion, a nice, perhaps, but, withal, very important distinction. Remark we, then, that *Goodness*, as appertaining to the Supreme Mind, is no such single and simple thing as one might too hastily conclude it to be. Goodness has, indeed, two sides; or it may be said to look with two faces. On the one side, it may be regarded as the still complacency of the Supreme Spirit, disposing It contemplatively and abstractly to doings of Benevolence. The other face of Goodness presents us with the actual active kindnesses exercised in regard to the already existing creature-minds, the images, to some extent, of that Supreme Mind. In the first way, there is perfect Happiness *ready* to overflow, and, creating, to flood *the other* with gladness: In the second way, the Happiness, so consummate, *has* run over into, being mingled with, acts of actual Goodness, by the continuous production of a creation with Intellectual and Moral agents capable, according to their measure, of happiness themselves. The creatures, once in being, are objects fitted to be continuously and lastingly receptive of the Most Happy Creator's successive communications.

§ 4. But Goodness, as the principle and fount of sustained series of actings, belongs rather to another head, and the

student may be prepared for finding Goodness, seen in such light, handled under a subsequent Proposition.<sup>a</sup>

#### EPILEGOMENON.

With Proposition I. in this Division, terminate the purely *Absolute* Attributes. As a whole, these two Propositions of this Sub-Division constitute and exhaust the *Transitional*, and prepare the way for the directly *Relative*, Moral Attributes. Of course, those Propositions carry on the series of the Propositions relating to the Attributes which are the *Simple* and the *Psychical*.

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### DIVISION III.

#### THE MORAL ATTRIBUTES.

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#### SUB-DIVISION II.

#### THE RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES.

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#### SCHOLIA PRÆPOSITA.

##### SCHOLIUM I.

§ 1. In place of the words, "The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy," as well as "perfectly Good," as occurring in the last section of

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, infra*, Prop. IV. in this same Division.

the last Sub-Proposition ;\* or in place of any such collection of words ; for the future, we shall employ the one term GOD. That is, so often as is desirable we shall do so.

§ 2. This substitution will be highly advantageous, inasmuch as it will save repetitions of words, in clauses consisting of many words. 'Twill be certainly a great object gained, to prevent the necessity, ever recurring, of using so many words, in cases where each word, or phrase, is simply syncategorematic, or a part only of the complex *term* which forms the *subject* of the proposition. In the generality of cases, such circumlocutions might be apt to become troublesome.

§ 3. There is, too, another consideration. This is not a case of mere arbitrary substitution of one term for another. For the great majority of persons, including many of our best etymologists, are firmly of opinion, that the term, "God," is tantamount, linguistically speaking, to "The Good." If, however, the fact, regarding the etymology, be not as is supposed, let the term chosen be—if not by etymology, by hypothesis, and express adoption—equivalent to the whole complex term constituting the subject in such propositions as we have in view. Then, having argumentatively compassed the existence of The Good One ; we shall henceforth employ the word in question as being simply equivalent to that Good Being whose existence the demonstration has attained to ; namely, The necessarily existing Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration ; who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and, also, perfectly Good.

§ 4. The term chosen as substitute has, therefore, the great virtue of suitableness. Other etymons for the word *good* have been assigned by the learned : not one of them, however, could have been selected as an eligible substitute.

\* Viz. Div. III. Prop. i. Sub-Prop. § 7.

But the term chosen by us is, from its established associations in men's minds, admirably adapted, in every respect, for the situation it has been fixed on to fill.

§ 5. In fine, in substituting "God," we are in possession of a word expressive of an idea tantamount to the last predicate. The term conveys the great attribute, the latest element, as yet, in the demonstration. A Being, perfectly Good, necessarily exists: that is, there is necessarily a God.

§ 6. It will be understood, therefore, that so often as the term *God* shall henceforth be employed, reference is always, though tacitly, made to this present Scholium.

#### SCHOLIUM II.

§ 1. Again, for the terms themselves, *The Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and perfectly Good*; or, for the neuter pronoun "it," as standing for these terms, or so many of them;<sup>a</sup> or, finally, for the substitute noun on which we have fixed;<sup>b</sup> the word "He" shall, on every suitable occasion, be employed to denote the same thing. Not that there can be an intention to attach any idea of specific sex<sup>c</sup> to the Being denoted by the more noble pronoun: but the one word will be more suitable than the other. To us, the inhabitants of Great Britain, and, in general, the peoples who speak our English tongue, it is more decorous and reverential, and in every way becoming, to apply the word *He* to the great<sup>d</sup> and good<sup>e</sup> Being in question than any such word as *it*. Such the genius and contexture of our language.

<sup>a</sup> As used, *ex. gr.*, in Div. III. Prop. i. § 3, & Sub-Prop. § 4.

<sup>b</sup> *Vide Schol. præced.*

<sup>d</sup> Div. I. II.

<sup>c</sup> *Confer* Div. IV. Prop. ii. Schol. § 13.

<sup>e</sup> Div. III. Sub-Div. i.

§ 2. It need hardly be observed, that, in substituting the more noble personal pronoun, in the place of the impersonal pronoun "it," and its cognates, we shall, of course, embrace, with "He," the cognates "His" and "Himself," in the substitution. And for the justification of the employment of "He," "His," or "Himself," in every future instance of the use, we shall be understood to make (it may be, silent) reference to the sanction accorded by this Second Scholium of these *Scholia Præposita*.

## PROPOSITION II.

*God is necessarily True.*

### PROLEGOMENON.

§ 1. Viewed as an affair of language, the proposition, *God is True*, may be taken in one or other of two distinct senses. *First sense*: *God is True*, may be held to mean, that He truly, or in truth, or according to truthfulness, is God. So, we say, or may say, "This is the True God." Again: "Ye turned to GOD from idols, to serve the Living and True GOD."

§ 2. *Second sense*. *God is True*, may mean that He acts truly, or with trueness, or truth, or truthfulness. In this way, we may say, "Let GOD be True, but every man a liar." Or, "He that hath received His testimony, hath set to his seal that GOD is True."

§ 3. These two meanings are not only distinguishable, but they are quite different, from each other. Nevertheless, they may be (for they have been) injudiciously blended, or more or less confounded together.

§ 4. Our English word, *True*, with its two meanings, is alleged to be of Anglo-Saxon, and even Gothic descent. And



there is significance in the fact, that the same sort of distinction is preserved in the Latin adjectives, *Verus* and *Verax*. Of course, it is only in the latter of those senses, that our Proposition, God is True, is to be taken. The Proposition in the other sense has been well, if only virtually, elaborated, and, 'tis trusted, most successfully established, in the previous portions of this demonstration.

#### LEMMA.

§ 1. Now, there is one thing involved in, or rather implied by, this proposition, which must be considered at the very outset. For we can righteously advance not so much as a single step without the aid of the supposition in view.

§ 2. The supposition in question—whether expressed, or only tacitly understood; for it is by no means always necessary that a necessary supposition should be formally expressed—is, that there are *objects* of God's Truth, objects in relation to which God's Truth must be. This becomes very evident on reflection: 'tis a position containing its own evidence within itself. The notion of God's Truth clearly implies that God has objects for the manifestation of that truth. Without these, there is palpably no place for the truth. No possibility of its existence. God cannot act with truthfulness in relation to—nothing. 'Tis, then, quite plain, that the supposition in question is actually involved in our Proposition.

§ 3. And this being so, the distinction of *absolute* Attributes, and *relative* Attributes, has been therefore brought, fairly and thoroughly, into the field. Now, the distinction between an absolute attribute, and a relative one, lies in this, that the former expresses what God is in Himself, or without relation to anything beyond Himself, or His own Essence: *while the latter*, or a relative attribute, expresses what God

is in relation to something which exists besides Himself, and beyond Himself, as a creature, or, at least, as in some way objective. If one wishes to study instances of the purely absolute Attributes, choice may be made among the predicates of former Propositions in Divisions I. and II. of this demonstration.

§ 4. 'Tis, therefore, quite plain, that in the Proposition *God is True*, it is involved that there are objects. But it is a totally different consideration of what character the objects are. These may be (observe, it is not said that they must be) creatures, that is, Intelligent and Moral creatures; for no one with whom we will have to do will insult mankind by contending that God can be considered Truthful in relation simply to mere Animal Natures, destitute of intellectual and moral qualities. And to speak of Truth in relation to the Vegetable World, were lamentably out of the question: while to talk of Truth as manifested to any portion of the Mineral Kingdom, would be to suggest a sheer impossibility, and to mock our understanding by a shameless pantheistical absurdity.

§ 5. The objects of the Truth in question may possibly not be creatures like men. Nevertheless, some persons would, doubtless, contend, that the *objects* present to the mind, when we treat of God's Truth, must needs be creatures like us. These persons would assever, None but men, None but men can be. We shall (they say) admit the existence of no Intellectual and Moral inhabitants, whether man-like, or angelic, *i.e.*, having faculties analogous to those of men, only higher in degree,—no inhabitants, we repeat, of any other planet in our system—or of our own Central Luminary—or of any other self-luminous Sun or Star—or, finally, of any other sidereal system among the countless constellations, or larger systems, of the wide Heavens. So decide these self-confident,

most rigid humanitarians. Narrow is their horizon : within it, themselves the only visibles. But 'tis enough to advance, in opposition to the tenet, that only creatures that are men upon this earth can be objects of God's Truth, that this tenet has not yet been proved to be true ; neither has it been rendered at all probable.<sup>a</sup>

§ 6. But further : There are objects, indeed, of God's Truth ; but whether the object be necessarily conceived to be a creature at all,—even this must be reckoned to be an open question. A question, however, on which we mean not at all to enter. For, to do so, would involve the entering upon the subject of the constitution, the internal constitution, as it were, of the Godhead ; and it is, as a matter of course, far removed from our present purpose to investigate such a subject,—especially, if the investigation should naturally tend to bear us to the deepest foundations, in our minds, of that most profound of metaphysical topics.<sup>b</sup>

§ 7. There is, then, to be supposed *the other than* God, in proceeding to our demonstration. And in treating of the other than God, we shall, for reasons which may be gathered from the preceding sections, cast out of the account all but the intellectual and moral creatures. And, in the next place, our view shall be,—for the most part, if not always,—limited to man. For, should we, in any place, speak of other creatures, or, in plainer language, spirits with intellectual and moral natures superior to man's nature ; we shall do so as a matter of grace, or of mere hypothesis. We shall do so only for the sake of some illustration, or for the mere purpose of widening the range of our horizon. A statement, indeed, which may be found to be more applicable to subsequent places, in our demonstration, than to this place.

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, infra*, Prop. IV. Schol. ii. § 14.

<sup>b</sup> *Vide, infra*, Prop. IV. Dem. § 14, &c.

## POSTULATE.

§ 1. Let it be granted, not only that the other than God exists as objective to Him, but that God does, in actual deed, act, or make communications, towards the other, the objects being men.

§ 2. The Postulate now laid down for use in this Proposition, shall—expressly, or tacitly—be made to hold with regard to the immediately ensuing Corollary, and the Proposition succeeding it. But such postulation shall cease whenever we shall have arrived at Proposition IV., under which the postulated position shall change its character, by becoming a proved point. The proof, too, will hold with regard to each one of the three specified Propositions alike. For the evidence of all which, weigh Scholium I. § 1—9, of the Proposition referred to.

## DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. We come now to the demonstration itself of the truth of our Proposition, *God is necessarily True*. And to demonstrate this, in the exactest manner, not a great deal will be required to be advanced.

§ 2. For a mind to be true, is, to consciously act as things are, and not as they are not. 'Tis, in a word, to consciously energize in accordance with the reality. Now, to act as a thing is, requires no foreign element: but it does obviously require the introduction of a foreign element, to act as a thing is not. God, a Conscious Mind,<sup>a</sup> in acting<sup>b</sup> as He is, to men as men,<sup>c</sup> goes not beyond the reality of things. But suppose it otherwise: Suppose, to wit, God consciously acting as if He were not what He really is, or as if He were what He really is not; and to men as not being what they

<sup>a</sup> Schol. under Part i. Div. II.

<sup>b</sup> Postul.

<sup>c</sup> Lemma, § 7.

are, or as being what they are not;—you thereby necessitate the introduction of a supposition to account for this acting falsely. Obviously, you require something out of God, and beyond God, to account for His (presumed) conscious falseness. His acting truly requires no reason—no reason certainly beyond the fact, that God is God, and men are men.<sup>a</sup> Can an extraneous reason be needed to account for God manifesting Himself as God, or for God communicating with men as being what they are? Impossible. But once say, that God acts as if He were not God, that is, as if He were ceasing to be, or made to cease to be, God; and as if men were no longer men, but non-human;—once say, in any form, that God acts towards the other than Himself as if He were what He is not, or as if the other be what it is not: and you have, in the most decided manner, introduced the necessity of the supposition of a foreign element. And what foreign element can there be? Most evidently, there can be none. Out of, or beyond, the necessarily existing Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and perfectly Good, what can there be to necessitate His acting falsely? No such foreign element can be assigned, or so much as thought of, by the most unbridled imagination in its very wildest flight. 'Tis plain, there can be no being independent of that Being: None, therefore, to cause Him to energize falsely.

§ 3. But an additional absurdity would be involved by the introduction of the supposition of such foreign element. There is no place for such element—But *on supposition* of it, a fresh absurdity would come into the field. At all events, the absurdity which there unquestionably is, will be presented in a somewhat new, and greatly stronger light.

§ 4. At this stage, we consider Falsity on its mere

<sup>a</sup> Lemma, § 7.

intellectual side, or simply as opposed to the True. But under the future<sup>a</sup> Proposition concerning Justice, the False will appear in its true colours, or as the Immoral. Yet, although precluded from occupying higher ground, by taking in the element of morality, still Falsity, Falseness, Falsehood, of any kind, and of every degree, involves imperfection in the being who is false. Falseness can only have a place in a nature defective in some respect. Now, defect or imperfection cannot be supposed in God. What defect or imperfection can there be in that One Necessary Being, of utmost Simplicity, who, being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, completely Happy, and perfectly Good?

§ 5. In fine, to suppose God otherwise than True, that is, as acting falsely, were equal to the absurdity of alleging, that the necessarily Un-limited One is, in point of fact, limited: most limited too. For, no limitation can be greater than that defect which would bring about the adoption of falsehood.

§ 6. Thus, even as it is involved in the proposition, that God is necessarily True,—involved in the proposition as what it essentially means;—so, it has been rigorously demonstrated,

That God, as a Conscious Mind, acts towards the other than Himself,

As if He is what He is, not what He is not. And

As if the other is what it is, not what it is not.

To state the same thing otherwise:

God must manifest Himself as God. And

He must manifest Himself to Man as Man.

Both relations being, at same time, preserved; or, in other words,

God, as God, must communicate with Man, as being what he is—Man.

<sup>a</sup> *Infra*, Prop. III.

§ 7. So, there is a sufficient reason for our position, that God, in acting, must act as things are; and, therefore, we conclude, that God is necessarily True.

§ 8. God, then, is, necessarily, *the True*.

#### COROLLARY FROM PROPOSITION II.

*God, who is True, is necessarily Faithful.*

#### LEMMA.

§ 1. A presupposition is implied by this proposition, *God is Faithful*, in addition to the presupposition implied in the preceding proposition.

§ 2. Faithfulness demands the positing of true *objects*, as well as Truth does.\* But Faithfulness not only demands *objects* (specific and peculiar objects, indeed), but itself, as *subject*, necessitates the supposition of a thing, not, like a pure object, beyond itself. For Faithfulness plainly can only come to be exercised with reference to Promises, Covenants, or Engagements of some kind. And it is not difficult to see that all these are at bottom one. A covenant, an engagement, an obligation of any description whatsoever, come under, or entered into, by God, is just a promise in another form. All the rest are resolvable into the first: Logically speaking, the whole genus contains but one species, Divine Promise.

§ 3. As, therefore, there are *relative* attributes; among the relative attributes, this attribute of Faithfulness is by no means the least relative.

\* Preced. Prop., Lemma.

## DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. In the proof of the Proposition, no great measure of force will need to be expended. The attribute of Truth being once established, the foundations of the Faithfulness have been laid.

§ 2. Indeed, Faithfulness, as an attribute, implies not a great deal more than Trueness. Truth is not Faithfulness, but the latter involves the former, and is neither more nor less than an application, a particular application, of Truthfulness. To be faithful, is to be something more than being true, for it is to be true as to engagements contracted. Faithfulness is simply Truth as to Engagements.

§ 3. As, therefore, 'tis so that Faithfulness holds so directly of Truth, a separate and lengthily drawn out demonstration is by no means necessary: such might not even be expedient, since it would, or might, have a tendency to obscure rather than to enlighten farther. If a separate demonstration be not absolutely necessary, such might serve the same sort of purpose which works of supererogation do oftentimes accomplish: it might give birth to the thought, that a mountainous difficulty ought to be removed, where, behold, all is a plain already.

§ 4. A Divine Promise, however, is a serious thing. The Faithfulness of God is an attribute which, more than many of the attributes, depends on, *i.e.*, implies, as objective, the other than God:<sup>a</sup> Nevertheless, the faithfulness in question is the true *heavenly archetype*, or (should you object to such form of words) the real *archetypal ground* of every law which altereth not. God's Faithfulness to a promise, is the God of Truth<sup>b</sup> Himself with reference to a promise.

<sup>a</sup> Lemma.

<sup>b</sup> Proposition II.



A divine promise, once made, is sure, yea unchangeable. A promise by God, is God Himself promising. A divine promise broken, would be God no longer God, and the pledge of intellectual and moral chaos and universal ruin. In fine, *it is impossible for God, having covenanted, to lie*, because it is impossible that God should cease to be.

§ 5. We cannot hesitate, therefore, to maintain, that the doctrine of the necessary Faithfulness of God is necessarily sound doctrine.

§ 6. So God, who is the True, is, necessarily, *the Faithful*.

### PROPOSITION III.

*God, who is True, and Faithful, is necessarily  
Inflexibly Just.*

#### LEMMA.

§ 1. If the preceding Proposition demanded a great presupposition to be previously grounded,<sup>a</sup> the present one equally, or much more, makes the same requirement. If to manifest Truth, or to do the Truth (as one saith), objects are required; to manifest Justice requires, no less, *objects* on which the Justice is to be exercised.

§ 2. And not to repeat at length considerations advanced under that previous Proposition, the objects presented to the Justice must be, or, at any rate, shall be, considered to be *men*. They must be so considered, taking the nature of the lower animals, and all beneath the lower animals, into account. And the objects of the Justice shall, or, perhaps, must be considered to the exclusion of angel-spirits, or any possibly existing higher natures.<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Prop. II. Lemma.

§ 3. But it falls to be now noticed, that another element, with special regard to one at least of the factors, must be introduced. While the proposition, God is True, regards, or may regard men, simply as men; the proposition, God is Just, regards, always regards, men in the farther light of being

Men,		Men,
Virtuous,	or	Un-virtuous, or
		Vicious :
In other words,		
Good,	or	Bad, or Evil ;
Righteous,		Un-righteous, or
		Wicked :
In fine,		
Moral,	or	Im-moral.
With		
All the subdivisions		
of		
Truthful, &c.		False, &c.

A moral designation, therefore, is added to the objects. The men are always considered to be Virtuous, or Moral, or, on the other hand, Unvirtuous, or Immoral.

§ 4. The propriety of the introduction of that new element will not be seriously gainsayed. To be True, nothing more is required than to do as things are, and not as they are not; and the notion is complete without considering whether the creatures, who are the objects to whom the Truth is manifested, be good or be bad. But it is different in the case of Justice. God cannot be the Just God to men unless their moral condition be taken into account. Justice, in fact, is a quality having necessary reference to the deserts or merits, and the demerits, that is, the goodness or the badness, of

its objects. Take away moral states, and you obliterate the possibility of the exercise of Justice.

§ 5. There needs no elaborate proof of the propriety of what is now advanced. 'Tis involved in the propositions themselves, as the use of language shows. No necessity can lie upon one to prove that common language means what it means. The use of language must proceed, no doubt, from the source of the firm realities in the region of absolute ideas, (the certain regulators they of affairs in the sphere or plane underneath,) as an effect involves the existence somewhere of its cause;<sup>a</sup> and the good use of language has fixed, that to be True is different from being Just, and that to be Just requires that there be some merit, or some demerit, in each one of the objects. Unless men be considered to be good, and bad, they are not fit objects for the display of Justice. Justice, in fine, has a distinct additional element in it over and above that which Trueness of necessity involves. Truth has to do with existences simply: Justice, with moral existences only as such.

§ 6. The present Proposition, therefore, not only relates to a *relative* Attribute; but, if there be degrees in relativeness, this Proposition were more relative than even the penultimate one.

§ 7. Our Proposition is tantamount, then, to this, that God must be Just to men, as Moral Beings. God is Just: that is, He acts towards the good man, as being a good man; and towards the evil or bad, as being so.

#### DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. Now come we to the demonstration of the proposition, *that God is inflexibly Just, and that necessarily*. This is a proposition second to none in importance, and the

<sup>a</sup> Confer, *infra*, Schol. III. § 35.

greatest care must be taken that, to the keenest eye, no lack of cogency, or the exactest accuracy, shall be discernible in our demonstration.

§ 2. We have already<sup>a</sup> adverted to the peculiarity connected with the objects of this attribute of Justice. Man is—specially, if not exclusively—regarded by it as a *moral being*.<sup>a</sup> A characteristic, in truth, of the human race is Conscience. Every genuine member of the family of man is distinguished, and honoured, and blessed, by the possession of this admirable mental power. This it is which, even more than his Intellectual pre-eminence, gives man (the undisputed sovereign lord of all this *kosmos*) his vast superiority over even the very highest of the lower animals: this it is which most assimilates man to every higher order of minds,—more especially to The Mind over all minds. By this Conscience, or Moral Sense, man approves or disapproves of the actions of moral agents,—praises, or blames, the doers of the actions, good and ill,—recognises the one kind to be worthy of reward, and the opposite kind to be deserving of punishment. The faculty, susceptibility, or power of mind in question, has been called, by some philosophers, *Conscientiousness*: a good word enough, perhaps, to express, distinctively, the thing meant.

§ 3. The next point is: Is there convincing reason for attributing to God such a quality or property of mind as that denoted? In answering which question, it may at once be fearlessly advanced, that, as far as regards man, this faculty of Conscientiousness is a most undoubted perfection. Not only so: for Conscience asserts, and vindicates in asserting, its rightful supremacy over the whole man, as a Moral Being. It claims to be above all the emotions, as well as all the passions,—above all the feelings, indeed, let them be called by any name one likes; and, above them all, Conscience

<sup>a</sup> Lemma.

reigns as rightful absolute monarch. In fine, if Conscience be no perfection, there is no perfection in, or connected with, man. That man has Intellectual excellencies or perfections, few will dispute, and none can establish, since a complete proof would itself denote a most unexceptionable excellency of reasoning. But man's power to take in intellectual truths in the pure mathematics themselves,—to discern, say, the relation of equality between twice two ( $2+2$ , or  $2\times 2$ ) and four (4)—the comprehension of the simplest equation being accepted as evidence of aptitude for the abstrusest geometrical, or algebraical, calculations; could yet be reckoned as appertaining to no perfection of man's nature, if the power to distinguish between right and wrong—virtuous action and unvirtuous,—to perceive merit and demerit, to award praise and blame, and to distribute reward and punishment, accordingly,—if such, we say, be no perfection. But the power of mind under notice is not only a perfection, but it is manifestly an original and distinct perfection of mind. Indeed, this is implied by the very nature of the case: For, how could such a perfection grow from nothing, or result from any congeries of powers destitute of Conscientiousness themselves? 'Twere ridiculous to contend, that Conscience, rudiments and all, could have been (not cultivated and improved, but acquired) absolutely acquired by education; for 'tis but too obvious, that a conscience cannot be the product of factors themselves wanting all conscience. In fact, every genuine representative of our race will admit—yea, he will glory in—the uniqueness, and the lawful supremacy, of Conscience. Those persons only who, malformed, or ill-constituted, as individuals, are deficient, as to degree, in this grand faculty, will seek to lower its claims, and represent them as baseless pretensions. These individuals, in speaking, may draw from their own experi-

ence—in which they are most unhappy. But their mishap must be corrected by the general verdict. Taking in all the landscape, exceptional infelicities are lost sight of by the large-minded spectator. And 'tis well that it be so. In fine, Conscience is the greatest of perfections in man's whole Intellectual System.

§ 4. In the next place : It being to be taken for granted, as a most certain truth, that Conscience is a perfection ; we proceed to consider the identification of God as the Originator of man's conscience, Himself the Conscience of consciences. Now, 'tis to be noted, that there is an Axiom as sure as any axiom, or any truth whatever, in any Science whatsoever, even inclusive of the exact sciences. The Axiom, so much to our purpose, is : *An effect, quò effect, cannot possess any original, distinct, perfection, which is not in the cause, either actually, or at least in a higher degree.* It has been proved, that man is a creature,<sup>a</sup> which is another way of saying that he is an effect; and to affirm, that man is a creature, or an effect, is equivalent to the affirmation that man has a Creator, or that (regard being had to the nature of the proof) there is a First Cause. Therefore, in the Creator, or Mind of minds, *quò* First Cause, there must be an attribute corresponding to this perfection, the Conscience to wit, in man the creature, *quò* effect. For, no Effect can possibly have a perfection which is not, in some respect, in the Cause : Otherwise, the perfection might be effected by—*nothing*.

§ 5. If any one should, by way of objecting, urge that such arguing from man's moral sense to the mind of God, is *à posteriori*; the reply is: Granted, that an *à posteriori* element has been allowed to enter here. But the continent of the element—the larger ground, in virtue of which the entrance of the element became a possibility—was by no means

<sup>a</sup> Schol. under Part iii. Div. II.

*d posteriori* ground. The larger point, that man is a creature, or an effect, and, correlatively, that there is a Creator, or First Cause;—the proof of this was sufficiently *d priori*. Let it be remembered, therefore, of what nature is the demonstration as a whole. The method which has been followed, in the present instance, is of a mixed character,—but what of that? The perfection of this demonstration consists not in this, that, from beginning to end, there are no *d posteriori*, or purely empirical, elements to be found, however diligent may be the search. Because, where man is concerned, and is, indeed, a main factor, it is impossible to be altogether without *momenta* drawn from (what is called) *probable evidence*. And any expectation that all such *momenta* would be altogether absent, would be the height of extravagance. The very introduction into the subject of *Matter*, as a thing to be reasoned about—*Matter*, which is the only and very God of the Atheists, who must be presumed to be ever in the posture of hostile critics;—*Matter*, we say, brings with it *d posteriori* elements, if, indeed, *Matter* itself be not to be regarded as an entirely empirical existence. Certainly, Expansion and Duration, on the one side, and *Matter*, on the other, do not fall under the same category: *Matter* being admittedly contingent in this, that we are not obliged, by the constitution of our minds, to conceive of it as always existing; while, again, Expansion and Duration exist to us as things the non-existence of which is not possible. Besides, too: When we shall have arrived at a succeeding Proposition,<sup>a</sup> it will be seen that there is a special reason, of a peculiar description, for the exceptional treatment of the Attribute under notice, the Justice, to wit, of God. But the perfection of our demonstration lies in this, that, in all the main features, and specially as touching the Being, and the absolute Attributes of

<sup>a</sup> Viz. Coroll. from Prop. III.

the Chief Factor, the method is purely *à priori*, synthetical, deductive, abstract. The perfection, too, of the demonstration, when its final cause is in view, will (in fine) be found to be in its being convincing, and irrefragable by any objector. In these regards will consist the real perfection of the demonstration: not in its having received no aids, anywhere, from human observation, or general experience, in matters relating to man, and his to him most weighty concernments.

§ 6. Upon the whole: 'Tis, therefore, clear that in the Supreme Mind there is the Quality or Property of Conscience. Reason shows, that God is the Just God: Consciously Just. Justice is most assuredly one of the Divine Attributes.

§ 7. It being, then, established, that God is Just, and it having been laid down (what is sufficiently incontrovertible) that the just and the unjust among men are the proper objects of God's Justice;<sup>a</sup> we are prepared to approach another point in our extensive horizon, and edge off our workmanship by an *à priori* finishing. God's Truth and His Justice impinge upon each other; but they do not, for all that, coalesce. The Truth and the Justice coincide, to a certain extent: so far they go on the same road; but, while Truth has been proceeding in a wider highway, Justice goes farther along the route. The fact is, that the Just God acts towards moral agents according to their true states,—that is, towards the good as being good, and towards the evil as being so. This is, however, in virtue, not of God's Trueness, but of His Justness. This latter it is which specializes in the common objects, men, fixing, exclusively, on the moral principles of the nature. But, nevertheless, God's Justice involves the Trueness. A matter of moment, since a highly important consequence follows.

§ 8. Inasmuch as God's Justice is, indeed, little more than

<sup>a</sup> Lemma.



His Trueness applied to the good, and to the bad, as being, respectively, good and bad, morally: The supposition that God is un-just, involving that He is false; as the absurdity of God's being false has been demonstrated,<sup>a</sup> the absurdity of the supposition which would involve that absurdity is also, at same time, made manifest. For God to be false, were impossible:<sup>a</sup> Therefore, the supposition of God being un-just, as implying the same impossibility, were impossible also.

§ 9. Again: For the Just God to act as if He were not Just,—or for God to act to the good as if they were bad, and to the bad as if they were good; were to be (not only not True, *i.e.*, False—but, moreover) un-just and im-moral. But the simple supposition of God's injustice is so absurd in itself, that no position can by any possibility be more absurd. For, to suppose God to be unjust, were to suppose that God has need to be unjust; and to suppose this, would be to suppose a cause without, or apart from, God, compelling Him: and 'tis absurd, in the case of God, as we have demonstrated His Existence, and so many of His Attributes,<sup>b</sup> to suppose a cause, *ab extra*, or outside Him, determining Him. In short, nothing more absurd than, without reference to any other absurdity, to suppose God to be necessitated, from without, to act as He is not—to be obliged to act as He is not, to men good, and men bad, as being otherwise than they really are.

§ 10. Thus, there can be no reason why we should suppose the possibility of God being unjust: but there is sufficient reason why we pronounce the impossibility of there being injustice in God.

§ 11. We can have no difficulty, therefore, in arriving at the conclusion, that God and Justice stand to each other as necessary inseparables; and so we maintain, that God is necessarily of inflexible Justice.

<sup>a</sup> *Supra*, Prop. II.

<sup>b</sup> See the Propositions in Divisions I. & II.

§ 12. Then, God, who is the True, and the Faithful, is, necessarily, *the inflexibly Just*.

#### SCHOLIUM I.

##### MAN, AS A MORAL BEING INHABITING THE EARTH.

§ 1. 'Tis incumbent upon us now to enter upon another part of our subject. We have noticed a special element which falls to be introduced when treating of Justice,<sup>a</sup> and we are arrived at the place where we must take notice of an additional element, one, too, of the gravest importance. The former element was weighty in one respect: this one will be seen to be so in another. The former went to make up the idea of what Justice implies, or what is Justice: and therefore it behoved to appear *before* the demonstration. But it may perhaps be, that the present element looks more towards the consequences of Justice, than the constitution itself of the idea thereof: and, so, its natural position is *after* the demonstration. Its fit place is in our posterior analytics.

§ 2. We have seen, that the Justice of God implies that He act to the good as good; to the bad, as being really bad.<sup>b</sup> But we now allege, that the good man is, as such, naturally happy: he is happy so far as he is good, or as the good which is in him is uninterruptedly operative. Analogously, the bad man, as such, is infallibly unhappy, or, to adopt as plain a word, miserable. Goodness or virtue, in short, implies happiness, and vice implies misery, of a greater or a less degree. God, therefore, must act towards the good man as being a happy man, and to the evil man as being a miserable man. And we shall have an opportunity of observing how much, of even tremendous significance, is involved in these things.<sup>c</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Supra*, Lemma.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra*, Dem.

<sup>c</sup> *Vide, infra*, Schol. II. Sect. 13, 14;—*aliasq*:

§ 3. It is, then, to be shown, that goodness in men involves happiness; and badness, unhappiness. Afterwards, we shall attend emphatically to what is implied in God acting to the good or happy man, as being truly a happy man, and to the evil or unhappy man—to be plain with you, the sinner—as being indeed an unhappy, yea a miserable man.<sup>a</sup> Not omitting neither the consequences of such action in the one way and in the other. At the point indicated, the grand doctrine of Rewards and Punishments will break in upon us; and, in self-luminous flashes of light derived from the source of that doctrine, we shall have, at a certain point in our progress, glimpses of the unutterable blessedness of heaven; as well as be obliged to admit within the scope of our gaze (although blasting will be the vision) the lurid darkness of the horrid damnation of hell. Such the dire necessity of the case.

§ 4. Thus, we are to address ourselves, in the first place, to the doctrine, that virtue involves happiness; and vice, misery.

§ 5. Now, when we say, that the virtuous, or good man is, as such, happy; we mean, that this is so according to the constitution and course of nature, the constitution and course of nature as experienced by us. But goodness is not the only thing or cause in operation, in any case. As Consciousness testifies, and as Observation of others, and Experience generally make plain, there is no man thoroughly good, and that continually: and there are other disturbing forces at work besides those flowing from the man himself, directly, or indirectly; voluntarily, or hereditarily. There are other lines, some of them of course traversing lines, besides the main line of life. All those disturbing forces, from whatever quarter, being resolvable into the evil that

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, infra*, Schol. II. *Atque*, Schol. III.

is in the world. And the consequence of all this, the experienced, and the admitted consequence is, that goodness is not so much productive of, and attended by, happiness simply, as *it tends, always tends, to be so*. Virtue, so far forth as it is virtue, involves happiness, so far as the virtue is singly operative. This length we must indeed go. But the confusion which there is in the actual world prevents us from being able to go farther. Still, let it be believed, that length is quite far enough from being a short way.

§ 6. And, similarly, the same sort of thing holds with regard to the opposite, unvirtuousness. As, according to the constitution of nature, the good man is happy, so, after the same fashion, the vicious man is miserable, more or less miserable, and he always *tends to become so, and more and more*. But no wicked man alive is as evil as it is possible he might have been, or may hereafter come to be; by reason—if for no other reason—of the good, the great good, which there is in this world of sense, with all its deficiencies: The good will not allow the evil to be so evil, as, without the good, the evil would assuredly be. The good is always striving (such is its nature) to keep the evil within bounds, and to lessen the effects, at least, of its malignity. And the experienced consequence is, that evil, or vice, is not attended by so much misery as it invariably tends to produce. For the same reason—that is, this is the reason—Sin, most prolific mother, does not sooner bring about Death, true, absolute Death. There are counteracting agencies at work, which keep the whole of the dreadful sin-brood in a sort of half-life, or lingering death. It is only when Sin hath conceived, in a completed way, that the dread 'monster-mother' effects the legitimate end, and bringeth forth unsightly Death.

§ 7. If there be any qualifications of the doctrine, above-delivered, of Virtue leading to Happiness, and Vice leading

to Misery,—any qualifications other than have been already advanced; these of course should have a hearing. But it does not appear that there are any other qualifications. The subject might, indeed, be much drawn out: many particulars might be brought in, in the way of details. But besides the great fact of the incessant conflict, the ever-waged battle, of Good against Evil, and Evil against Good, and the consequent limits and constraints set by the one to the actual progress of the other; there cannot be adduced any distinct consideration. In fine, how can there be any qualifications but those denoted, however dimly? Apart from the limitations set by The Good, and its kingdom, to the Evil, with its shadowy likeness of a kingdom, and by the Evil to The Good; what should hinder each working, without let or hindrance, on and on? Good tending always to happiness, more good and more happiness; evil tending always to evil, and misery, more and more, without assignable end.

§ 8. Those effects, namely, happiness and the reverse, are, then, the natural consequences, certainly the natural attendants, of Virtue and Viciousness. And if any one will, the effects in question might be designated *Rewards* and *Punishments*. Happiness may, indeed, be said to be the natural Reward of the good man; as Misery may be said to be the natural Punishment of the evil man.

§ 9. All this which has been advanced is nothing but an appeal to those facts with which knowledge of ourselves, and external observation supply us. A *demonstrative proof*, therefore, as it were out of the question, so it is quite unnecessary. In truth, we can demonstrate no fact regarding men: that is, we cannot demonstrate, in the strictest sense; we can only prove in virtue of postulates. There is no more than *one fact, in all the universe*, which is truly strictly *demonstrative, the fact*, namely, of the Existence of God. Nor can

those statements regarding human nature be supported by *authority*; because the facts are so, or they are so and so, whatever any one may urge. Authority, *as such*, would go for nothing. Yet, in a question, as to any matter of fact, whether a thing be so and so, or not, it is quite competent and pertinent to adduce the testimony of those who are the best judges of what is really the fact. It is quite competent to produce *witnesses*, who could testify as to what they have observed, in regard to the matter in hand; and it would be quite pertinent, were the facts of the case doubtful. *But they are not so.*

## SCHOLIUM II.

THE INDISSOLUBLE CONNECTION BETWEEN MORALITY AND HAPPINESS,—  
AND IMMORALITY AND MISERY.

§ 1. 'Tis the case, then, that, by the constitution and course of nature, the moral are actually happy; the immoral, the reverse.\* This is true, but true, however, with the conditions and qualifications stated in the preceding Scholium. The imperfect virtue which obtains among men tends to produce happiness,—while the actually existing vice, with all its checks, has a tendency to produce unhappiness and positive misery. So far as virtue operates unimpeded, it has such a tendency: so far as untrammelled vice extends, it has a tendency drawing in the opposite direction, or to wretchedness within and without the man. Such is indeed the constitution and course of nature, as made known to us by our own consciousness, and as observed regarding others, in the way of daily experience. The moral are, comparatively, the happy: the immoral, the unhappy. Now, an important immanent question awaits us here: Is such constitution founded in the

\* *Schol. præced.*

eternal fitnesses of things, or not? is it intrinsically necessary, or is it, on the contrary, purely contingent and arbitrary? Let us put it otherwise. Is it an inherent power of virtue that it produce happiness? and, Is it inherent in vice to produce misery? Or, Is the reverse true? And, Are the happiness and the unhappiness merely arbitrarily superadded qualities—superadded, that is, by the arbitrary fiat, the mere will or good pleasure, of the Creator?<sup>a</sup>

§ 2. But whereas the question, as put, does, though secretly, yet really, distinguish between the nature of the Creator, and His good pleasure, or fiat, insinuating, too, that the nature and the particular will could possibly be disjoined and disconnected: it is to be preliminarily observed that the disconnection is impossible. This follows from Proposition II., where it was proved that God, the Creator, is necessarily True. Being most Truthful, He must manifest Himself as He is; He cannot, therefore, reveal Himself by a fiat, declarative of a general law, inconsistent with the reality of His character. God's fiat, in fine, must be but the pure expression of Himself, as willing from, or in accordance with, His nature.

§ 3. This may be said to be an answer to the question by objecting to it, by objecting to an assumption radically contained in it, and by raising a previous question. Nevertheless, it appears to involve, in any view, an answer to the interrogatory. It answers by a decided negative as to the possible arbitrariness of any such fiat.

§ 4. Thus, the course of nature determining that virtue should produce happiness, and vice misery; it seems to follow, that the connection between the virtue and the happiness, the vice and the misery, is not arbitrary but necessary. That is, taking the constitution of things as an expression of

<sup>a</sup> Scholium under Part iii. Division II.

the will—*fiat*, if you prefer the word—of God ; it seems to be evident that the constitution of things, which fixes the connection in question, is unalterable. The expression of will being grounded in the nature of that God whose attributes have been demonstrated, is therefore unchangeable. The essential attributes of God are immutable, if immutability be.

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§ 5. But as the relation of virtue to happiness, and of vice to misery, is an important subject ; and it may be attended with good results to dwell upon the character of the connection in question ; let us consider the matter yet a little further, by letting in new lights, and looking at the objects in other attitudes. Let us, starting afresh, put the question over again, while the ground of the objection which was sustained is dropped out.

§ 6. Is it inherent in virtue to be accompanied by happiness ? and in vice to be accompanied by the reverse ? Or, on the contrary, could virtue be followed, as a matter of course, by misery ? and could vice be followed, by reason of the same law, by true happiness ?

§ 7. Virtue leads, at present, to happiness ; and vice, to misery.<sup>a</sup> Now, this human virtue—of whatever it may consist, *i. e.*, of whatever particulars it may be composed, or into whatever elemental bases it may be resolved—must be held to be, generally, expressive of conformity to the moral nature with which man is endowed ; while vice, shortly, denotes departure from such conformity. Next, the virtue, which is simply conformity to the true moral nature of man, must be also allowed to be in conformity, *so far, at the very least*, with the moral nature with which man was originally endowed by his Creator ; while the contrary holds as to vice.

<sup>a</sup> *Schol. præced.*



This is just what is meant by *Virtue*, or *Morality*; what, by the opposite, *Vice*. This is just the virtue and the vice about which the question asks: Otherwise, no question can be legitimately before us, as at this stage in our argument. We cannot logically ignore now the supposition of God, the Creator of men.

§ 8. This being so, the question before us almost answers itself. In viewing human virtue as a conformity, partial conformity it may be, to the moral nature with which man was at first endowed, it must view virtue as being, to a certain extent at least, in conformity also with the nature of the Creator Himself. How, then, were it possible that virtue should not be followed by happiness, since the Creator Himself is happy?<sup>a</sup> Could conformity, in a variety of ways, to the Creator's own nature, lead to anything but something else equally in conformity with the nature of the Creator? Could living as God would have us live; being, so, like Himself; conduct but to something like Himself? Could it possibly conduct to anything unlike Himself?—So, too, regarding vice. This is disconformity to the true nature of man, and, so, to the nature of God. How, then, could it lead to happiness, or aught but the reverse of happiness? How could disconformity, in important regards, to the God-like, lead but to some other un-God-like disconformity? Could the vice, the unlike God, lead to happiness, the like God?

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§ 9. Thus the question which was raised<sup>b</sup> is to be met with a decided negative, approaching it by the track pursued. But while throughout the preceding, the elements of Virtue and Vice predominated; in what is to follow, certain other elements will be the predominating ones.

<sup>a</sup> Div. III. Prop. i.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra*, § 6, *sub fin.*

§ 10. The question, then, being looked at with the element of Happiness, and that of Misery, its reverse, prominently in the foreground ; it is fortunate that we can, at once, answer, that any alternative, such as the question presents, cannot be entertained for one moment. The connection between virtue and happiness, and vice and misery, is indissoluble, being grounded in the very nature of things which are themselves immutable.

§ 11. The reason why the connection in question is unalterable, is, because the supposition of aught else were quite inconsistent with the nature of that Supreme already demonstrated. He is, for example, necessarily consummately Happy.<sup>a</sup> And, so far as He produces anything *like Himself*, He must effect creaturely Happiness, only creaturely Happiness.<sup>b</sup> That is, by the constitution of things established by God, the creature man, following the laws of its highest or inmost being, must be happy. Un-happiness is the un-like God ; unhappiness, therefore, can only be the attribute of creatures unlike God. There will be no dispute as to whether the moral part of the nature of moral beings be the main seat of happiness, worthy of the name, and of unhappiness. True happiness, if not itself a moral quality, is necessarily associated with moral qualities. Perhaps it is an index to their state and condition : the greater the true happiness, the more the genuine moral qualities are in exercise. Happiness, in fine, if not a moral faculty, is at least a *quasi* moral faculty ; and it is certainly a very important quality, whatever else it be. It follows, that moral creatures, unlike God as to happiness, presuppose a change to have taken place with regard to them since the time of their being created. Thus : Certain creatures are unhappy, that is, habitually so. Being unhappy, they are unlike God. A race of

<sup>a</sup> Div. III. Prop. i.

<sup>b</sup> Sub-Prop. under Prop i. Div. III.

moral creatures, unlike God, must in time have become so ; that is, they must, in some way or other, have degenerated, or become sinners. God cannot be supposed to have for creatures, the direct work of his hands, or (should you object to the anthropomorphic language) his own workmanship, beings unlike Himself, opposed to Himself, in their moral qualifications ; as this would involve an effect without a cause ; or, rather, it would involve an effect proceeding from an inadequate and impossible cause, a thing, if possible, even more absurd than the other. The creatures, therefore, as they came from God, at their creation, must have resembled God ; in other words, they must have been in His image and likeness. They must have been, therefore, happy. That is, as moral beings, with their moral natures entire, and in legitimate exercise ; which in other words is just saying, truly and thoroughly virtuous beings ; they must have been happy. Being like God, being virtuous or innocent, man (very properly we, under our present circumstances, shall by no means be allowed to call him *the Adamic man*) was necessarily very happy.

§ 12. All this is, unless a huge mistake has entered into the reasoning, a demonstration, founded upon the nature, or the attributes, of God, of the real connection which exists between virtue and happiness, and, consequentially, between vice and misery ; when one ascends to the source of things, where, only, things at their perfection can be seen. In the foregoing Scholium, the connection between imperfect virtue, and imperfect happiness, in man, as he at present is, is stated as a *fact of experience* : and herein we have been greatly busied with an enquiry as to human virtue and happiness as man must have existed when he came fresh from his Creator's hands. To this enquiry, the application of strict *a priori* reasoning is quite practicable and legitimate. And should

any one deem it to be otherwise, in general, or in particular, he has no more to do than put his finger on the place where is the wrongness in what is advanced. An objector has only to shew, that *a priori* reasoning is totally inapplicable, or point out wherein it has been positively misapplied in the detail.

§ 13. And now to enforce that for which much of the foregoing is an excellent preparation. But before proceeding in our course, we may take the opportunity to make, or to repeat, an observation. When certain expressions (such as, "a good man;" "a happy man:" "a bad man;" an "unhappy," or a "miserable" man) and others coined after the same fashions, are employed; they are, of course, to be taken in connection with their proper qualifications. It cannot be deemed to be necessary to qualify, on every occasion, propositions, or expressions, which have been qualified once for all.<sup>a</sup> To return now to that which we were about to enforce: Goodness and happiness are intimately, yea, inseparably, associated; as well as are the opposites, badness and unhappiness.<sup>b</sup> When, therefore, God acts in relation to a good man, as such, He is in contact with a happy man. And when God manifests Himself towards a happy man, the man is, of course, made to be more happy. The good man is naturally happy: moreover, he necessarily becomes more so, in the case where God, The Blessed One (*Ὁ Μακάριος*),<sup>c</sup> in acting, just reveals or communicates Himself.

§ 14. In like manner, when the consummately Happy Being specially reveals Himself to a bad man, the man, naturally unhappy, is necessarily made to become more

<sup>a</sup> Scholium I. §§ 5, 6; also, above, § 1.

<sup>b</sup> Schol. I. and preceding portion of this Schol.      <sup>c</sup> Div. III. Prop. i.

miserable. Just because, in the case supposed, a Nature diametrically opposite, and contrary, is in contact with the evil of the bad man. It is, indeed, an awful thought—but one of the most pregnant with high consequences of any which deal in the great concernments of moral matters—that the mere contact of goodness and evil, where the goodness is over-poweringly influential, should result in misery, or, rather, an increase in misery, to the bad. But it is inevitably so. Such is the constitution of things: *and it could not be otherwise*. It could not be otherwise, simply because God is God, and cannot cease to be God.

#### SCHOLIUM SUB SCHOLIO II.

§ 1. One thing is now clear: Sinners have a reason for hating God. Men who are conscious of sinning against Him who is the True,—the Faithful executor of the laws of Nature, as being, so far, but the outside expressions of His inner Character, and to which, by once establishing them, He has engaged to adhere,—the inflexibly Just One, rendering to every man according to his deeds; men, we repeat, who are conscious of being sinners, may well hate God, because He increases their misery when He draws nigh unto them. Sinners, however, and Sin, are not the same, and not everything which is true of the one, is true of the other also. Inasmuch, then, as the domain of Sin is intensified, and so increased, by the contact of God with the nature in which Sin reigns, she (to personify Sin) may yet be imagined to rejoice herein. Sin, in becoming more conscious to herself of her exceeding sinfulness, becoming enlarged, or intensified, by contact with God, may be imagined to rejoice at this the extension of her borders. Still, Sin, the monster-mother of all human anguish, should she, in portentous audacity, court

for such reason the thought of God, should also remember, that she courts the contact of her bane: not wise, after the pattern of the wisdom of the serpent, but foolish, after the fashion of fatuous self-murderers, to allow herself to be drawn within the vortex of that mighty influence which shall at last be her inevitable destruction. When Sin hath fully conceived, by reason of her visions of God, her offspring will assuredly be Death. And Death, once brought fairly forth, will have an insatiable maw, maw never to be satisfied until Sin herself, own mother of Death, shall be consumed. And then his occupation being entirely gone, and his subsistence no longer possible, but thoroughly impossible, Death himself shall die.

§ 2. Therefore, it is pre-eminently sinners, miserable sinners, who yet madly cry, in their hearts, to God, 'Depart from us, for we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways,' who, as actuated by self-interested motives, *should* desire the contact of the Good One, even though He approach as the Just God; for in the increase, and the ever increase, of their misery, lies the direction of the only door of hope. For to have hope, the sinner must forsake his way, and, as unrighteous, his thoughts, the very thoughts however which constitute, as it were, his radical nature, as his nature has come to be. Then, indeed, repenting, or changing his mind; ceasing to do evil, and learning to do well; becoming, in fine, a new man; God can be the Just God to him, and yet a source of blessedness.

§ 3. But although the preceding be nothing but what is legitimately consistent with doctrine dealing only in *à priori* principles; alas! neither *à priori* principle, nor application of any *à priori* principle; no *à priori* reasoning, and, in fact, no reasoning whatever; can tell how a man, being evil, is, in consistency with the strict rules of the attribute of Inflexible Justice, to be changed into a good being: For this

would involve a new creation, and, so, it would utterly transcend the region of purely Moral Law. Reasoning, not ascending above the plane of this attribute of Justice, can do no more than tell how the Just God acts towards the good and the bad, the happy and the unhappy, as such, and the results, in accordance with the established course of nature, in the first place, and, in the next, with the constitution of things, as related to each other by eternal fitnesses.

### SCHOLIUM III.

#### THE JUSTICE OF THE FUTURE.

§ 1. It has been stated,<sup>a</sup> that Happiness may be said to be the natural Reward of the good man, and Misery the natural Punishment of the evil man. This brings us, in a general way, to the great topic of *Rewards and Punishments*. May it not be said with truth, that, for us, men, and sinners, (as we unquestionably are, on the supposition of a God of Truth,<sup>b</sup> and of Justice,<sup>c</sup> who created us in His own image and likeness, morally,) not the least important subject falling to be discussed, under this Proposition relating to God's Justice, is this same subject of Rewards and Punishments? Or, might it not be said, with propriety, that the doctrine of PUNISHMENTS, solely, is, for mankind as they commonly are, the important matter in this whole inquiry? A form of the question which would surely fit the topic more accurately to the occasion, than one which introduced the subject of REWARDS as an equally prominent element.

§ 2. Connected, then, with the great subject of Good and Evil, of Happiness and Unhappiness, of Reward and Punishment, there is still a question remaining for consideration; a question yielding, in importance and interest, to none what-

<sup>a</sup> Schol. I. § 8,—*aliiq;*

<sup>b</sup> Prop. II.

<sup>c</sup> Dem. preced.

ever. The particular subject is that of future Rewards and Punishments, or, to express it more accurately, Rewards and Punishments in a future state, if a future state there be. And how are these Rewards and Punishments of the future—assumed to be certain—to be affected by that Inflexible Justice of God?

§ 3. There are, therefore, two great questions before us for consideration in this place. Do the premises to which we have acquired right, entitle us to infer that there shall be a future state of existence for man? Such is the first question, and the second is, What saith the Justice of God as to the moral arrangements of the future state, ascertained, and held to be certain?

#### I. SHALL THERE BE A FUTURE STATE FOR MAN?

§ 4. Looking, then, in the direction of these topics, we ask, Does the doctrine of the reality of a future life, with its Rewards and Punishments, belong in truth to the subject of Natural Religion? and, in particular, does the doctrine fall under our *a priori* argument, appertaining, with perfect propriety, to its procedure? These queries deserve to be answered in the most decided affirmatives; and it is to be remembered, that the affirmation of the latter implies the affirmation of the former. The general consideration of a future state of Rewards and Punishments, does evidently belong to the subject of Natural Religion, and, most incontestably, the consideration does, specifically, belong to the domain of the *a priori* Theology. For, every thing which undeniably follows from, or is a strict application of, the *first principles* of our Science,—which themselves must be unimpugnable;—every such thing, 'tis repeated, is legitimately introducible, and, in a question of *title*, must be allowed to remain, as lawful adjuncts, among the fitting accessory perti-



nents of the principal theme. But 'tis not less than a duty to make this whole matter level to the commonest understanding. Of the most weighty concernments of every man we are directly treating at this present; and here, therefore, if any where, the deliverance should be clear, and devoid of all uncertainty or ambiguity. 'Tis a most serious thing to consider the judgment of imperative Justice itself. It behoves us, in sooth, to make the matter quite plain.

§ 5. It has been demonstrated, that there is a God of Truth, and of Faithfulness, and of Inflexible Justice, and we have seen what demonstrations of such a character do, of necessity, involve. To the Justice of God, as the acme of the series,<sup>a</sup> there must be now adjoined the facts made clear regarding man: to wit, that, to him, happiness comes in proportion to his advances in virtuousness—in proportion, too, to the absence of traversing influences, those, more especially, running quite counter to the line of virtue; while, in a reverse way, unhappiness, or misery, is the unfailing concomitant, and dread follower, of immorality and active viciousness: that this is, because there exists an indefeasible connection between these things themselves, between, that is, the virtue and the happiness, on the one hand, and the vice and the misery, on the other. So that God, by simply communicating with man, increases,—by the necessity of the case, increases,—the happiness of the good, and the unhappiness of the bad.<sup>b</sup> All this has been made very clear; and a considerable portion has been matter of the strictest demonstration, direct, or consequential.

§ 6. It results, then, that, although the good have their reward, they are by no means fully rewarded, in this world. Nor are the wicked adequately punished here. Often, indeed, they *seem* to be hardly punished at all,—certainly,

<sup>a</sup> *Supra*, Prop. III. Dem.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra*, Schol. II., §§ 13, 14.

far from punished according to the measure of their deserts, which, at times, are very great, the iniquities (which are also sins) being appallingly flagrant and rampant. What is deducible? What is the conclusion to which our consciences are infallibly led? Must not it follow, that Inflexible Justice requires a future state in which all those inequalities shall be rectified? the rectification doing away with all the confusion in which moral existencies are enveloped and enclosed in this present scene? In fine, is it not necessary that the Moral Governor of men (for a Just God at the head of affairs in the universe, is, to all intents and purposes, a Moral Governor) should accomplish that which the Heaven-bestowed Consciences of His creatures cry out is necessary to be accomplished, in order that the behests of irrepressible Justice may be obeyed?

§ 7. In this world, and before our eyes, a scheme of Moral Government is evidently established, and, the operations being visibly and palpably in progress, the plan may be said to be, as a whole, in course of fulfilment, having attained a certain amount of actual development. There is a Moral Government, the *principles and beginnings* of which are evident on all sides: will there be no *completion* of the system? Beyond all dispute, there are discernible, in the present constitution and course of nature, the first principles, and the commencement, of a scheme of government carried on by moral means working to an end consonant thereunto: Is it now a possible supposition, that the undeviatingly Just One should stay the initial operations by a fiat of, *No farther?* that the Supreme, denying Himself, should go contrary to His own plan, or that He would allow His purpose to fall, through desuetude, into complete and final inefficacy and abortion?

§ 8. Would not such inefficacy and abortion amount to a

direct breach in the integrity and continuity of things? Would not it amount to an actual positive violation of the Veracity, and Faithfulness, and Justice of the Universal Ruler? There are laws of Nature established by Him, and they encompass us before and behind, and on all sides: but none is more weighty and abiding than the moral laws written by His finger on and in the hearts of His intelligent creatures, whereby they are obliged to infer, that—in consonance with the present experience, and with the past, since the earliest records of man upon the earth, in consonance also with the unmistakable aspirations, and not-to-be-suppressed yearnings, of our natures projecting themselves, as 'twere, into the anticipatigly realized future;—to infer (we repeat) that there shall be a time of complete reckoning for the just, and for the unjust. For the just among men, in order that they may receive the due reward of all their difficult and painful struggles, through so many toilsome days, after perfect conformity to the Will and Character of God, their Maker; and for the unjust, that they, arraigned before the universe, may receive the recompense of their unrighteous deeds—too often cruel deeds, committed at the expense of the suffering of their more righteous neighbours.

§ 9. As a legitimate conclusion from our premises (sure as these are) it is, therefore, a matter of moral certainty that there shall be a future state for man: and a future life is the foundation of all human hopes and fears of any considerable weight. No wise person ever thinks of laying down grand plans with reference to a casual residence in a road-side inn, to be left behind whenever the journey towards home shall be resumed. A wise man reserves his fine architectonic devices, and measures of general amenity, for that permanent abode where all that he most loves is to be found abiding.

II. HOW SHALL JUSTICE BE ADMINISTERED IN THE  
FUTURE STATE?

§ 10. Taking for granted, therefore, that there shall be a future state of Rewards and Punishments, Rewards for the righteous, and Punishments for the unrighteous or wicked; we proceed to the remaining portion of our undertaking, and ask, How does the inflexible Justice of God stand in relation to the future life? How are we to apply, in a particular way, to the denizens of the kingdoms beyond the grave, the doctrine that God is inflexibly Just? The point has, indeed, been, to a certain extent, anticipated by the foregoing observations. We found, that God's Justice, and man's earthly condition, being conjoined, a valid practical proof emerges, shewing that a future state must be inferred. At present, our business lies with the future world as our postulate, and we are concerned with the moral administration which shall prevail in that world. That is our *datum*: this, the *quæsitum*.

§ 11. In grappling with our subject, the solution of whatever difficulty there is, or may be imagined to be, is to be found in the circumstance that there is no radically and essentially new element introduced into the case put, except the (assumed) fact of the existence being after the death of the body on earth. Now, the introduction of this element of mere continuance of the life of men cannot disturb, in any way, or to any extent, the application of the rule valid for the Inflexible Justice; that is to say, *the application, to the same objects as before, substantially the same, of the same rule.*

§ 12. It must be plain to every mind, that the strict Justice of God is the same this year as it was the last year, and as it will be the next year, and for ever. The Justice is the

same now that ever it was ; and it will be for ever the same as it is now. Mere continuance, any amount of perpetuity one likes to imagine, of existence of the objects, can, of itself, make no difference in the application of the regulating principle. And, by hypothesis, the continued existence is the sole new element in the matter.<sup>a</sup>

§ 13. The law, or rule, is :

The inflexibly Just God acts towards

Good, who are also happy, men, as being, in reality, good,  
and happy, men ; and towards

Evil men, who are likewise unhappy or miserable men, as  
being, in truth, such.<sup>b</sup>

Now, no difference can arise when the scene for the display of the Justice is in one state of being rather than in another ; is in—word it. this way, if you please—the spiritual world rather than on this earth ;—the future world, as contradistinguished from this world, at any rate. The Inflexible Justice of the Supreme, which renders to every man according to his works, proceeding from the state of his mind, cannot alter itself, nor submit to alteration brought about from without, even if causes for alteration could exist, as they cannot:<sup>c</sup> and the objects presented to the Justice being the same, to wit, good and blessed men here, and bad and miserable men there, the result is the same.

§ 14. The result is the same. The good are, in consequence of the manifestation of God, in His Justice, to them, made to be more happy ; and the more manifestation, the more blessedness : While the evil are, by the same means, made to become more miserable, ever more miserable. And so on with regard to both classes of men, without determinate end.<sup>d</sup>

<sup>a</sup> Sect. preced.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra*, Dem., & Schol. II.

<sup>c</sup> Dem. above, Sect. 9.

<sup>d</sup> Schol. II., §§ 13, 14.

§ 15. But 'tis time that an objection, which may not unnaturally occur, should be favoured with a hearing. An objector, then, might urge the following. Has not one important point been omitted? Is there not an additional element, of great weight, to which, as yet, no allusion has been made? Is it not true, that this life is a state of probation, of trial, and of discipline,—the future life being one, not of probation at all, but of retribution, full and final retribution: and is not this vital difference between the two states a matter of the very highest moment, the consideration of it being quite indispensable in the rendering of an answer to the question which has been raised?

§ 16. No doubt can be entertained about the importance of the point, but a doubt may be entertained about the entire novelty of the same. If you take the additional element, *as such*, to the problem, it will, doubtless, be contained in it, and must go along with it. But what if the element pre-existed in the problem before this handling of it as a distinct thing? With great propriety is the mooted point to be weighed: the only doubt concerns its existence beforehand, in the matter which has been before the reader.

§ 17. The essential of a state of future retribution, as distinguished from the present scene, where men are upon their trial, is, that, in that future, all the checks, impediments, and limiting conditions of all kinds, will be removed out of the way. So that virtue, or goodness, will reap its full reward in unalloyed and perfect happiness: while viciousness, as a permanent disposition, no longer counteracted by direct or immediate influences from the kingdom of The Good, will be allowed to meet with the extremest punishment in the dire misery which is the necessary consequent, no less than the appropriate accompaniment, of vice let loose without restraint.

This representation appears to be, in all its parts, correct. But it only shews, that the administration of the Divine Justice will go on without the limiting conditions, which restrained its exercise, and were hindrances to its complete manifestation, on earth. In fact, the representation quite harmonizes with the whole course of the argumentation pursued throughout these Scholiums. The element, which has been made prominent by being singled out, was—latently it may be, but yet—really and truly, in the premises, and the conclusion, which had been previously submitted to the critical reader.

### III. SHALL FUTURE PUNISHMENT BE ETERNAL?

§ 18. Answer has been returned to the query, How, there being a future state, how shall Justice be administered therein? But, after all, there is no denying that the real gist of the inquiry relates more to the hidden import, than to the precise form, of the words in which the inquiry is embodied. In all probability, the questioner does not ask, or care, so much about the *nature* of the future Rewards and Punishments, as he would ask, and is naturally curious, about the *continuance* of the Rewards and Punishments? Shall they last for ever and ever? It is of some importance that no miscarriage should take place in conveying these things. A rash inconsiderate critic might be ready to come to an erroneous judgment, simply because he had laid hold of the wrong premises. Let this, therefore, be impressed on the reader's mind, that our precise question, at the present moment, is, Are the natural, and consequentially necessary, Rewards of the righteous, and the natural, and consequentially necessary, Punishments of the evil or wicked,—in short, are the complete retributions, *whatever these may be*,—to continue in the future state? are they, indeed, to

endure coeval with Duration, and coexist with Eternity itself?

§ 19. But at this stage, and for a sufficient reason, (the goodness of the reason will be apparent by and by,<sup>a</sup>) we may drop out of view one of the two constituent *data* of the subject-matter, which we have hitherto carried along, imbedded in our interrogation. As we have been asking about the Rewards of the Righteous, as well as the Punishments of the Unrighteous, about the former as much as about the latter; so, we may advantageously let go our hold now of the former of these topics,—the Rewards of the righteous or good,—and confine our attention to the latter, the Punishments of the unrighteous or bad. It shall suffice, that, in what remains of this Scholium, we adhere to that latter topic alone, and exclusively. Treating, then, of the Punishments of the wicked, we ask, Shall these be continued without end?

§ 20. Without end? Without end, in truth, should you lay down that the men, the bad men, have no end. But if your position were, that the men had an end; then, the natural, and consequentially necessary, punishment would, of course, have an end too. How could it be otherwise? But what? shall the men, then, themselves have an end, or shall they continue in existence for ever? Of course, their punishment cannot go on without the men as subjects of inhesion: but as to the continuance perpetually of the men, themselves, the bad men, how is it?

§ 21. Justice cannot tell. She can give no dogmatic, apodictically certain, reply. This attribute must admit, that the ground for a confident answer is not in her. Justice can, in fact, throw no light, not the faintest ray, upon this topic. If we want more light let in, we must be humbly and gladly ready to receive, and admit, rays coming from

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, infra*, Prop. IV. Schol. iii.



above, coming through a sky-lightened window, exposed to another region of the heavens above us all.

§ 22. An ample light shines around us at the point where we stand, illumining things to a certain distance ; but beyond the limit within which the full light is confined, all is obscure, a faint light only being discernible in rare directions, at a few favoured spots. Endeavouring, to the best of our power, to cast our eyes in the direction of the more luminous portions of the region which is beyond the space of the clear light, and fixing our gaze intently on the partially enlightened places ; let us note, and set down carefully, the result of the experiences.

§ 23. Shall those dread Punishments be without end ? Justice, by herself, cannot tell. Justice alone, in answering such a query, and speaking with a voice of authority, can do no more than pronounce what the rule must be : the punishment shall be adequate, or proportionate to the wickedness. But if it be assumed, or subsumed, by the questioner, that there shall be no such proportionateness,—namely, no proportion, to the wickedness, in the measure of suffering, and, so, punishment, borne : this would involve, or plainly be, an outrage on all the requirements of Justice. The intenseness of the misery, or the punishment, shall be proportioned to the greatness of the wickedness : otherwise, things are made to run counter to the elementary principles themselves of all which this unbending attribute demands.

§ 24. In this connection, it may be noted, that, while every act of wickedness (a life of wickedness being merely the sum of so many wicked acts) should be punished by an adequate, or proportionate, *i.e.*, measurable amount of suffering ; endless suffering would appear to be, very plainly too, measureless, or incommensurable suffering.

§ 25. Two things, indeed, go to make up the full idea of adequateness in suffering and punishment, so that nothing can be added to the notion of adequacy to make it more complete. The first element, is, intensity in degree in the suffering; and the second, is, the length of time during which that degree of suffering is to be endured: and the two elements are to be added, or multiplied, together, in order to the production of the completed compound of misery, and punishment. But if, for one of the constituents, or any assigned, or assignable, period of time, you put in, as an *ex post facto* coefficient, endless duration, you thereby render the process of calculation, as to adequacy, impossible.

§ 26. One thing, however, by way of a qualifying observation, deserves to be attended to, while we are discoursing, perhaps glibly enough, concerning the endless life of contingent beings, who, besides, are sinners. Let it be borne in mind, then, that the intensity, that is, of suffering, is, to Justice, the chief ingredient, among the elements, or in the product; length of time, or continuance of the suffering, being merely the adscititious accessory. And you cannot, with deference to Justice, suppose that, by prolongation of the time of suffering, the due measure of intenseness may be withdrawn,—the adequate degree of intensity in the suffering being justly compensated for by that prolongation.

§ 27. But, at this point, an objection may possibly be started. The natural, or consequentially necessary, Punishments of wickedness consist in sufferings, or miseries, proportionate to the wickedness itself,—the effect being according to the measure of the potency residing in the cause. Justice can award suitable punishment, for the wickedness, to the doer of the wickedness, only while he lives. But is it not within the province of Justice to take all possible care to prolong life, in order to render the criminal capable of

enduring the due amount—the specified number of days, or months, or years, or (for that matter) myriads, or millenniums, of years—of so much *minimum* in suffering? True: yet only so far. In the case of human Justice, the principle of the representation may be allowed to be unobjectionable.

§ 28. In the case, however, of the Divine Justice, the representation is defective, and the principle animating it is even untrue. The Supreme Judge who appoints the retribution, runs no risk of losing the object of Divine Justice untimously; because the life of the object, and the retribution, do both depend on Him who has decreed the one not without equal reference to the other. In fact, such a difficulty as the preceding is only applicable to a human legislator and judge, who has no power of making his sentence, and the existence of the criminal, be bound up together, in one indissoluble connection. The Divine Lawgiver, and Judge, however, punishes by natural laws, self-acting, and self-enforcing, or by infliction of connected sufferings, intense in proportion to the degree, or measure, of evil done: and all eventualities are alike provided for, and made to be mutually inter-dependent, by the original decree. No danger that any criminal will escape, by putting himself out of the way, in the case of *this* Judge, and Executor of *this* law.—In fine, the objection, drawn from, and misapplying, one of the ingredients in the compound giving the full notion of complete adequacy of suffering; forgets, that the one element (that, the non-essential element) cannot be—can, to no extent, be—substituted for the other. Indefinitely prolonged time cannot be substituted for a certain amount of intensity, *i.e.*, a certain high degree of intensity, in suffering.

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§ 29. But here we are reminded, once more, that, though a full light illuminates certain places, that light finally borders on the most profound darkness, with only regions of more or less uncertain vaporous gloom, interspersed with partial and fitful irradiations. We were speaking of the adequacy of punishment, in the guise of suffering, and specially of the main ingredient—intenseness; and we had been remarking, that the intensity could not be abolished, and the vacuity filled up by a substituted prolongation of the time of suffering. Nay, it seems to be a law of suffering, applicable, therefore, to all suffering, that, the more intense suffering becomes, so much the nearer the sufferer is to extinction. We are familiar with the workings of this wide law in our little, and low, sphere. Some of us are only too familiar with the workings of the law. But for the benign anæsthetics, exemplifications of the law might be seen, any hour, in domestic hospital practice. Pain, carried up to a certain point, causes fainting, and utter insensibility, to ensue. And, in like manner, with regard to more purely mental suffering, namely, sufferings from moral causes: Inflict measure upon measure of calamities, growing worse and worse, upon a man, and (unless a miracle shall prevent) the necessary consequence is, madness, or delirium in some form,—or stupor, and accompanying insensibility. No kind of suffering can be continually laid on and increased, without incapacity for farther suffering being induced at length. This is one of the ways by which kind Nature, the outside, or ultimate, of God, shews her pity and active compassion for her children, when the cup of human distress has been filled to the brim, and runs over. The blessed anæsthetic, producing insensibility to pain, if not utter unconsciousness, is a resemblance to the operations of Nature herself, in that the copy effects that very insensibility to over great agony which the

original, and greater cause, had before pointed out (only men were blind) as the fit amelioration in the case of extremest suffering.

§ 30. The reason of that merciful law is profound, and yet the evidence of its existence will be convincing. It should be observed, however, that we must keep in mind, beforehand, the original and most intimate connection between sin and suffering, whereby so much suffering indicates the existence—somewhere, and in some form—of so much previously contracted sin and guilt,—the unfailing precursors, they, of the co-relative. A truth which, in the present connection, must by no means be lost sight of. A good man, then, has his face turned to God, who, as the highest or inmost Sun, and the Sun of suns,<sup>a</sup>—the great focus-centre of all attractive power,—is the life-giver; and, so, the good man is in the way of receiving life-influences. But a bad man is he who has his face turned away from God, and the bad man, his back to God, is always withdrawing farther, and farther from Him who is Life, and the life of the world; and, so, from the source of all life-influences goeth the man, his atmosphere becoming more and more darkened, and chilly, and inimical to all health and life. Consequently, the evil man is ever drawing nearer to death. He is a living thing, in the course of evanescing. Now the law in view seems to be a necessary law of dependent moral being: which nothing can counteract but a miraculous intervention to sustain, by supplying, life contrary to that moral law.

§ 31. When, therefore, the incorrigibly bad man's positive wickedness, as the cause of a diminishing series, and his proportionate sufferings, at the head of another series of diminutions, shall be added together, or multiplied together; what an abundance of the causes and circumstances, tend-

<sup>a</sup> *Confer, infra*, Prop. IV. Schol. i. § 10.

ing to extinction of being, will be at work to increase the fearful stock!

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§ 32. But it may be urged, in the way of objection, that the law referred to<sup>a</sup> is a law but for man's body, or, at most, for man as existing in this temporal scene. When the blood recedes suddenly, and in undue quantity, *from* the brain, the person who has received the accession of agonizing pain, or the agitating mental shocks, becomes pale, feeling-less, and faints right away. But this is merely by virtue of a law applicable to the corporeal system—applicable to the corporeal system, and limited to it. And so of all the other particular phenomena, whether the exciting and proximate causes be strictly corporeal, or more purely mental. All the causes are inert, until they reach to, and operate on, the nervous system, or, rather, centre, and the terminus of the *cranio-spinal axis*, the white and grey medullary and cerebral matter. Such is the medical, and, so, fittingly technical, objection, and, as materialistic, it is one of a class common enough, and very old. If, therefore, the reply to the objection should be of an ancient, and characteristic nature likewise, it need not surprise any.

§ 33. 'Tis admitted, that there is such a law for the body,—admitted, happily, on both sides; for the existence of the law, as applicable to man's material frame, was exactly that which the objectionable, or (by your leave) objected-to section<sup>b</sup> had been trying to enforce. But 'tis verily another point, whether the law be applicable to the human body, in the sense that it has no wider applications, and that it is not founded on profounder and more enduring realities, appertaining to the region of a higher, and more potent causation.

<sup>a</sup> *Supra*, § 29.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*

This, indeed, raises another question, to which, therefore, 'tis right that we now address ourselves.

§ 34. The law applies to the human body. But does not the law, *as it is*, adumbrate a more interior law? or, rather, does not that outside working, on the plane of ultimates, shadow forth, that, archetypally, there is a more Universal Law, of which the time-manifestation is only the external exponent and index?

§ 35. Now, in answer, let us consider the following. Things on the earth, *if* made, and regulated, by a Contriving Mind, (and that this is so, is, at this point, our *postulate*, and no matter of question,)—earthly things, we say, must have been made according to a plan, or after a pattern: there must, therefore, be, in the higher sphere of causes, the models, of which the earthly objects and effects are the resemblances; and according to the laws of these causes, the earthly operations are conducted and go on. The earthly images may be affirmed, or may be denied, to be the representatives of the most real and ever-enduring '*archetypal ideas*': but certain it is, that, whatever be the names by which these likenesses are designated, the causes of them must have pre-existed in, or been present to, in some special manner, the Divine Mind, which was the depository of the model-thoughts, until they were actualized in this lower theatre. 'Tis from the very nature and intrinsic necessity of the case that this should be so. Postulate a Divine Mind, the creative cause of men, and of all earthly things: the men, and all their surroundings (and the mental constitution, and the corporeal system of man, cannot be permitted to be overlooked in such a circumstantiating) become matters of the utmost moment, not, for an instant, to be forgotten. But all these are ultimates, in the world of effects; and not one of the general laws which rule sub-

stances, and all operations here, can be without its representative in that higher world of causes, where the real and abiding exemplars exist: where they must exist, else there could have been no manifestation, in time, of things on that plane of ultimates, which is, now and here, their continent.<sup>a</sup>

§ 36. What is the nature, or what are the characteristics, of that higher law, to which those phenomena of Man, and of Nature correspond; is a question which, in many regards, would be a most difficult one to solve.

§ 37. It may be, that to pile agony on agony, ceaselessly, upon a man's body, or upon a man's soul,—upon a man, at any rate; is impossible, regard being had to that finite nature, by which, and within which, man is necessarily environed and confined. A finite spirit cannot bear the weight of agony, infinite in any respect: this appears to be clear and certain. The two things, a creature, to wit, and infinite agony, seem to be incapable of approximation,—far less, of junction. The two factors would obstinately refuse to be blended, and wrought together. Possibly, this is the nearest approach which it is permitted us to make to the solution of that awful mystery. How much torture, keeping within the bounds of finity, can a human being,—a pure spirit, or a spirit clothed with a body, it matters not,—endure, and be yet consciously alive? this is that Secret—profounder than the Sphinx's riddle, and more terrible than aught save lowest Hell—which may Heaven's pity and compassion never allow to be solved in the person of any mere son of man!

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§ 38. Finally,—Our immediate topic has throughout been a definite one. It was this: So far as the *single* attribute of Justice is involved, (for with that sole attribute we were

<sup>a</sup> Confer, *supra*, Lemma, § 5.



concerned,) How about the Rewards of the Good, and the Punishments of the Wicked, in the future state of existence? How shall the Divine Justice be exercised there? Is the natural, and consequentially necessary, Punishment of the Evil, as well as the natural, and consequentially necessary, Reward of the Righteous, to continue in the future state for ever and ever?

§ 39. There is, however, another, a far wider, and, probably, more deeply interesting, question, awaiting decision; although it might, with some truth, be said, that the question which has been before us concerned us all the more that we were obliged, in strict logical procedure, to pass over, here and now, the wider, and more interesting topic. The new question is this: So far as God, with *all* His attributes, including, of course, yea pre-eminently, His perfect Goodness, harmonizing with His consummate Happiness, (these two animating mutually, and animated by each other,) the very Attributes from the activity and action of which the creation itself of men arose:—we say, taking into account all the Attributes of God—specially, those concerned with calling the men themselves into being,—What about the Reward of the Good, not forgetting the Punishment of the Bad, in the future state? How will God act towards them in the eternal world? Will the natural, and the necessary, Rewards, and Punishments be for ever, or to all eternity? This, indeed, is a question very different from the other interrogatory,—different as to stand-point, and in all the circumstantialia. It will fall to be answered in another, and a more fitting place.<sup>a</sup> And as the questions are so very different, it is possible that the replies thereunto may turn out to be as different as are the questions themselves. Possibly, too, as the latter of the two may deserve to receive

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, infra*, Prop. IV. Schol. iii.

a different answer from that due to the other, so the answer itself appertaining to the wider and profounder question, may be found to be more worthy of all acceptance, acceptable, in sooth, as cold water to a thirsty soul in a parched and thirsty wilderness.

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### COROLLARY FROM PROPOSITION III.

*God, who is True, and Faithful, and inflexibly Just, is necessarily altogether Righteous.*

§ 1. It has been demonstrated, that, making certain pre-suppositions, God is the Inflexibly Just One.<sup>a</sup> Now, to be just, is unquestionably to stand in a certain relation to *the other*. But justice, in act, must proceed from a capacity of being just : in other words, justice points back to a principle, or a something in the mind distinguishable from the justice itself. The act must be regarded as the consequence of the capacity, or (if you object not to the term) the faculty. Most decidedly, and most specially, is this the case with respect to God, as the Supreme Mind, absolute in Himself. If He be just to His moral creatures, there must be considered to be in Him a mental principle, as a something other than the justice itself, considered as act ; the act proceeding from the faculty giving birth to it.

§ 2. Now, what is the absolute principle in the Divine Mind which gives birth to the justice, on supposition of the existence of the suitable objects, and of communications therewith ? *Absolute Justice* it cannot be, because, Justice denoting necessarily relation,<sup>b</sup> the terms, " absolute justice,"

<sup>a</sup> Preced. Prop.

<sup>b</sup> Prop. preced. Lemma.

are expressive of an impossibility, or rather absurdity. In reality, there can be no Justice but one sort. All Justice is necessarily relative—to its objects, its own objects. Unrelative Justice would be a chimera. In fact, not a little nonsense has been vented, both in this region, and in the approaches to it, or byways from it. Alas! it is quite possible to utter nonsense on almost any topic.

§ 3. No error, however, will be fallen into, should we denominate the absolute principle in question by the name of *Righteousness*. With all correctness we may say, that there is in God, as absolute in Himself, the principle of *right*, *rectitude*, or *righteousness*; from which absolute principle proceeds, on occasion, justice as act, whereby God exercises the strictest justice to His Intelligent, Moral creatures.

§ 4. We conclude, therefore, that there is in God an absolute principle of Rectitude, or Righteousness, by reason of which He is, ever and necessarily, determined towards that which in thought is, in itself, right: No matter, whether the thing thought of be a purely abstract conception, or be a thing leading to positive acts in relation to the other.

§ 5. The unalterable Rightness of the Divine Nature, which we have arrived at by the course actually taken, which we may admit has been forced on us by the progress of our ratiocination;—that unalterable Rightness, or Rectitude, we say, might have been demonstrated otherwise. The truth in question might have been proved, in the most strictly logical manner, by considerations withdrawn from any notions of Justice as a positive series of relative acts: and the student who shall diligently weigh the elements of a demonstration to be found in our Fourth Division,<sup>a</sup> will not be far from a perception of a mode of proof by which the Absolute

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, infra*, Div. IV. Prop. ii. Dem.

Rectitude, here—as well as the Ineffable Moral Purity, there—might be most satisfactorily established.

§ 6. In fine, absolutely speaking, the Divine Being *must be* Righteous. But, as logicians, we dare not, at this point, make a stronger affirmation respecting the relative act than that God must be Just *conditionally*. For, as we have seen, the Justice depends on there being suitable objects, and on communications being established with them. Thus, God is necessarily undeviatingly Righteous in Himself: and He is, by consequential necessity, of inflexible Justice in His relations to the other. Justice began (it might be affirmed) with the creation. . Yea, 'tis not without its own significance that, in the progress of our proof, the Justice of God was (first) reached by an *à posteriori* step. The proposition as to Justice supplies, in fact, the only instance where a simple argument from effect to cause is introduced into a demonstration; and this circumstance may be held to tell its own tale. Rectitude, however, was ere the universe of finites was: it was from eternity; and from eternity it was a necessary constituent of the Divine Mind. A condition of the Divine Mind is to be always thinking: and the thoughts of the Divine Mind were, of necessity, always Right.

§ 7. It is, therefore, undeniable, being a most evidently true position, that God, the True, the Faithful, the inflexibly Just, is, of necessity, altogether Righteous; and we formulate the certain and most weighty truth accordingly.

§ 8. So, God, who is the True, and the Faithful, and the inflexibly Just, is, necessarily, *the altogether Righteous*.

## PROPOSITION IV.

*God, who is True, and Faithful, and inflexibly Just, and altogether Righteous, is, necessarily, All-Loving, yea, Love Itself.*

## PROLEGOMENON.

§ 1. Having the Proposition, *God is Loving*, given as one to be evinced by strict demonstration, is exactly equipollent to the obligation to prove, by reasoning the severest, and impervious to the shafts of the keenest logic which may be opposed, that God is Love. Let, then, what has been already advanced be carefully remembered and pondered: namely, That every position which undeniably follows from our first principles, *themselves altogether unimpugnable*, is introducible, and, in fact, has a real title to remain among the truths of our science.<sup>a</sup> Let this be weighed, likewise, That any objector, who may present himself, has something not so very inconsiderable to do. *An objector is under the necessity of shewing that à priori reasoning is totally inapplicable, or he must point out wherein it has been positively misapplied in the detail.*<sup>b</sup>

§ 2. But to facilitate our progress in demonstrating the proposition before us, and in deducing correctly the suitable inferences, and making the proper applications of the demonstration; let us, first of all, lay down two pre-suppositions, in a distinct form. They might indeed have been subsumed as we went along, without any such explicit enunciation, and verily in a noiseless and unpretentious way.

<sup>a</sup> Sect. 4 of Schol. III. under Prop. iii. Div. III.

<sup>b</sup> Sect. 12 of Schol. II. under Prop. iii. Div. III.

Unpretentiousness is generally commendable: yet 'tis laudable only where no illicit assumption is concealed under the affected reticence; and every assumption (metaphysical, as well as ethical) is improper which is not meant for the eye, or honest inspection of some sort. An assumption not meant for inspection, but kept sedulously out of sight, is dishonest; and, so, it discreetly courts the shade. In fine, 'twas deemed best to proceed in the most undisguised and open manner. Besides, what ill consequences need be feared from the formal exposure of the postulates in question? The more they are considered, the more their truth will be conceded, and appreciated.

#### LEMMA I.

§ 1. On the supposition of a creation of the world, the continuance of the same in being is equal to (not, observe, identical with) the continually repeated creation of the particulars and their continent.

§ 2. 'Tis clear, that *created* existence implies the relative *Creator*. Existence, by reason of a Being having made the things begin to be, is dependent, of course, on the Being. In fine, conservation, or preservation of existence, is plainly tantamount to continued creation, on supposition of a creation.

#### LEMMA II.

On the supposition of the conservation of things, consequent on a creation; the supposition of the possibility of an annihilation of any, or of all, of the things actually existing, involves no contradiction, nor even difficulty. The supposition, that things began to be, involves that they may, as a possibility, cease to be. Creation involves the possibility of annihilation. A Creator, therefore, may annihilate.

## DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. It has been demonstrated, that the Supreme is consummately Happy,<sup>a</sup> and that the motive to create was the overflowing Happiness, in alliance with a desire coincident with the perfect Goodness, of the Creator.<sup>b</sup> Now, a great deal is contained in these positions; and it will be necessary that we weigh well their fulness of meaning.

§ 2. In the next place, we must consider the force of the indisputably true proposition, that preservation or conservation is tantamount to continued creation;<sup>c</sup> not overlooking what is implied thereby.

§ 3. For the consequence is truly important. Creation involves Happiness and Goodness: the conservation, therefore, must also involve the Goodness. Conservation (we say) being equivalent to continued creation; while creation itself proceeded from the Goodness of God: the conservation must be regarded as the product of the same Goodness.

§ 4. But to come a little closer still to our point. The attribute of Goodness it was which brought the race of man into being.<sup>d</sup> Preservation is just creation indefinitely prolonged:<sup>e</sup> The preservation of man upon the face of the earth, is, therefore, due to that attribute of Goodness.

§ 5. Now, *Goodness*, calling men into existence, and preserving them in being, after their creation; this is *Love* to men. If, in fact, Goodness be viewed as a permanent condition or state of mind; Love may be viewed as the same Goodness in exercise, or in its acts. In truth: Given Goodness, preserving the men whom the Goodness created, and have you not Love? What else could be meant by Love? Verily, such Goodness preserving men, is but another name for Love to men.

<sup>a</sup> Div. III. Prop. i.    <sup>b</sup> Div. III. Sub-Prop. after Prop. i.    <sup>c</sup> Lemma I.

<sup>d</sup> Schol. under Part iii. Div. II.; and Sub-Prop. Prop. i. Div. III.

§ 6. We must bear in mind whereabouts we are. Our exact standpoint will be seen in the following recapitulatory positions. The world, with all it contains, began to be.<sup>a</sup> In particular, our race was created;<sup>b</sup> and the Goodness of the consummately Happy Supreme was the cause or reason of the creation.<sup>c</sup> In fine, *Man became*, is to us equal, in logical force, or apodictically, to saying, Goodness, creating, was in lively exercise. The living Goodness, as a potency, was put forth in acts. And now 'tis added: Conservation involving continued Goodness;<sup>d</sup> the Goodness, in such continuous living act, is Love.

§ 7. On the supposition, that it has been demonstrated that God is All-loving, a question arises, naturally arises from the subject itself, but arises also from reflection on the case of the attribute of Justice.<sup>e</sup> In the case referred to, we have seen that *Justice* is a purely relative affection; while, to express what is, in God, the absolute principle from which the Justice—on presentation of the fit and suitable objects—derives its birth, we are obliged to use another term, standing for another idea, namely, *Righteousness*, *Rightness*, *Rectitude*.<sup>f</sup> Analogously, must we adopt now another term when we would denote that which, in God as absolute, corresponds to Love to mankind? Or, does it suffice, to denote the original absolute principle from which that Love proceeded, that we abide by the same word itself, saying, That, as God loves men, so, from eternity, there was, in Him, the principle of Love, or (to express it so) He is Love itself: Love from eternity, or absolutely, as a source, *in posse*, of the Love which, *in esse*, a creation, or real becoming, of Intelligent and Moral creatures—capable (because of their nature) of

<sup>a</sup> Sub-Prop. & Coroll. from same, after Prop. iv. Part ii. Div. I.

<sup>b</sup> Schol. after Part iii. Div. II.

<sup>d</sup> *Supra*, § 3.

<sup>c</sup> Prop. i. and Sub-Prop. Div. III.

<sup>e</sup> *Supra*, Prop. III.

<sup>f</sup> *Supra*, Coroll. from Prop. III.



loving God in return—would develope, or bring forth as a time-manifestation?

§ 8. To the query thus started, the correct answer must indubitably be, that here,—unlike what holds in the case of *Justice* and *Righteousness*,—the very same word which expresses the relative affection towards the creature-objects, will properly serve to express the absolute principle in which the time-manifestation has its origin. Love to men could not have come to be, unless there had been in God the source, and immediate cause, of such a becoming: and the absolute principle, or the principle in God as absolute, could be righteously denoted by no term better than by the term itself which stands for the relative affection.

§ 9. Thus, God, as He is Loving to His creature, so is He, as in Himself, Love itself, or essentially.

§ 10. But this solution of the inquiry only gives rise to another question—or the same question in another form—or the same question, but raised (to speak the language of algebra) to a higher power, or (in unscientific language) advanced to a profounder phasis. God is loving to men: and God is Love itself: But does not Love, whether as a relative affection, or as an absolute principle in (or of) Deity, equally demand an object? It may be said, and truly, that God is Righteous in Himself, or without the supposal of any object. But can we suppose Love in God,—any sort of Love,—without supposing, at the same time, an object—some object or other, to which the Love must be directed, and on which the Love must be exerted and expended? In short, are not Love, and objectivity, so related that the former cannot be, or be conceived to be, without the latter?

§ 11. The answer to this query, must be in the most decided affirmative. It is formally and absolutely impossible—an impossibility in the inmost nature of things—that Love can

exist without there being Love exerted towards, or in connection with, some object or other.

§ 12. But if this be so, (and very plainly it must be so,) does not the supposition farther demand, that there should be the eternal, *i. e.*, beginning-less, object of the eternal Love? Of course, that supposition *does* demand the farther concession; and, of a truth, there is no denying, nor evading either, the consequence.

§ 13. Well, then: that being so, is there not necessitated thereby the supposition of the existence of the creation, or actual beginning to be of creatures, as the objective? Is not the creation the necessary eternal effect of an eternal efficient cause? Is not there such a necessity? By no means. Nothing of the kind must, or need, be supposed. For, as we have already had a demonstration of the impossibility of the conception of the 'eternity of the material universe,<sup>a</sup> so there is now no reason why we should feel the need of a created object to meet the requirements of absolute Love, or Love in God as absolute.

§ 14. Of necessity, Love demands the objective to it. True; but the object may be existing in the Supreme Mind Itself, and discoverable on an analysis of—the outer part at least of—the internal constitution of the Godhead. The Divine Being, in being conscious of His own thoughts,<sup>b</sup> must be capable of reflection upon Himself, also. Without such capability of self-reflection, or apperception, there were no mind: True mind demands, necessarily demands, this power of apperception, or self-analysis.<sup>b</sup> Well: the mind reflecting has, as objective to it, the mind reflected on. All the consequences resulting necessarily from the circumstance thus referred to, it can form no part of our present business

<sup>a</sup> Div. I. Part ii. Prop. iv. Sub-Prop. and Coroll. from same.

<sup>b</sup> Div. II. Part i., Schol. *Vide, etiam*, Div. III. Prop. i. § 3.

to follow out. A single suggestive hint, however, in addition to the cardinal fact alluded to, may be dropped ere we retire from this ground—a region admitting to, and abounding in, the most fascinating speculation on the sublimest of all subjects.

§ 15. The Supreme Mind, in reflecting, and in being, *simul et semel*, reflected on, supplies, in the active, and the passive, attitudes involved, the strikingly pronounced duality necessarily inherent in the very conception of such a mind. Now, the reflection must be accompanied by perfect complacence, entertained by the agent reflecting, to wit, the mind existing as agent, towards and upon the reflected on, or the mind existing as patient. That is, the Divine Mind reflecting, is delighted with = loves the Mind reflected on. Necessarily so, because the reflecting on perfections (whether attributes or thoughts) must causally necessitate perfect complacence, delight, love—pure felicity, in short—in the very reflection. Thus, the reflected on is loved: the Eternal Mind, therefore, eternally delights in, or loves, that image, or likeness, begotten of itself, which is reflected on. It is evident, too, that the reflecting Mind, as the cause of the loved reflection, is truly and really the Father, of the other, which, therefore, becomes, is eternally becoming, the Son of that Love. All this is evident, because it follows from the postulation of premises which themselves have been thoroughly established.

§ 16. But is not the relation which has just been exhibited productive, by the necessary sequence of thought, of yet another relation in the Godhead? Doubtlessly it would appear so: but it behoves us to stop short, else, and ere we are aware, we shall be certainly landed in the study of the verity of the Divine Trinity. Indeed, it seems hardly possible to encounter the doctrine of the true Love of God, even in

the abstractest way, without touching on some points where the doctrine branches off into, if not Trinitarian ground, ground surely adjoining the sphere within which the doctrine of the primal Triad is contained. In fact, the two may be compared to two circles, or other geometrical figures, whereof the one is contained *within, and forms part of*, the other. While, on the other hand, the dogma of one God, shut up in but one person, is an unprolific *datum*, and leads to very little of any great importance or interest to man. The Love to a creature of a Being, loveless before the creation, furnishes but a cold sort of warmth. That dogma is besides a horrific dogma, holding within it the idea of an utterly solitary Mind, existing, for the eternity before the creation was, in drear, dread solitude, alone, and un-loving: for, the moment Love enters on the scene, agent and patient, the lover and the loved, enter too, and, in fine, the first step leading to hypostases in the Godhead is taken.

§ 17. As a matter of course, this is another *relative* Attribute: relative it is, at all events, in the same way as that in which Truth is relative.<sup>a</sup> Both Attributes require the objective, an object of some kind. *Love* imperatively needs an *object*. The nature of Love is such that it incessantly craves after an object. Without any object, Love would inevitably cease to be Love, becoming an unsatisfied longing for—it would not know what: there could remain no more than an everlasting pining. Love, then, must have its object: Without it, Love Itself were unhappy. Completely Happy Love; in other words, the Love of The Consummately Happy One; must have its object: ay, and an adequate object too. An insufficient object could not meet such Love, or (but language, with its limited power, threatens to fail us here) be equal to the requirements of the yearnings of the Love of the

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, supra*, Prop. II. Lemma.

Eternal Infinite One. Anything contained within Time and Space were all too little. *Love* ('tis repeated) imperatively needs an *object*. The objective, *of some sort*: whether a Hypostasis in the Godhead,<sup>a</sup> or some phase of the creaturely nature; this latter, again, being divisible into the angelic nature,<sup>b</sup> and the human nature. Of course, we eschew the particular consideration of every object rising above the plane of mankind; in the same way as was done in the case of the proposition about Truth.<sup>c</sup>

§ 18. This is a *most relative* Proposition, if you like, or when held to be restricted to a creature, and to man. For, should it be argued, that, strictly, as Goodness is to all things, or may be conceived to regard all things, in creation; so Love is certainly not applicable to even animality generally, but, in propriety, can be considered applicable to only humanity, the Intelligent and Moral, the Rational and Loving, part of the world; no one should be greatly inclined to dispute it.

§ 19. On the whole, as it has been demonstrated, that the Simple, Sole, Being of Infinity of Expansion and of Duration, who is All-knowing, All-powerful, entirely Free, and completely Happy, is necessarily perfectly Good;<sup>d</sup> the implied Goodness being entirely equivalent to Love;<sup>e</sup> the conclusion is, therefore, inevitable, that that Great and Good Being is necessarily Loving, or, to vary the phraseology, the All-Loving One. And the Love to the creature being regarded as to its source, that Being is rightly said to be Love Itself. Love, unlike Justice, has its foundation *in se*. Love is act, or state, as to time, and aboriginal principle, all in one.

§ 20. Then, God, who is the True, and the Faithful, and

<sup>a</sup> Weigh § 6 of Lemma, Prop. ii. Division III.

<sup>b</sup> Weigh § 5, *ibid.*

<sup>c</sup> *Ibid.*, § 7.

<sup>d</sup> Sub-Prop. to Prop. i. Div. III.

<sup>e</sup> *Supra*, Sect. 5, 6.

the inflexibly Just, and the altogether Righteous, is, necessarily, *the All-Loving One, yea, Love Itself.*

## SCHOLIUM I.

AN IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROPOSITIONS II. & III.,  
ON ONE SIDE, AND PROPOSITION IV., ON THE OTHER.

§ 1. A great difference exists, and is to be noticed between the cases of Truth and Justice, and the case of Love; and it shall be our business, here, to distinguish between the cases, as the nature of things demands.

§ 2. Whereas, the demonstrations, in the cases of *Truth* and *Justice*, are to this effect: postulating objects, and that there be action; God is, necessarily, Truthful and Just. But the action itself is not proved.

§ 3. To particularize. To be True, requires objects.<sup>a</sup> God is necessarily Truthful to man, when He communicates with man.<sup>b</sup> But the communication itself is not demonstrated: it was but postulated. Consequently, Truthfulness, as a fact, is never proved under the demonstration in view.<sup>c</sup>

§ 4. So with regard to Justice. To be just requires objects,<sup>d</sup> and objects of a special description.<sup>e</sup> God necessarily administers Justice, in communicating with the good and with the bad.<sup>f</sup> But the actual administration itself of the Justice, in reference to those objects, is never demonstrated: Consequently, no one exercise of the attribute in question is ever demonstratively established.

§ 5. But, with regard to *Love*, 'tis quite otherwise. For, when there is postulated now, what has been beforehand demonstrated, that Love does conserve the men whom

<sup>a</sup> *Supra*, Prop. II. Lemma.

<sup>b</sup> Prop. II. Dem.

<sup>c</sup> Prop. II. Postul.

<sup>d</sup> *Supra*, Prop. III. Lemma, § 1.

<sup>e</sup> Prop. III. Lemma, § 3, &c.

<sup>f</sup> Prop. III. Dem.

Goodness created,<sup>a</sup> the existence itself of the men, the objects of the Love, is irreversibly bestowed. Love does, therefore, evidence the existence of its own objects, by its intimate living relation to them.

§ 6. In truth, nobody—except, perhaps, a stray metaphysician (maddened by all-unadulterated *egoistic* emanations, inhaled undilutedly, and, by a great deal, too incautiously) dreaming in a pantheistically idealistic region hopelessly beyond the sphere common to Theists and Atheists, and very far indeed away in the clouds; he (a man himself, it is to be presumed) having been expressly transported thither by no other machinery than his own pure and simple, but rapt, imagination, helped, mayhap, by a push from some other unsober philosopher, at starting: nobody (we say) but a stricken metaphysician, denies the existence of men. Nobody denies, therefore, the existence of the objects of this attribute of Love.

§ 7. And this is now to be considered: Whether it is credible, that, Goodness having created men, and Love being concerned in preserving them, God, as possessor of the attributes of Trueness and Justness, should never, on any occasion, reveal Himself to men, or come, in any way, into living contact with them? Love has men for its cosmical objects: God loves the world of men: Were it not incredible, therefore, that the God of Truth, and Justice, should never draw nigh unto men; draw nigh, for example, unto the virtuous and good, who resemble Himself, to bless them yet more and more.<sup>b</sup> Yea, Love makes it plain, that God's presence with men is credible, and more than credible: the utter absence of God were incredible. Incredible, indeed, and impossible, too, that Love should never communicate with its objects, whom, yet, it conserves from day to day. Love and God

<sup>a</sup> Dem. above, Sect. 5, 6.

<sup>b</sup> *Vide, supra*, Prop. III. Schol. ii. § 13, &c.

are the same:<sup>a</sup> God does, therefore, communicate with Love's objects, that is, men. But God is Truthful, and Just, as well as Loving. In fine, Love must be supposed to have Truth and Justice in its train. The three Attributes meet in the same God, the common Substrate of all the Attributes: Therefore, the three do necessarily go together.

§ 8. Thus, it is proved, that the condition of Truth, as actual fact, and the condition of Justice, as actual fact, have been implemented. And so, what was before demonstrated as *in posse*, is now demonstrated as *in esse*; the only postulate subsumed, by the demonstration, being one as inoffensive as it is verily unobjectionable, the position, to wit, *There are men*. A position very secure from assailment on the side of Atheism; as Atheists are agreed in ignoring, not men indeed, but all intelligences, or orders of intelligences, but men. So far from denying the existence of men, Atheists go to the opposite extreme, and deny all mental existence which is not a man's.

§ 9. The present demonstration is, thus, the complement, not only of the Proposition as to Goodness,<sup>b</sup>—as it unquestionably is,—but also it is (though in another way) the complement of the Proposition regarding Truth,<sup>c</sup> as well as of that regarding Justice.<sup>d</sup> For which reason, the importance of this Proposition cannot be rated too highly. The referential importance of this Proposition, therefore, cannot be rated too highly, even if we were to urge nought about its importance on its own account. But such importance, in its turn, cannot be overrated.

§ 10. For, Love is, without doubt, a tree of Life: in a certain good sense, it is the tree of Life. It is, in fact, the true mundane Yggdrasil. To vary our view, and enlarge, to

<sup>a</sup> Dem. above, § 19.

<sup>c</sup> Prop. ii. Div. III.

<sup>b</sup> Sub-Prop. under Prop. i. Div. III.

<sup>d</sup> Prop. iii. Div. III.



the utmost, the illustrating medium: Love is the central attractive power of the universe. It is the centre, whence all influential radiations must depart, and to which they must return as their proper home. There is, of necessity, an inmost Spiritual Sun to the Universe; a central influence appertaining to the sum total of all the forces of every world, and every system of worlds.<sup>a</sup> There must be supposed a centre; in other words, a Sun of all Suns, material and spiritual: otherwise, related things would be out of proportion to each other, and apparent effects would be unlawfully divorced from their only possible causes.

§ 11. *GOD is Love*; and, when we say so, we evoke the omnipotent word, representative of the all-radiant idea, which throws warmth upon the field of our world. Possessed of this secret, we feel we are in possession of the talisman yielding the primal causation. When we have reached as high as Love, we have reached (to use the humanly most significant expression) *the very heart of GOD*.

§ 12. And if Love is omnipotent at one pole, equally so is it at the opposite pole. Strong as an aggressive force, it is equally strong as a resisting force. Equally positive: equally negative.

§ 13. What, now, can resist the Love of God? What can be stronger than the great motive power of the absolute universe?

#### SCHOLIUM II.

##### OTHER VITAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PROPOSITIONS II. & III., AND PROPOSITION IV.

§ 1. In the preceding Scholium there is pointed out one great difference between Propositions II. and III. and the present Proposition.<sup>b</sup> There are other differences; and it may

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, supra*, Prop. III. Schol. iii. § 30.

<sup>b</sup> Schol. preced. §§ 1-6.

be wise to take this opportunity, so fit and suitable in every way, to draw attention to some of those other differences.

§ 2. Why, or from what cause, Creation? And how do the several attributes of Truthfulness, Justice, and Goodness = Love, stand affected to Creation, and to each other with reference to that relation? These are the questions to which attention shall be now directed.

§ 3. *Supposing* the fact of a creation—*Supposing*, in other words, that the world which is around us, and the worlds upon worlds, or systems upon systems of worlds, which are around our little ball, or our small sidereal system, as a centre, with all things in those continents, *began sometime to be* (a point demonstrated<sup>a</sup>); when 'tis asked, Why was that world of ours, or the universe at large, created? the answer (as we have seen<sup>b</sup>) is: Because of the existence of a principle co-incident with the over-flowing, as 'twere, of the Happiness of the Being who is the essential Substratum of Expansion and Duration, Immensity and Eternity. To repeat it: The Happiness of the Supreme, uniting with His Goodness, does, as it were, flow over: Over-flowing, the confluence freely out-births itself in Creation. And this is Goodness: at any rate, one great part of Goodness.

§ 4. But were one to ask *abstractly*, that is, *abstracting* in mind creation *as fact*, with its only possible cause; were one (we say) to ask abstractly, Why, or, Whence Creation? a totally different state of things would be presented. Our stand-point would be different: the objects seen would be different: The vision, therefore, would be reported (because presented) quite differently. In the case now supposed, we would not be in possession of the indispensable condition of the unspeakable Happiness, in union and unison with the

<sup>a</sup> Div. I. Part ii. Sub-Prop. and Coroll. therefrom.

<sup>b</sup> Div. III. Sub-Prop.

aboriginal Goodness, of the One self-existent Substance. But this whole matter shall be made still plainer, until it is indeed very plain.

§ 5. And to begin at the beginning. Were the question put, Will the Supreme create? the question being taken in and by itself, it could not be answered. The reasons, or causes, would be awanting. In the case at present imagined, the *fact* of creation would be out of sight: creation would be only possible. And whether the Supreme would, or would not, create, could not be declared. The question could be answered only by the help of certain assumed positions.<sup>a</sup> Creation being viewed as no more than a mere possibility; and the theorem of complete Happiness<sup>b</sup> being entirely omitted; no creaturely mind, however exalted, could by any means decide even this,—*Whether* it were *likely* that there would be a *creation* at all, or *not*. The premises warranting any decision would be absent. On the other hand, the Happiness<sup>b</sup> being taken into account; creation *would be likely*: Not necessary, by reason of the entire Frèeness,<sup>c</sup> but very likely. In fine, when we view creation as a possibility, and not yet actually being, the absolute attribute of Happiness is the attribute to which we must mainly look.

§ 6. But another *datum* shall next be postulated. On the supposition of a creation of men,—a point itself demonstrated elsewhere,<sup>d</sup>—we have demonstrated Goodness to be an Attribute:<sup>e</sup> the transitional Attribute; intermediate between the *absolute* attributes of Divisions I. & II., and the really *relative* attributes of this Division.<sup>f</sup> We have

<sup>a</sup> Confer § 3 of Lemma, Prop. ii. Div. III.

<sup>b</sup> Div. III. Prop. i.

<sup>c</sup> Div. II. Part iii.

<sup>d</sup> Coroll. from Sub-Prop. Part ii. Div. I.; & Schol. Part iii. Div. II.

<sup>e</sup> Div. III. Sub-Prop.

<sup>f</sup> Vide Div. III. Prop. ii. Lemma, § 3.—Coroll. from Prop. ii. Lemma, § 3.—Prop. iii. Lemma, § 6. Vide, etiam, Prop. iv., Dem. Sect. 17, 18.

demonstrated, we repeat, Goodness to be an attribute. That is; accepting the creation of man as a fact; then, applying to the attribute of Happiness,<sup>a</sup> we prove that the one must be assigned as the cause of the other :<sup>b</sup> Happiness resulting in Goodness, and Creation, are in relation to each other as cause and effect.<sup>b</sup> Thus, the question of creation is one about Goodness. This is the attribute to which creation must be attached.

§ 7. Of course, we may affirm nearly the same thing of Conservation, so far forth as conservation is tantamount to continued creation.<sup>c</sup> Conservation, as well as Creation, is the result of Goodness.

§ 8. Thus : If the question, Taking for granted creation, why creation? be put; the attributes of Happiness and Goodness give us the answer. And they only are capable of entering into the solution.

§ 9. But when we are abreast of Justice, 'tis quite another case. Another attribute has been introduced, and a quite different field is before us.

§ 10. These topics, though they may be comparatively uninteresting, are yet highly important in themselves; and therefore, and to attain exceeding plainness in so grave a matter, we shall go over the ground again. When we regard creation as only possible, man is viewed, of course, as not yet actually existent: he is only to be. He exists in the ideas of the Supreme Mind, and there only. And when, postulating man, we speak of the cause of man's existence, we must look to Happiness, and the accompanying and resulting Goodness. But when we have in aspect man as really existing; and God's dealing with man, the reality: there is taken in another attribute, that, to wit, of Justice. We say, we take in the Justice of God;

<sup>a</sup> Div. III. Prop. i.

<sup>b</sup> Div. III. Sub-Prop.

<sup>c</sup> *Supra*, Lemma I.

not merely His Truth. Yet, doubtless, the Justice of God involves the Truth of God.<sup>a</sup>

§ 11. And, in the same way, when we regard God as the Just God, man is held as created; not, to be created. God created man:<sup>b</sup> and He acts towards man, the real existence, not only as the Good, One, who conserves the creatures He brought into being,<sup>c</sup> but as the Just God, who must act towards each man as he truly is, and who, therefore, must render to every man according to his state of mind, and resulting works; the good man being treated as being so, and the bad man being treated as such.<sup>d</sup>

§ 12. To go over the ground once more. The question concerning creation can have no reference to the attribute of Justice. But it refers to Goodness. The fields of the two attributes are, so far, entirely distinct.

§ 13. Truth and Justice, as in God, have, thus, nought to do with creation, old or new,—*id est*, whether the creation of man at first, or his re-creation by the impartation to him, as a deteriorated being, of a better nature than the old one, defaced and all-degraded as it has become.<sup>e</sup> Yea, these attributes require, not a possible creation, but the creature as an accomplished fact,<sup>f</sup> as the field for their exercise. *GOD is Just = GOD is Just to creatures, or at least to men.*<sup>g</sup> It is never to be forgotten, that the Good One, who creates, conserves man; and, as Conserver or Preserver, has, therefore, to do with man as a real existence.<sup>h</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, supra*, § 7, &c., Dem. Prop. III.

<sup>b</sup> Schol. after Sub-Prop. under Prop. i. Div. III.; in conjunction with Schol. after Part iii. Div. II.

<sup>c</sup> Dem. preced. Sect. 3, 4.

<sup>d</sup> *Supra*, Prop. III. Dem. § 9, *multisque aliis locis*.

<sup>e</sup> *Confer, ut supra*, Prop. III. Schol. ii. § 11,—& Schol. sub Schol. ii. § 3.

<sup>f</sup> *Confer* Sect. 10, 11, *ut supra*.

<sup>g</sup> Div. III. Prop. iii. Lemma, § 2.—*etc.*

<sup>h</sup> Dem. preced.

§ 14. There is one thing which must be admitted,—and which (if our conceptions were capacious and clear) should and would be borne in mind,—that, in one great special respect, 'tis somewhat different with regard to Truth, from what strictly holds with regard to Justice. Truth may be conceived to be occupied, not only concerning creaturely intelligences other than men, for instance, angelic spirits; but also concerning uncreated hypostases, if there be such,—if there be (let us say) a Second Hypostasis, and a Third, in the GODHEAD.<sup>a</sup> Justice, however,—Justice in, at any rate, its essential aspects,—can be exercised only in the case of creaturely objects; that is, as far as our demonstration is concerned, only with regard to human beings.<sup>b</sup>

### SCHOLIUM III.

SHALL THE REWARDS OF THE GOOD, AND THE PUNISHMENTS OF THE EVIL, BE TO ALL ETERNITY?

§ 1. A question was reserved<sup>c</sup> for this place; the question, to wit, Will the Rewards of the Righteous, and the Punishment of the Wicked, continue for ever? And, on a first view, it appears as if, in this quarter of our *à priori* horizon, the question might be decided very easily. For the Love of God, founded on His Goodness, being in the field of argument, as now to be postulated, what great difficulty can there be?

§ 2. We have seen<sup>d</sup> what is the decision, upon the matter in hand, of the attribute of Justice, the origin, this, of so many prominent and differential *masculine* characteristics. Justice cannot decide, dogmatically and unconditionally, *whether* the

<sup>a</sup> Confer Div. III. Prop. ii. Lemma, Sect. 4, 5, 6.

<sup>b</sup> Div. III. Prop. iii. Lemma, § 2.—etc.

<sup>c</sup> Vide § 39, Schol. III. Prop. iii. Div. III.

<sup>d</sup> *Supra*, Prop. III. Schol. iii.

rewards of the righteous, and the punishments of the wicked, shall last for ever, *or not*. Justice can, in truth, say nothing apodictically on these points.<sup>a</sup> This attribute informs us, that impartial retributions shall be inflexibly and accurately administered to every man, according to his works; whether the administration takes place in this world, or shall take place in the next world.<sup>b</sup> But, taking for granted that the rewards and the punishments, or, at any rate, the punishments, shall be finite in duration, Justice, at the utmost, can do no more than decide precisely *how long* the punishments shall last, by declaring that they shall, or at least may, last long enough to allow of the infliction of misery adequate to the enormity of the wickedness calling for punishment. Yet Justice hath no power to decide even this by abstract information as to how long the men themselves will live; whether for a long time, or for a very long time. Justice did not make the men begin to be: Justice does not conserve them: This attribute has nought to do with such matters.<sup>c</sup>

§ 3. But is the same decision to be come to by the attribute of Love? Love, on one, at least, of its sides, the seat, as it were, of the *femininism* of Deity,—namely, Love, as long-suffering patience, and pitiful compassionateness, to the low and sunk, and mercifulness to the miserable and lost,—Love, the source, consequently, of the *feminine* excellencies of our race. Does Love answer the question with the same, *I know not: it is not in me?*<sup>d</sup> Surely, one need not be reckoned over hasty who would at once say, No: Love must reply with a difference.

§ 4. As far as the Rewards of the Righteous are concerned,

<sup>a</sup> *Supra*, Prop. III. Schol. iii., § 21, &c.

<sup>b</sup> *Ibid.*, Sect. 11–14, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Schol. preced. Sect. 9–13, &c.

<sup>d</sup> *Vide, supra*, § 21, Schol. iii. Prop. III.

there will be no difficulty at all, from any quarter. The ground of the decision here is clear; the decision itself easy. Goodness called the men into being:<sup>a</sup> Love preserves them:<sup>b</sup> In the spiritual world, or in heaven, good men will be only *more like* GOD than they were when they lived on earth:<sup>c</sup> On the whole, therefore, the answer must be, It is certain, that the men will exist for ever. All the causes of their existence, and conservation, are at work. And no inexorable attribute demands, or even seems to demand, aught else to be accomplished. The Righteous, then, will continue for ever and ever. They are attached (if the strong anthropomorphism may be pardoned<sup>d</sup>) by strong connecting links, to the throne of God. As God liveth, they shall live also. Star-suns, they shall shine ceaselessly in the Eternal Empyrean.

§ 5. Such is the answer to the question, so far as the one class of men is concerned.

§ 6. But what is the answer which is to be returned as to the other class? A very different sort of men are the Righteous from the Wicked, and a very different solution must be accorded as to the case of these latter. The true gist of the whole question, as one of difficulty, is undoubtedly in this direction.

§ 7. Will the Punishment of the Wicked be for ever? Or, as we might *now* put the question, without just offence to the unalterable laws of logic, Will God punish sinners, or, suffer sinners to be punished (= to punish themselves) eternally? This, then, is the question; and there can be no doubt, that this is a fearfully momentous question for sinners to ask, and to have answered for them. The great reason is,

<sup>a</sup> Sub-Prop. Div. III.

<sup>b</sup> Div. III. Prop. iv. Dem. sect. 5 & 9.

<sup>c</sup> *Vide, supra*, § 11, & § 13, Schol. ii.; and § 11 to § 14, Schol. iii., both in Prop. III.;—*aliosq; loc.*

<sup>d</sup> *Vide, supra*, § 11, Schol. ii. Prop. III., etc.



of course, because of the tremendous weight attached to one of the terms in the query: "for ever," or "eternally," or whatsoever the word, or rather words, mayhap the phrase, may be. Whatever was the case at first, with regard to the equivalent terms, or rather expressions, in the original Greek and Hebrew languages—from which source the current English meaning was doubtless taken; the term *has come* to have a most particularly emphatic meaning *with us*. By "eternal" existence, as employed in this question, the ordinary superficial theologian of the day means (though perhaps he knows it not) an existence enduring alongside of, and coincident with, the duration of the existence of God Himself: *true co-existence*. 'Tis but proper to avoid enlarging, on the present occasion, on this portentous topic; but, nevertheless, 'tis not easy to omit the suggestion of a single reflection: Only think, then, of the full significance of that affirmation which attaches the miserable damnation of the wicked in hell—and, consequently, infernal blasphemies, the absolute acme of all evil—to the glorious high throne of the Eternal: which binds up the existence of *evil*, and the existence of GOD, in one indissoluble attachment. Speak we not of the accumulation of horrors, to every individual member of the universe, implied in the dreadful position: But in what sense can God be the *One Living One*, if an antagonistic element, centred in a monstrous Monarch, be bound up with the *eternity to come* as much as God Himself? For, no condition of things, even hellish, can exist without the shadow at least of a government. No kingdom without a king. Even an abhorred kingdom of darkness could not maintain itself through one of the days, nights rather, of hell, without its appallingly hateful and hating Ahriman.

§ 8. But in touching on the immense signification covered by one of the terms of that query, have not we been betrayed

into something like a proleptical objection to the doctrine itself of Eternal Torments? The excuse must be, that the drifting into objection, proceeding from exposition, is only too natural. Yet it must be remembered that, whatever be implied in the position, The torments of the damned shall be to all eternity; our inquiry at present is really this, Is the doctrine true? Whatever be involved in the fundamental idea of the junction of such a predicate to such a subject, Is the proposition itself true, or false; to be accepted, or rejected?

§ 9. What great difficulty can there be, after all, in deciding the question?

§ 10. Namely, what difficulty can there be in deciding, that those attributes of Goodness and Love will be always exigent in demanding that, *if possible*, the torments of the miserable damned should be made to cease to be: While not one of the other Attributes, as demonstrated, necessitates, or even seems to necessitate, the everlasting continuance of the misery of those unhappy damned ones,—most miserable they in their minds, and most grievously tormented perhaps in their responsive bodies;—those most pitiable sufferers, most to be pitied as suffering tortures by reason of their own evil passions, strong and victorious over all their lawful feelings and thoughts, strong and victorious even in hell, the place of not-to-be-comforted lost souls. Certainly, not one of the other Attributes does, in the merest seeming, necessitate the everlasting continuance of misery, if Inflexible Justice do not so. And this Attribute does not, even in seeming, demand the everlasting misery—nor any such appallingly, unutterably, horrific consequence.\*

§ 11. If, then, the misery be to come to an end, *How* (say you) shall the misery come to its end? Who can tell? and

\* *Vide, supra*, Prop. III.

it is not necessary that any one should know. Enough, if we know that Inflexible Justice is silent, while Divine Love—in the shape of gentle pity and compassion, or (better yet) soft-hearted Mercy—Mercy, which is simply Love = Goodness to the abject and miserable,—Divine Love (we say) unceasingly pleads and prays for the cessation, *as soon as possible*, of all the unutterable wretchedness in the wide domains of God. Love to men is very fain to become Mercy, on the presentation of the truly miserable among men: and Divine Mercy—what, in this wide universe, can refuse to yield itself thereunto? Enough is it for the good to know so much: and humbly must they wait, in hope, for that consummation, the greatest, and the last, of all the creaturely consummations. For, by that consummation, the whole creation, which, so visibly and pitifully, groaneth and travaileth in pain together until now, shall, finally, be delivered from the bondage of corruption. In fine,—Then the end; and God shall be all in all.

#### SCHOLIUM SUB SCHOLIO III.

§ 1. But though no one can tell, in a positive way, or dogmatically, how the misery is to come to its end; one may surmise how the misery will be terminated. The misery will assuredly end: But very likely not by the ceasing to be of the evil, or (to give the most proper term) the wickedness, abstractly taken—the cause of all the misery. For, no way of ending evil is patent, or even comprehensible, so long as the wicked persons themselves remain. The evil tree must first be made good, before the poison-fruit will become good, and safe for food, and wholesome in every way. It seems, indeed, a moral proposition as certain as any in metaphysical science, or mathematical, that the intensely wicked will not

cease from troubling even in hell: (whatever they may be compelled to be, or not to do, in the grave.) But, at all events, the wickedness, and its effect, the misery, might be made to cease to be, by an Almighty fiat, commanding the wickedness, *with its subject*, to cease to be.<sup>a</sup> That Power which called all men into being, can cause men to be no more:<sup>a</sup> yea, it could cause all the things of Time itself to be no longer, and that in the very fullest of senses. The question is solely about the exercise of the ability. The annihilation of the wicked in hell is quite possible to the Creator.<sup>a</sup> Some of the Moral Attributes demand it: Not one Attribute says, Nay; the wickedness, and the misery,—multiplied into each other, and increasing in more than any geometrical ratio,—must last for ever. The final annihilation, therefore, is possible: And, being possible, it is absolutely certain.

§ 2. Thus, the doctrine of the final annihilation of the hopelessly abandoned and reprobate wicked, is a doctrine from which there is no escaping. It is a tenet of reason, and it is, therefore, in perfect accord with the reasonings of the Argument, *à priori*.

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§ 3. Not the philosophically-sounding *annihilation*, however, but the morally-characteristic “destruction,” is the ethically correct (not to say, the Scriptural) expression, to denote the awful utter close of the career of incorrigible, and finally impenitent, wicked men. ’Twere not lawful to seek to found any statement, in a demonstrative work, upon the testimony of a Bible-writer, or upon any authority whatever: but as there is here but surmising, and not laying down the law apodictically,<sup>b</sup> each of the writers in the Bible

<sup>a</sup> Lemma II.

<sup>b</sup> *Supra*, § 1.

is entitled to be heard, as well as, and as much as, any author, whosoever he be; even taking that low ground wherefrom the authors of the books in The Book are viewed as purely human authorities. "Destruction," 'tis repeated, is the ordinary Scriptural expression, though, occasionally, we meet with the idea in even stronger words or phrases; such as, "everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." *Everlasting destruction*, indeed, just because *from the presence of the Lord, the Demiurge*, the "express image" of the person (ὑποστάσεως) of Him "who only" "hath Life in Himself," the sole source of life to all the creatures.

#### EPILEGOMENON.

§ 1. One circumstance there is, on which an observation, not to be forgotten, must be made. It is only by a licence, that Truth, or Truthfulness, rigorously construed, is included among the Moral Attributes. Considered apart from other modes of Mind, Trueness belongs rather to the Intellectual class of faculties. But, being (in its turn) a main constituent in Justice, or *the Moral faculty*,<sup>a</sup> Truthfulness is drawn over to the great Moral group of mental susceptibilities.

§ 2. The proposition as to Trueness constitutes, indeed, the link between the Intellectual Attributes and the strictly Moral powers of Mind. Just as, in a similar manner, the principle of Freeness might be said to be a link between the same two sets of powers: Freeness being capable of being viewed as connected with the large *Will* branch, and, so, as a Moral faculty; as well as capable of being viewed as connected with the more purely Intellectual Attributes, or those appertaining to the domain of the *Understanding*,—Freeness

<sup>a</sup> *Vide, supra*, § 3 of Lemma, Prop. iii. Div. III.

standing in relation to the power of beginning motion, being itself beyond the reach of, and unconstrained by, all *ab extra* influences.

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§ 3. Here terminates the consideration of the, at once, directly *Relative*, and purely *Moral*, Attributes. The propositions of this group carry on, of course, the series of the *Psychical* Attributes; and they close the series of those Attributes which have been denominated the *Simple*, in opposition to the *Complex* or *Compound*, which are yet before us, remaining for consideration in the Fourth Division of this demonstration.

## DIVISION IV

## THE COMPLEX OR COMPOUND ATTRIBUTES.

## SCHOLIUM PRÆPOSITUM.

§ 1. In place of such words as, *God, who is the True, and the Faithful, and the inflexibly Just, and the altogether Righteous One,—who is also the All-Loving One, yea, Love Itself,*—as occurring in the last section of the preceding Proposition\*; in future, there shall be employed, for the most part, these terms,—**GOD, THE LORD, or, THE LORD GOD.**

§ 2. The substitution will conduce to an effective brevity. It will enable us to avoid circumlocutions and repetitions, which might be not only tedious, but undesirable perhaps on other accounts also.

§ 3. The predicates in the various propositions demonstrated in the foregoing Sub-Division, express relative qualities. These are the attributes expressive of peculiar relations in which the Supreme Being stands to the human race; and the term **LORD** shall henceforth be used—frequently, at all events, shall be used—to signify the relations denoted by those words respectively. The term in question shall stand for all those predicates of moral relation.

\* Viz. Prop. iv. Div. III.

## PROPOSITION I.

*As God, the Lord, is the Best, so He is, necessarily, the Wisest of Beings.*

## PROLEGOMENA.

§ 1. Wisdom is not the same as Knowledge. But Wisdom implies Knowledge, as Knowledge implies Intelligence, and Intelligence, again, implies a Mind.\* Knowledge is implied by Wisdom as the less is implied by the greater.

§ 2. In itself, Wisdom may be said to be the capacity of designing to employ means to ends, so as to bring the ends or purposes about. Wisdom, therefore, involves the knowledge of the use of the most proper means, in aiming after purposes or objects. Wisdom may even be said to involve the capability of handling things, so as to turn them into causes adequate to produce effects.

§ 3. Thus, Wisdom is Knowledge of a certain kind, applied in a certain way. Wisdom is the knowledge of the relations of things—specially, of the relations of some things, as means, to other things, as ends. Wisdom is also the knowledge of the fitnesses of causes to produce effects, in combination with the power to employ the means, and to bring the ends or effects to pass, in combination, moreover, with the actual realisations of the mere potentialities. For Wisdom implies somewhere a power of execution. And power must be measured by the actual execution or effect.

§ 4. The elements, therefore, going to constitute Wisdom are, *Knowledge of relations,—will and power to use means, and thereby to realise ends, or put in execution affairs.*

\* Division II. Part i. Scholium.



§ 5. Wisdom, as it has hitherto been explained, is,—for the most part, at least,—an Intellectual function of Mind. Whatever be the constituents of which, exclusively, Wisdom consists (a point on which we are by no means obliged to pronounce an absolute verdict;) 'tis certain, that Wisdom appertains to Intellect in this, that every act of Wisdom involves a mental act or process into which the Intellect enters. Whether or no Wisdom is purely Intellectual, Wisdom implies always the operation of the Intellectual powers. That which containeth not any appeal to, or use of, the faculties of the Intellect, is, in no propriety of speech, Wisdom of any sort.

§ 6. So much with regard to Wisdom abstractly, or considered apart from all but the essential *momenta*. In fine, Wisdom, so far furth as it is an Intellectual function of Mind, is what we have been considering. There is, however, another sort of Wisdom; a Wisdom with positive *moral* elements, -superadded thereunto. Of which additional species anon.

§ 7. The ground being thus opened up, by the appropriate definition, or description, we are ready to advance to the *demonstration* itself of the Proposition, *that God the Lord is necessarily the Wisest of Beings.*

#### FIRST DEMONSTRATION.

##### PROPOSITION.

*God the Lord is, necessarily, the Wisest of Beings.*

§ 1. Now, that God the Lord must needs be the Wisest of Beings, requires no very laboured demonstration. The *media concludendi* are at hand, and irresistible.

§ 2. God the Lord has been demonstrated to be the Intelligent and All-knowing Creator of all things whatsoever;<sup>a</sup> and He has also been proved to be the Upholder or Sustainer in being of all things:<sup>b</sup> it consequently follows, that He knoweth all the relations, actual and possible, of things to each other. The Mind which brought the things, with all their powers and qualities, into existence, and which continues the existence, cannot but know all the relations to each other of the things made and upheld by it.

§ 3. To know all the possible relations of things to each other, involves the knowledge of the adaptability of the powers of things, as means to ends. God the Lord, therefore, must be supposed to know the fitness of this or that, to effect this or the other thing. His knowledge of possible fitnesses must be as profound as the knowledge of all actual fitnesses throughout the wide universe.

§ 4. But the knowledge is not all that is possessed. For as God the Lord is All-powerful,<sup>c</sup> as well as All-knowing,<sup>d</sup> He must have ability to accomplish the realisation of all the adaptations of things arising from so many fitnesses. Even as He knows the various fitnesses of things to each other, so He can bring about the adaptations, and the ends had in view, whatever they be.

§ 5. In fine, it is a necessary consequence from what has preceded in this demonstration, that God the Lord can bring about all the purposes which his All-knowing Intelligence presents, and which are desired as effects.

§ 6. From all which it follows, most evidently, that God, the Lord, is necessarily the Wisest of Beings.

§ 7. Then, God, the Lord, is, necessarily, *the Wisest of Beings*.

<sup>a</sup> Div. II. Part i. § 4, and Part ii. § 2.

<sup>b</sup> Div. III. Prop. iv. Dem. § 5, &c.

<sup>c</sup> Div. II. Part ii.

<sup>d</sup> Div. II. Part i.

## SCHOLIUM AFTER FIRST DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. The demonstration just set forth may be said to be that of the truth of the predicate. But a second demonstration is available, in which the subject, *quod* subject, shall become more prominent. The proof shall extend to the subject as much as to the predicate, and to both in conjunction equally.

§ 2. As, therefore, the proof, in the foregoing demonstration, was greatly confined to the predicate, so, joining subject to predicate after another fashion, we must note the result. Conjoining, then, those two, we have the Perfect Goodness and Love of God the Lord, adjoined to His Measureless Wisdom. The practical result of the conjunction will be, that all the ends accomplished by the Being of beings must be the most Benevolent, as well as the most Wise,—or, the Best, at once, and the Wisest.

§ 3. But the important truth shall be best brought out in a separate demonstration.

## SECOND DEMONSTRATION.

## PROPOSITION.

*As God, the Lord, is the Best: so He is, necessarily, the Wisest of Beings.*

§ 1. God, the Lord, not only is the All-knowing and the All-powerful Cause of all things in the material universe:<sup>a</sup> He is, also, the Loving One conserving all.<sup>b</sup> He created all the things of the world in Goodness, and He sustains them in Love.<sup>c</sup> What, now, is the necessary result of the addition

<sup>a</sup> Div. II. Parts i. & ii.

<sup>b</sup> Div. III. Prop. iv. Dem.

<sup>c</sup> Div. III. Sub-Prop. § 2, & Prop. iv. Dem. § 5.

of the precise Moral element in view to the Wisdom, the possession of which by God, the Lord, has been already demonstrated?<sup>a</sup>

§ 2. Of course, it follows from the special additional elements of the Goodness, and the Love, being combined with the Wisdom,—most manifestly, it immediately follows,—that God, the Lord, will be always exercising His Wisdom so as to bring Beneficent ends about. Only Benevolent effects will be aimed at by One who is endowed with an assemblage of such Perfections, acting ever harmoniously with a view to a common end.

§ 3. The Wisdom, then, with which we are now concerned, is that which is engaged in seeking to bring about Good ends. By no means ends or effects irrespective of their moral bearing, but ends having distinctly recognisable Benevolent action in view.

§ 4. And, thus, it has been made clear, that as God, the Lord, is the Best, so He is necessarily the Wisest of Beings.

§ 5. As God, the Lord, then, is the Best, so He is, necessarily, *the Wisest of Beings*.

#### COROLLARY FROM SECOND DEMONSTRATION.

From this demonstration it follows, that, as Love and Wisdom act combinedly, so the one must be supposed to serve as the measure (as it were) of the other. From the very nature of the case, it follows that the Wisdom will be the regulative measure,—the guide and the controller,—of the Love. Love, in its promptings and actings, will be ruled by Wisdom: Wisdom will point out the fittest means for Love to employ in accomplishing its ends. Wisdom will be restrained and prevented from ever resorting to any but beneficent devices; and Love will be prevented from enlisting

<sup>a</sup> Preced. Dem.

in its service any benevolences but those best calculated to bring about the desired effects. Thus, there is Love as the Moral motive ; Wisdom as the Intellectual director. The one the mover ; the other, the regulating principle of the motion.

#### SCHOLIUM AFTER SECOND DEMONSTRATION.

Of course, the influence which Love imparts, is not the only influence which will be at work. Wisdom will ever consist in what is consonant to the dictates of each and all of the other Attributes. Justice, for instance, will be represented as well as Love, in the case of operations having men, that is, actually existing moral beings, directly for their subject and end.

#### GENERAL SCHOLIUM AS TO WISDOM.

§ 1. It has been suggested,<sup>a</sup> that there is another sort of Wisdom than that which is purely or almost entirely Intellectual, a Wisdom, to wit, which has a distinct Moral element inherent in it ; and it shall now be our business to open up this whole matter. The Second Demonstration was concerned with the proof of Moral Wisdom, or Wisdom as existing in the Supreme Being, and that Demonstration has, anticipatively, prepared the way for us.

§ 2. In the first place, then, there is the Wisdom which has been above defined and described :<sup>b</sup> Wisdom divested of all extraneous elements ; abstracted from all non-essential *momenta* whatever. This Wisdom in itself, or most strictly taken, is, speaking generally, an Intellectual function of Mind.

§ 3. But, no doubt, there is, also, a Wisdom having Moral elements most distinctly added : inasmuch that the Wisdom

<sup>a</sup> Proleg. § 6.

<sup>b</sup> Proleg.

now in view constitutes a species widely different from the other.

§ 4. The Moral Wisdom is, in turn, twofold. Inasmuch as the Moral itself is of two kinds, the strictly Moral, to wit, and its opposite, the Im-moral;<sup>a</sup> so Moral Wisdom, likewise, is of two kinds.

§ 5. First, there is Wisdom with the addition of the eminently Moral quality of Goodness, Beneficence, Benevolence,—or by whatever term the superadded Moral element may be expressed.

§ 6. And there is a kind of Wisdom which has an addition of an opposite character: Wisdom which is evil; aiming at wicked ends, being animated by the desire to accomplish cruelties. This kind may be denominated *False Wisdom*, as the former kind may be denominated *True Wisdom*. And it may be of use to expatiate, for a little, on the topic of that bad Wisdom, as distinguished from the better sort, the proper, the genuine Wisdom.

§ 7. The mere abstract knowledge of relations, or fitnesses, and the will and the power of using means to ends so as to effect aims, is all that is absolutely involved in pure Wisdom: Wisdom defecated from all extraneous or non-essential adjuncts. But when we speak of an end, an aim, a purpose, we imply the idea of something truly desirable for its own sake, or as a good in itself. And desirable things are of two sorts: things are desirable by reason of the good, or of the evil, which is, or may be, in them. Good ends will be aimed at by Good Beings; evil ends, by Evil Beings. Not that evil ends, as evil, can ever be sought after by any mind, even a mind labouring under mere insane delirations. But ends, which are really evil in themselves, are apprehended—or may be occasionally apprehended—to be good

<sup>a</sup> Div. III. Prop. iii., Lemma, § 1.

things by those who, incurably principled in evil, are only Evil Beings. It is to be observed, too, that the *end*, in one case, may become but the *means*, in another. There may be a vast interval between the primary action of the Efficient Cause, and the last operation in the Final Cause; and there may be, between the extremes, a series of ends, each of which (except the last) may be, in turn, means to a further end. And it is, in great part, owing to the circumstance now adverted to that the erroneous judgment has been come to, that Wisdom is concerned with ends as much as with means.

§ 8. To speak, now, of the True Wisdom. This Wisdom always has regard to the nature of the ends, or the effects it would accomplish; and it will seek to bring about only good or beneficent ends. Hence, 'tis plain, that True Wisdom is simply Wisdom in combination with Goodness, or it is the Wisdom of a Good Being. (Wisdom + Goodness = Wisdom of a Good Mind.) Such Wisdom, in the most exalted form, is handled above, where the Wisdom of the pre-eminently Good One is treated of.<sup>a</sup>

§ 9. On the other hand, the False Wisdom has regard to ends of a totally different character. It seeks to accomplish evil effects. It is the wisdom of the wicked mind: its motives, therefore, are malevolent. But to draw out this subject to good purpose, and, by doing so, to illustrate yet farther the distinction itself between the Good Wisdom, and the Evil, let us go at once to the great fountain-head and standard of our language, our English Bible. Whatever on this subject is found depicted plainly therein, may be taken for granted as being in accordance with the true genius of our tongue, if not in perfect consistence also with good usage. Of course, in no other sense is the Bible referred to here as an authority.

<sup>a</sup> Second Dem.

§ 10. Not to be prolix, a single passage will serve to illustrate the distinction in question. See the General Epistle of James; the Third Chapter, from the 13th to the 17th verses inclusive. The section begins by asking, Who is a wise man among you? taking *wise*, perhaps, in the strictest sense. Then the improper, the false, the evil Wisdom is treated of. Afterwards, the proper or genuine, the true, the beneficent Wisdom is introduced. In the one case, as well as in the other, the Epistle-writer employs the term σοφία, ἡ σοφία. The same sort of broad distinction is to be met with in many other places in the New Testament. But it will suffice that we keep by the one place in the Epistle of James, the practical Moralist among those writers.

§ 11. The passage in view, then, informs us, that there is a Wisdom, whose origin is from beneath, which is "earthly, sensual, (or *animal*,) devilish," (or *demon-sprung*;) and a "Wisdom which is from above," this Heavenly Wisdom being "full of mercy, and good fruits," or benevolences. In short, the one Wisdom is cruel; the other, altogether beneficent.

§ 12. From which it appears that the false Wisdom, when fully developed, is cruel, or has cruel ends in view in its aims. It uses the means to produce cruelties. While, on the contrary, the other kind of Wisdom is essentially beneficent: it is gentle, and full of mercy.

§ 13. Hence, the improper and false Wisdom is the wisdom of the evil mind, and the proper and true Wisdom is the wisdom of the good-minded person. But whereas Wisdom, in and by itself, is (as we have seen<sup>a</sup>) nowise concerned with ends, as in and by themselves, or is indifferent to ends as such, whether they be good or be evil; the more

<sup>a</sup> Proleg., & above, § 7.



natural, and the much more common way, is by an association of a certain kind. Wisdom and Goodness, conjoined in the closest embrace, act together in unity, and from oneness. But why is such conjunction natural?

§ 14. The question, and the answer, will bring before us a circumstance worthy of observation. When, in ordinary speech, *Wisdom* simply is spoken of, the proper, the true, the good Wisdom only is meant to be understood. The reason for the phenomenon must be sought for *in the depths*. The phenomenon, however, must have a sound reason, how profound soever it be. The wisdom of the good or gracious character is more natural than the wisdom of the cruel character: such is the phenomenon of which the cause is to be assigned, and the cause of so remarkable a circumstance is well entitled to our attention.

§ 15. The reason is this: Cruel (= devilish) contrivances (*i.e.*, adaptations of means to ends) must be supposed to proceed from a Malevolent Mind, and a Malevolent Spirit is itself unnatural: it is in Nature, but not of Nature. Malevolence betokens imperfection within its own sphere, and such imperfection cannot be, or be properly considered to be, truly natural.

§ 16. While, on the other hand, benevolent contrivances betoken the action of a Loving Spirit, and this is ever recognised as becoming and fit. It harmonizes with Nature, as she truly expresses herself. In Nature, it is also of Nature: in truth, a very grand part of Nature herself.

§ 17. No malevolence can be, or be supposed to be, in the Supreme Cause, the Cause of causes, for this very reason, that Malevolence implies the unnatural, and the imperfect. And to bring together the idea of the First Cause and that of Imperfection,—of what kind soever, or degree soever, it matters not,—were to associate together things which are

in irreconcilable opposition.<sup>a</sup> Things which could be brought together only to expose their irreconcilable variance and antagonism. They would fly asunder with an immense rebound. On the contrary, all benevolent and worthy consummations have their origin in God the Lord, the fount of all creaturely life and blessings.

§ 18. And thus it has come about that Wisdom is associated by us with the Moral. If we speak of men, Wisdom, as a birth of the Intellect (even as a Minerva is feigned to have sprung from the brow of Jove), and the Emotional or Moral part of our nature, are held to be in the most intimate connection with each other.

#### EPILOGOMENON.

From all that has been advanced, it will be evident, that *Wisdom*, considered as an Attribute of The Supreme, belongs, so far, to the *Relative* Attributes, and that, moreover, it is not a pure and simple Attribute, but forms one of the class of *Compound* Attributes—of which class, *Holiness* (to which we are rapidly advancing) is another, and a most notable instance. We have seen that there are more elements than one in that complex mode of mind which goes by the name of *Wisdom*. It is, indeed, abundantly apparent, that Wisdom is not one pure and simple element, in what relation soever it stands to Mind generally.

<sup>a</sup> Div. III. Prop. i., § 2,—& ii., § 4.

## PROPOSITION II.

*God, the Lord, who is the Wisest of Beings, is, necessarily,  
of Ineffable Moral Purity.*

## PROLEGOMENA.

§ 1. According to our highest standards of English, the term *Holiness*, when applied to the Supreme Being, has two meanings. It means, either, entire absolute Moral Purity; or, the Excellency involved in, and flowing from, the confluence and conjunction of all the Attributes. When each one of the Attributes is conjoined with the rest, and the whole of the Attributes or Excellencies are considered as an assemblage of constituents acting together, a vision of Holiness, in the comprehensive sense, is the result. The same remark is applicable to the cognate words. *Holy*, for instance, may be employed in one, or other, of the two senses. The same sort of remark might be extended to the corresponding words in other languages, such as the Hebrew, representative of the Shemitic class, and the Greek, as representing the Japhetic, or Aryan, class of languages. But it behoves us to be more particular with the statement of the distinction of the meanings. The distinction is a most important one, and carries great things in its train.

§ 2. In the first place, then, the term *Holiness* is used as expressive of Moral Purity, or the opposite of Moral Impurity. Hence, Holiness is moral stainlessness, spotlessness, unsulliedness, immaculateness,—in fine, freedom from polluting taint of any kind, in moral respects. And,

§ 3. In the second place, *Holiness* is used to express the combination of the Excellencies, even the commingling lustre or glory of all the Divine Attributes. It has regard

to the union, and the result of the union, of the Divine Attributes,—especially the Intellectual and Moral Attributes, but emphatically the Moral Attributes; and, of the Moral Attributes, it regards emphatically the presence of the Moral Purity of our Proposition.

§ 4. It is only with the former of the two meanings, that we have to do as under this Proposition. The other sense will fall to be handled in a Proposition devoted to itself.<sup>a</sup> For the future, then, *Purity*, or *Moral Purity*, shall be, almost exclusively, employed to express the idea proper to this place; reserving *Holiness*, in the latter of the two significations, for after consideration.

#### DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. That God, the Lord, is necessarily of ineffable Moral Purity, that is, cannot possibly be considered as being, in any, even the least, respect, Impure Morally; shall be made as clear as any truth can be. The proof lies not very far off, and it will be found to be quite irresistible.

§ 2. The reason why God, the Lord, must be conceived of as Morally Pure,—or cannot by possibility be conceived of as being otherwise,—is, because 'tis most plain that Moral impureness signifies, or involves, some defect or imperfection. And no absurdity could be greater than the absurdity which would couple the idea of any defect or imperfection with God, the Lord.<sup>b</sup> What defect or imperfection, of any kind, or degree, can there be in that Being who is the subject of all the predicates in our preceding Propositions? The preceding Demonstrations must all be taken now for granted. What imperfection, then, can there be in the One Necessary Being, of utmost Simplicity, who, being of Infinity of Expansion and Duration, is Intelligent and All-knowing,

<sup>a</sup> Succeed. Prop.

<sup>b</sup> Vide Gen. Schol. under preced. Prop., § 17.

All-powerful, and entirely Free,—completely Happy, and perfectly Good ; who, in addition, is necessarily True, Faithful, inflexibly Just, altogether Righteous, and most Loving,—and withal of absolute Wisdom ? To attribute any imperfection to such a Being, were to utter a mere contradictory impossibility.

§ 3. Moreover, a stain of impurity must needs be something impressed from without, or brought about from within. In the case of the Lord God, a stain would involve a change from the præexistent immaculate cleanness,—inasmuch as foulness could never be considered, by even the wildest flight of imagination, to be the original condition of the subject of our Proposition, the Being to whom so many excellencies do so undeniably appertain. The foulness must needs be separable from the subject of inhesion.

§ 4. Now, a stain involving a change from the præexistent immaculateness : In the first place, nothing can be more palpable than that the Being demonstrated in the preceding Propositions, cannot be subject to being changed, or acted on, *from without*. There can, indeed, be no *without* in reference to the Substance that fills Infinite Space, or is the Being of Infinity of Expansion, and that inhabits Eternity, or is the One Being of Infinity of Duration. And if it be so palpable that the Lord God cannot be acted on from without, much less (to speak so) can He be subject to be stained from without, or by any object or cause without Himself.

§ 5. And, in the second place, equally clear it is, that no change, from a præexistent condition of purity, can be conceived as passing upon the Lord God *from within* Himself. For as to the supposition of a change wrought from within in the case under contemplation—a change from immaculateness to a state of some foulness or other,—such a supposi-

tion would involve as great an impossibility as can be, the supposition, to wit, of an effect without there being any possible cause. To assign, as the cause of a polluting impurity, the Immaculate, and the absolutely Pure, were simply to present an incongruous absurdity. An utterly impossible and contradictory cause, is no cause, and something more—even a heap of nonsensical words.

§ 6. The demonstration is, therefore, complete and perfect, and, accordingly, we say, without hesitation, that it has been irrefragably proved, that God, the Lord, who is the Wisest of Beings, is necessarily of Ineffable Moral Purity.

§ 7. God, the Lord, then, who is the Wisest of Beings, is, necessarily, of *Ineffable Moral Purity*.

#### SCHOLIUM.

THE MORAL PURITY, WHAT IT FUNDAMENTALLY INVOLVES,  
AND REALLY CONSISTS IN.

§ 1. The demonstration of the present proposition might have been dispensed with, but for one circumstance. In demonstrating the inflexible Justice of God,<sup>a</sup> it was demonstrated that the character of God is, with respect to Justice, without flaw. The Divine Justice is perfect, or altogether pure. And so of the rest of the Moral Attributes.<sup>b</sup> We demonstrated the Attributes as the necessary Modes of the One Necessary Substance : which is just saying, in other words, that the perfection of each Attribute, or each Attribute in perfection, was demonstrated. Nothing more could be righteously required. Quite superfluous, to prove no decadence, no deterioration, no decay, in necessarily existing Excellencies. A work of idle supererogation to evince, that Perfect Attributes are Perfect.

<sup>a</sup> Prop. iii. Div. III.

<sup>b</sup> *Vide* Div. III. Sub-Div. ii.

§ 2. A circumstance, however, intervenes, to prevent us from arguing in such a manner. One essential element in Moral Purity has not as yet been touched on anywhere. It is incumbent on us, therefore, to supply the *desideratum*, and to shew how indispensable was a separate demonstration under the present head.

§ 3. In opening up this most important matter, it will be necessary to take a more than ordinarily extensive sweep. It has been demonstrated, that the race of man began to be.<sup>a</sup> As a constituent of the universe, there was a time when the race was not, since the whole Material Universe itself had an absolute commencement.<sup>b</sup> *Whatever begins to be must have a cause*: the human race, therefore, had a Creator.

§ 4. A necessary consequence of man's having had a Creator, is very weighty. Speaking psychologically, man is but a congeries of certain mental powers and faculties. From which unquestionable truth it is righteously deducible, that each one of the original powers or faculties of the human mind was the free bestowment of the same First Cause.

§ 5. To every distinct faculty or quality, and relative perfection, of mind possessed congenitally by man, there must be a corresponding Attribute, and absolute Perfection, in the mind of the Creator, the Father of spirits: Otherwise, there would be in the creature a perfection, without there being aught answering thereunto in the Creator. There would be a distinct quality of mind which, with its subject of inhesion, began to be, without, however, there having been any cause whatsoever. An arrant absurdity. In fine, 'tis an axiomatic truth, That an effect cannot possess any original, distinct perfection, which is not in the cause, either actually, or at least in a higher degree.<sup>c</sup>

§ 6. Now, 'tis unquestionable, that there is in man the

<sup>a</sup> Schol. under Part iii. Div. II.

<sup>b</sup> Sub-Prop. Part ii. Div. I.

<sup>c</sup> *Vide, supra*, § 4, Dem. Prop. iii. Div. III.

feeling, or there are the feelings, which lead to *marriage*; and perhaps we shall not greatly err if we give, as the result of the last analysis of that feeling, *a certain disposition for communion*, or, *a disposition for a certain communion*, to end—by means of thorough unison—in complete union, and absolute oneness. The question, thus, arises, Must there, therefore, be, in first principles, a perfection, in man's Creator, the Great First Cause of all things, corresponding to that disposition for communion? Indeed, we shall not much err if we so estimate, and so use in argumentation, the cardinal feeling in view.

§ 7. That the feeling indicated, to wit, the feeling which brings together individuals of opposite sexes, strangers hitherto, for life-long association, is a *fundamental* part of our mental constitution; this is undeniable. That, moreover, the feeling is a *distinct* part of our nature, admits of as little doubt. That it is not a mere imperfection, but, on the contrary, is a true (relative) *perfection*, is, also, a point which cannot be with propriety contested. Call the feeling in question *passion*, if you will; still, 'tis certain and indisputable, that the feeling does really exist: that it is a radical and distinct part of man's nature, and cannot be classed among the mere imperfections and blemishes of our mental constitution. All these are, indeed, points which the true psychologist will readily concede. If one, through any perverseness, will not admit that genuine conjugal love, as an indispensable mental power or susceptibility not to be confounded with any other, presents the most heavenly sight to be seen on earth, being too a most blessed thing in itself; he is bound at least to give another and a better account of the facts in human life which are patent to all.

§ 8. The inference unavoidably deducible from the great fact, or class of facts, adverted to, is, that in the Creator



as Father of minds and First Cause, there must be that absolute perfection, which, in first principles, corresponds to the feeling in question—call it *instinct* or *passion*, or by what name soever you please. To deny this inference, were to deny the Axiom which has been laid down, and founded on<sup>a</sup>: and deny the axiom in view, and then—Nothing, pure Nothing, might be the cause of Something, yea, of all Things.

§ 9. But if a true marriage is a most beautiful and blessed thing, there is, alas! a reverse side to the picture. That which, in happy cases, is developed into the beatitude of conjugal love, is, in unprincipled or ill-regulated minds, manifested in the hideous shape of violent, utterly lawless passion. Become ungovernable, the perverted feeling—susceptible as it is of so great variation—is capable of the most dreadful abuses. And just in proportion to the excellency of true and pure conjugal love, is the vileness of the unbridled licentiousness, and demoralization, displayed in the abandonment of fornication, or in the form of hellish rebelliousness against the ordinances of Heaven. The one is outward, and in the body; the other, inward, and in the mind: But both are equally, or they equally involve, unclean adulteries.

§ 10. And as God the Lord is the Originator of the blessedness of conjugal love, so He is utterly and unalterably opposed, through the Perfect Purity of His Nature, to that abuse to which we have pointed. If He be the cause of the one; so, with regard to either of the others, there cannot be anything in the Divine Mind but what is immutably opposed to it. To impurity of the character indicated, there cannot be in God the Lord aught at all corresponding. There is a correspondence indeed—but the correspondence is only pro-

<sup>a</sup> *Ut supra*, § 5, *cum loc. citat.*

ductive of, and manifested by, the most determined Contrast, and perpetually warring Opposition.

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§ 11. Thus, Moral Purity makes secret allusion always to a certain species of contrasted impurity. But there is a farther and more profound *arcanum*, well worthy of the deepest contemplation.

§ 12. Of all the kinds of impurity which can defile the soul of man, there is one kind which, by emphasis, has received the name of "*pollution*." The reason of this will take us at once among the recesses of Nature's most hidden secrets. 'Tis not of sexual impurity that we are now to treat, but another and a much worse sort of impurity stands before us as our dread, yet uneschewable, topic. Our subject, however, is, unnatural sins or vices in their generic aspect, not any one sin or vice specially. Too dreadful a task would be involved in the painting, in true colours, of any single species of unnatural depravity. The most general allusions must suffice. That there are enormities so hideous that they cannot be so much as named among us, tells its own tale. Nevertheless, such portentous wickedness is, unquestionably, to be found among men.

§ 13. But at this point attention must be given to a truth of great weight in order to the clear elucidation of the subject. The Lord God is never to be conceived of by us as existing without any and all respect to sex. On the contrary, He is to be considered all-sexual, in the sense that He contains within Himself the first principles of the perfections of both sexes. He is Male, but He is not merely Male, or to the thorough exclusion of any excellent principle serving as the ground-work of the creation of the Female. Else, how could the Lord God be, as He is, the Creator of the human race,

with its male and female? The existence of the woman must be accounted for somehow. If woman began to be as a distinct unit created at first-hand, or without creaturely mediation, the Lord God was her Creator, and a first principle correspondingly must be supposed in that First Cause. If, again, woman, being a mediate formation, had no *such* Creator, then she, as an individual, came into (not being, but) separate being with the first out-going of sinfulness in man, and, as separate, was but an imperfection appertaining to the human creature as such. But whichever hypothesis be adopted, it comes to the same thing, as the thoughtful student will not be slow to understand. The human race is essentially Male and Female; and it began to be: so, it must have had a Creator. And the Creator of the human race must have, in first principles, the perfections of the same.

§ 14. So, being such a Creator, the Lord God is rightly deemed to be altogether Holy or Pure, in direct contrast with every immoral human being—no matter what the sex—giving its personality up to the debasement, and untold wickedness of the abominable pollution thus shudderingly glanced at.

§ 15. Indeed, it requires no stretch of intellect to perceive, that, if the Lord God is rightly conceived as being without taint, or the shadow of taint, in respect of sexual impurity,—as being, in that respect, the altogether Pure, or Holy One; *much more*, must He be considered as the Holy One in opposition to the worst kind of human, or, rather, the worse than human, impurity and depravity. Sexual impurities are, at any rate, sins in the direction of nature, and not worse than gross aggravations and coarse and vile exaggerations of natural instincts, and tendencies; while sins of uncleanness against nature, are sins of the utmost possible human (and *only less than diabolical*) wickedness, in the very form

of wickedness. In truth, the opposition between the Purity of the Holy One, and the impurity of an abandoned man, becomes greater as the impurity, passing from one stage to another, is increased by reaching to a yet more monstrous wickedness.

§ 16. In making the transition from sexual excesses to unnatural vices, and the opposite to these last in the character of The Supreme, we may deem that we have passed to the region of the inner ground of opposition. Having traced this sort of impurity to its deepest point in interior wickedness, we are necessarily arrived at the place where the abstractest considerations are the most apposite.

§ 17. The reason of the enormous heinousness which attaches to this unnatural kind of wickedness, lies just in this, that here is an offence which is, formally and expressly, a sin by a man against himself, and his own nature, as such. The germ of suicide and murder is here—murder and suicide at once.

§ 18. In fine, the Lord God, considered as the most Pure Being, must be set in opposition to that sort of uncleanness *most of all*. The portentous sin—whatever the precise guise assumed—is a crime against Nature. While all other sins are, more or less, in the direction of Nature; this one alone sins against Nature—radically against Nature herself, and as such. But (as has been decisively demonstrated<sup>a</sup>) God is the source and fount of Nature: hence, He is the most Natural Being. The nature of the whole of *the other* is but an efflux, and, in some respects, a resemblance, of His Nature. Consequently, God the Lord must be conceived of as being removed—infinately, as it were—from, and opposed to, the very appearance of that portent among evil deeds.

<sup>a</sup> Div. II. Parts ii. & iii., & Div. III. Prop. i., Sub-prop., Schol.

§ 19. The doer of such an enormity is striving to overturn the whole course of nature. The endeavour is but a beginning, but, in point of consistency, there is really the germ of an attempt to obliterate, with nature, its Divine Source. All sin, indeed, has, for its inmost essence, a principle of hatred to the very existence of the Lord God, and the order of nature instituted by Him. Sin would overthrow all. But some sins, more than others, aim at the destruction of the foundations of things. This sin, perhaps, most of all does so, *so far as possible to the human sinner*. Every man, therefore, avoiding the very appearance of that awful evil, should *reverence* himself, the creature, and the image, of the Uncreated One.

§ 20. Emphatically, then, is the character of the Lord God set against that sort of Impurity. By reason of His ineffable Moral Purity, He is opposed to that sort *most of all*.

#### SUB-SCHOLIUM.

Purity, as directly opposed to such impurity as we have dared to glance at, can (as has been seen) be rightly ascribed to the Divine Mind; *and there can be no direct opposition, proceeding from contrast, unless there be certain points of resemblance between the two sources of the opposing forces*. This may be a profound truth, but 'tis none the less true because of the profundity. In fact, but for abstract, or most innerly grounded reasons, it would be next to impossible to tell, and impossible to tell well, why the Divine Cause of all things is the purest morally. The doctrine might, no doubt, be propounded without any strict proof being an accompaniment of the promulgation; and, as a matter of fact, the Moral Purity of the Deity has been taught, and most successfully taught, without any but the most obvious reasons being

assigned, so far as any reasons at all were assigned: the truth being, that the doctrine was greatly rested on the argument of the authority of the Promulgator. But the argument of authority being of no weight with us, it is fortunate that we are enabled to dispense with it. Metaphysically, it is quite proper to ascribe to the Great Supreme that which was, in point of fact, applied to Him by the most excellent of the world's judges, the Shemitic seers who caught sight of Divine truths by grand intuitions,—the seers, we repeat, among the monotheistic and theological people of all the nations of the earth. The Hebrew Législator and all the Prophets of the peculiar people, and the Apostles of a later day, the Missionaries to all Adamic peoples,—all united in declaring that the Lord God is the thrice Holy One, and that His very soul hateth the unnatural sins which were openly, and at all times, practised by the Heathen on every side. The ancient method was by a patent track, while our reasons are profound and even occult: but both procedures are good, having their foundations in the nature of things.

## PROPOSITION III.

*God, the Lord, who is the Wisest of Beings, and of Ineffable Moral Purity, is, necessarily, the Holiest One.*

## PROLEGOMENA.

§ 1. In entering upon the consideration of a Proposition which forms a culminating point in our progress, a recapitulation of matter already advanced will be, to some extent, requisite.<sup>a</sup> There may be even enlargement, in some directions, on topics formerly touched.<sup>a</sup>

§ 2. The word *Holy*, and the cognate *Holiness*, as applicable to the Divine Being, may be used in the one, or the other, of two great senses. 1. The word may be employed to denote Moral immaculateness, or perfect Purity or Pureness. 2. It may be taken as standing for the result of the Excellencies of the Divine Nature being united in a commingling whole, and for the gloriousness thence arising. And this latter is the sense in which uniformly *Holiness* is to be understood as under the present Proposition. In truth, the meaning affixed here to the term is the strict and proper meaning of the same.

§ 3. Yet, although such the true import of the word, one thing ought never to be lost sight of, namely, that the *Holiness* subsumed by this Proposition denotes the excellency of God, the Lord, flowing from the whole of His Attributes, *with, however, an emphatic weight attached always to Pureness Morally.* The Holiness regards the union, and the result of the union, of the Divine Attributes—especially, the Intellectual and Moral, but emphatically the Moral Attributes ;

<sup>a</sup> Proleg. preced. Prop.

and, of the Moral Attributes, the presence of the Moral Purity of the preceding Proposition is imperatively postulated.

§ 4. In that Proposition, the Holiness of The Supreme, in the first of the senses, was demonstrated; and our business now is to prove, in a manner equally irrefragable, the Holiness of the Deity, in the other, and more strict and proper sense.

§ 5. But ere we advance to the demonstration itself, it may be well to illustrate the two differing meanings, by an appeal to the best usage. In both the preceding Proposition, and above, the distinction has been formally stated, but as yet the reader has had no opportunity of observing the distinction embodied in actual examples. It is one thing to state the distinction between the two senses in an abstract manner, and it is another to bring out the distinction in a more concrete sort of way, or by vivid illustrations drawn from the worthiest sources. It shall be our present business, therefore, to illustrate the important distinction in question by a reference to the best authorities known to the student of the English language.

§ 6. Now, 'tis allowed, by all competent persons, that, for general purposes, we have no better standard of English than our Bible in the vernacular. But farther, and more particularly, we can apply to no other source than our English Bible, with regard to a large class of words. For terms answering to a number of Moral and Religious ideas, no other course than an appeal to the treasures of the Old and New Testaments, is practicable. We might, of a truth, go elsewhere, but the authorities themselves would be found to have drawn from those very sources of the various books of the two Testaments, as *their own* fountain-head. Where, indeed, shall we find words adequately expressive of the awful Purity, and the glorious Holiness, our theme, except



in the glowing descriptions of the rapt Hebrew seers, the true prophets for all times? Let the fact be accounted for how it may, the fact is, and will remain, that we have no other repertory at all suitable to go to for words answering to our grandest Moral and Religious ideas than our correspondents to the Testament in Hebrew, and the Testament in Greek.

§ 7. It need scarcely be said—or rather repeated, for the statement has been made once and again,—that, in this demonstration, the argument of *authority* were quite out of place. In citing, therefore, passages of *Sacred Scripture*, no purpose but one is entertained, the citations being made for the sole sake of illustrating—in, however, appropriate language—the reality of the distinction, by a display of the two true meanings of our term.

§ 8. As instances of the use of the term in the sense of *Moral Purity*, the following passages may be adduced:—

“Ye shall not make yourselves abominable with any creeping thing that creepeth, neither shall ye make yourselves unclean with them, that ye should be defiled thereby. For I am the Lord your God [Jehovah your Elohim]: ye shall therefore sanctify yourselves [make yourselves holy], and ye shall be holy, for I am holy; neither shall ye defile yourselves with any manner of creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. For I am the Lord that bringeth you up out of the land of Egypt, to be your God: ye shall therefore be holy, for I am holy.”—*Leviticus*, xi. 43, 44, 45.—“Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you.”—*Matthew*, vii. 6.—“He that is unjust, let him be unjust still: and he which is filthy, let him be filthy still: and he that is righteous, let him be righteous still: and he that is holy, let him be holy still.”—*Revelation*, xxii. 11.

§ 9. To which might be appended many additional felicitous examples. But the selection made will suffice to illustrate the meaning of *holy*, in the more restricted sense of the word. That ceremonial physical cleanness was but the outside emblem of Purity within—even of that Moral Purity which was really the ultimate end of the great Lawgiver of the Hebrews, and the other penmen, his countrymen.

§ 10. Advance we next to passages which have reference to *Holy*, or *Holiness*, in the more comprehensive of the two senses. The following will afford illustrations of the term when standing for the Excellency necessitated by the totality of the Divine Attributes :—

“There is none holy as the Lord [Jehovah] : for there is none beside Thee : neither is there any rock like our God [our Elohim].”—1 *Samuel*, ii. 2.—“They (the fathers of our flesh) verily for a few days chastened us after their own pleasure ; but he (God) for our profit, that we might be partakers of his holiness.”—*Hebrews*, xii. 10.—“Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name ? for thou only art holy : for all nations shall come and worship before thee.”—*Revelation*, xv. 4.

§ 11. Numerous apt exemplifications of the same meaning might be adduced. No place, however, is more memorable than the august passage in the sublimest of prophets—the sublimest, perhaps, of all writers—where are described the effects, upon the most excellent Intelligences of our universe, as well as upon the seer himself, *our* representative in that glorious scene,—the effects, we repeat, of the vision of the unutterable Holiness of the Lord of the hosts of all the starry continents. “I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it stood the Seraphim : each one had six wings ; with twain he covered his face, and with twain he covered

his feet, and with twain he did fly. And one cried unto another, and said, Holy, holy, holy, is the Lord of hosts: the whole earth is full of his glory. And the posts of the door moved at the voice of him that cried, and the house was filled with smoke. Then said I, Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the king, the Lord of hosts.”—*Isaiah*, vi. 1-5. One of the sublimest places in the sublime Apocalypse is founded upon that description. “And the four living creatures [*ἑῶα* = the four representatives of the created universe] had each of them six wings about him; and they were full of eyes within: and they rest not day and night, saying, Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come.”—*Revelation*, iv. 8.

§ 12. In giving a lucid, and, at same time, vivid and fervid idea of the Attribute or Excellency under consideration, no other language could approach the capacities and aptitudes of that language. No other language can equal in force and complete suitableness the language of our Book of books when we would give expression to the heights of Moral and Religious ideas. Without the aid in question, we should have endeavoured in vain to convey, by words, any true idea of that *Holiness* which springs from the concatenation of Attributes, each one of which is, singly, an Excellency in itself.

#### DEMONSTRATION.

§ 1. That *the whole is equal to the sum of the parts*, is a position equally self-evident as this, that *the whole is greater than its part*, which is one of the preliminary Axioms of the Geometricians. And it will be seen, that the Proposition now in hand is on the same footing of indisputability with *those positions*.

§ 2. For, taking *Holy* in the sense of our Proposition, that is, taking *Holiness* to denote the excellency of the Lord God as implied by, or flowing from, the union of the whole of His Attributes; there is needed but the simplest application of the doctrine, The whole is equal to the sum of the parts. Take the predicates in all the preceding Propositions, and unite them in one predicate, applying this to the same subject as that which appears in the last demonstrated Proposition in our series; and you have, of course, a predicate, or whole, expressive of what is equal to the sum of all the individual predicates, or parts.

§ 3. Our application of that self-evident doctrine, is, indeed, unassailable. 'Tis quite evident (whether it be self-evident or no) that the Being to whom must be attributed each one of the Attributes, or Excellencies, as these have been educed in the foregoing demonstrations, must be in possession of that greater, or (we may say) absolute, Excellence which is the necessary result of the total attribution. He who is conform to each predicate, one after the other, is, at the same time, conform to all the predicates together. Quite palpably, and all undeniably, is this so. No position in the Mathematics is more certain.

§ 4. Doubtless, then, *Holiness* may be considered as if it were but one Attribute, and no more; yet, none the less true is it that the Holiness which expresses the universal Excellence of God, the Lord, is a result, and the resultant of all the other Qualities or Properties of the Divine Nature. The prominence, in the view, of the attribute in question, as one attribute, may affect the whole vision: nevertheless, the attributes, whose union yields us this *Holiness*, are clearly distinguishable from the glory which is the result of the congeries in union.

§ 5. The Lord God is in possession of so many Attri-

butes, each one of which is an Excellency in itself : Therefore, He is in possession of that far greater Excellency which is the result of the union of all the individual Attributes or Excellencies. This, the point to which we have reached, is a most certain truth, and it forms the foundation of the doctrine of the one great Attribute, or Super-Excellency of Holiness.

§ 6. But there is a truth beyond that to which we have attained hitherto. The ground on which we have been standing is but the vestibule of a much grander temple of truth, into which we may, so far, enter. In the region beyond our present stand-point, may be beheld, in a far-off way, indeed, and through a mitigating medium, a dazzling, and, in sooth, blinding glory, which far excelleth that which is the pure resultant of the totality of the attributes, or individual excellencies. That which is glorious, may be conceived to have no glory, by reason of the glory which excelleth.

§ 7. There is a law of mind to which very little attention has ever been paid: a grand law it is, however: a supreme law in Intellectual and Moral matters—super-eminently dominating in the Moral region of Mind. The law in question is this, that, with regard to an assemblage of mental excellencies, the position, The whole is equal to the sum of the parts, when applied to the Supreme Mind, gives place to this other and higher containing law, that from the whole, or all the assembled, united parts, there results an Excellency or Glory greater far than could result from, or can be expressed by, the mere sum of the parts, or the union of all the individual Attributes. Given the union, *each one* of the Excellencies increases, or intensifies, the action of *each one and all* of the others: so that the resultant bears no (definite) proportion to the pure sum of all the Qualities or Properties of the Substrate.

§ 8. For evidence of the existence of the law, you may take a survey of the things of creation : for, the law of, or rather to, the creature, is directly connected with the fiat of the Lawgiver. No Law-giver, no law. In Man's little world, we may behold images, or reflections in small, of that great truth ; and, in this direction, any one may verify the law to what extent he pleaseth. Nay—leaving behind the whole Animal Kingdom, and betaking ourselves, at once, to the Inorganic portion of our kosmos,—we may see, if we use our eyes aright, plentiful evidence of the prevalence of the same law,—only the law raised there to a higher—reduced here to a lower power. *Exempli gratiâ*, in chemical combinations themselves, we may see adumbrations of the higher, or wider law, which holds so remarkably in Moral matters, or in the supreme world of Mind.

§ 9. Morally speaking, then, a confluence of perfections, say the confluence of the Perfections of the Divine Mind, as these have severally been demonstrated,—the confluence, we repeat, and conjunction of Perfections is equal to—not the product of each single Attribute added to the remainder: but the conjunction itself, and any mere resultant of it, is surpassed by the far greater glory which expresses the effect of the union of the Excellencies, as each individual Excellency intensifies the action of every other one, and of all the rest. Each Attribute increaseth the action of every other, to an inexpressible pitch of intensity. From the very nature of the case, it must be so.

§ 10. Just as in a grand display of musical harmony. The harmony which is so indescribably entrancing, is not merely the amount of the different volumes of sounds, from so many instruments, and so many throats, added together—but is a something resulting somehow from that union, but not purely co-incident with it. So, in a beautiful landscape, or

painting of it, the felt beauty is not merely a collection of so many primary colours, and shades of colours of all kinds, with their various blendings, in their respective subjects of inhesion,—but it is a something, produced by, indeed, yet different from, and superadded to, the assemblage of colours, and shadings, in all their groupings.

§ 11. Thus, it is a great law of Mind, that Moral Perfections, co-existing harmoniously in the same subject, are much intensified. What, then, must be the glory of the Divine Perfections meeting and embracing each other—the multiplicity of intensifying and intensified Excellencies absorbed in the wondrous unity? That glory must be altogether unapproachable by mortal eye, or human conception. No created mind can ever see (save through the veil) that vision, and live.

§ 12. From all which, it is manifestly evident, that God the Lord, who is the Wisest of Beings, and of ineffable Moral Purity, is, necessarily, the Holiest of all.

§ 13. God the Lord, then, who is the Wisest of Beings, and of ineffable Moral Purity, is, necessarily, *the Holiest One*.

#### SCHOLIUM I.

##### THE HOLINESS AND SIN NOT ABSOLUTELY CONTRADICTORY CORRELATIVES.

§ 1. What chiefly distinguishes Holiness as an actual existent force in the absolute universe, is its contrariety to Sin, and (the effect of the contrariety) opposition thereto. The contrariety in question may indeed be said to be a distinguishing characteristic of Holiness. Yet such contrariety cannot be of the essence of the attribute, because Holiness, as result of all the other necessary attributes, is inseparable from the Divine Nature,\* and Sin appertains to but the temporal

\* Dem. above.

region. That cannot be essential to Holiness, or any fundamental Attribute of God the Lord, which had its beginning in Time, and which is, itself, but departure from, and violation of, the Nature, the Attributes, the Laws of God, the Lord, which last, again, are but the outside expression of His Nature. Unless, therefore, Sin be laid down as necessary to the system of things; if, in other words, Sin be but accident, or incidental to the essential constitution of things as existing absolutely in the universe: then Sin, as reality, cannot stand as indispensable correlate to Holiness. The necessary Holiness of God the Lord, and Sin as accomplished fact in the universe, cannot correlate each other.

§ 2, The actuality of the contrariety and opposition alluded to, together with the reason thereof, are palpable enough. Holiness is the excellency or perfection of God the Lord, resulting from the totality of His Attributes. Sin denies the perfection. Not only does Sin go contrary to the fact of the Attributes, and the resulting Holiness: Sin denies virtually the true excellence of the Holiness, and, with it, the being of all the Attributes. It may even be said, that Sin seeks to eat into (so to speak) and destroy the very throne of the Lord God, the Holy One. For Sin is not merely an inactive passive principle, flowing from a pure negation, or privation: since Sin, as concentrated source of evil in the universe, is active and virulent, and most virulent in its activity.

§ 3. Though Sin be not the correlate to Holiness, absolutely speaking, yet 'tis true that Sin, being viewed as mere pure potency, stands in unavoidable antithesis to, if not in never-ceasing conflict with, the Holiness of the Lord God. Yet the Holiness, as necessary result of the necessary Attributes, cannot be regarded as the unceasing and inevitable antagonist of the enemy, Sin. Given Sin, given ever present hatred and antagonism to Holiness: Yet, given Holiness, there does not



necessarily emerge the everlasting opposition to, and conflict with, the temporal inimical force. The one is necessarily existing: not so the other. Hence the necessity of not losing hold of a distinction so essential, and withal so important.

## SCHOLIUM II.

### THE HOLINESS AND NEVER-CEASING SIN INCOMPATIBLE.

§ 1. As Goodness and Love demand the cessation, at some point in duration, of misery, their opposite and foil;<sup>a</sup> so Holiness, the gloriousness of the Divine Existence, demands, in like manner, the cessation, at some period, of sin,—demands the entire and ceaseless cessation of all sin, moral defilement, degradation, degenerate disfigurement, of all kinds.

§ 2. Love in the Lord God, and misery in man, as end in itself, are irreconcilable. The two things, the Love of the Creator, and the purposed misery of the creature, for the misery's own sake, are absolutely, and most clearly, inconsistent with each other. They are inimical forces which by no possibility can ever coalesce anywhere in the compass of wide nature.<sup>a</sup> But not more are Love and Misery incompatible, than are Holiness and never-ceasing Sin. Not more, but less—if less be possible: as by the preceding Scholium has been made abundantly apparent.

§ 3. O Love, from beginningless sources; that suffereth long, and is kind—that never faileth; O sempiternal Love, exhaustless, Thou hast companion fit in that Holiness, which, as a consuming fire, struggles to consume the potency first, and, last, the very being of Sin. Sin, ugly and deadly excrescence upon the body of man's world—that, as a malignant cancer, eats away, bit by bit, the member it preys upon—

<sup>a</sup> Schol. III., Prop. iv., Div. III.

that, as a loathsome leprosy, gradually but too surely destroys the body it disfigures, and disgraces; has, for only possible issue, entire annihilation. Sin, devouring, devouring, is a gigantic parasite which, last of all, does away with itself.

### SCHOLIUM III.

#### THE NEGATIVE MORAL PURITY, AND THE POSITIVE HOLINESS, IN FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT.

§ 1. Having considered *Holiness* in its two-fold character—as perfect Moral Purenness, and as universal Mental Perfectionness—we are prepared to weigh the relation which the one bears to the other. Both characteristics are expressed by the same term, but it has been seen that they are distinguishable, and how much they differ, from each other. Yet, have they, in reality, a fundamental agreement? Whatever outside appearances may suggest, are those two things in radical consonance?

§ 2. What, if we perceive good reasons for coming to the conclusion, that the *Moral Purity* of the penultimate Proposition, and the universal *Holiness* of this last Proposition, do not, after all, differ in so pronounced a manner as may have been suggested by a cursory examination of that precise topic? In a word, it is our task in this place to point out that inner agreement which exists between the two things, the themes in those two Propositions.

§ 3. What, then, is entire absolute Moral Purity? It signifies, that, in no one respect, is there any, even the least, spot of impurity. What, now, does this involve? It involves, that, after a review of all the Attributes, one by one, each one is reported to be void of the slightest taint. So that, in such respect, the presence of all the Attributes is assumed, and a judgment is pronounced, declaring that all the Attri-

butes are perfect, or altogether pure; not one of them having the faintest shadow of defilement.

§ 4. It seems to follow, that the proof of *Holiness*, in this sense of the term, may rightly be called the *negative* proof.

§ 5. What, next, is *Holiness*, in the comprehensive sense; or as standing for the totality of the Divine Excellencies? It signifies the presence of all the Attributes, in all their perfection. It involves that Super-Excellency, or Excellent Glory, which is the resultant of all the individual Excellencies acting in harmonious unison, and intensifying each other in all-perfect harmony.

§ 6. May not this be said to be the *positive* aspect of the same thing: and may not the proof be denominated the *positive* proof, as contra-distinguished from the other?

§ 7. Finally, the one method declares: All the Attributes being surveyed, one by one, there is *not* the slightest taint of impurity or imperfection in any one of them all. The other declares: All the Attributes, in all their perfections, are present, and from their commingling, and intensifications, a great glory is the necessary result. Glory, indeed, so dazzling, as to be insupportable by mortal eyes.

#### EPILEGOMENON.

It need scarcely be observed, that the Attributes of this Division are, as a whole, to be reckoned as belonging to the great *Moral* group. The same Attributes, too, are members of the large *Psychical* class. But the enunciation most apposite to this place, is, that the setting forth of the *Complex* or *Compound* Attributes terminates here.

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